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Abstract
It is widely held that Martin Heidegger appropriated several existential
concepts from Søren Kierkegaard in his 1927 work, Being and Time. Most scholars
agree that Heidegger did not sufficiently credit Kierkegaard. What was the extent
of the appropriation, and why did Heidegger not duly cite Kierkegaard? This work
will focus on the concept of anxiety which appears throughout Being and Time and
which was influenced by the concept of the same name presented in Kierkegaard’s
1844 work The Concept of Anxiety. It will also be seen how the structure of
Being and Time closely resembles that of Concept of Anxiety given that the first
halves of both works focus on aspects of physical existence while the second halves
concern temporal existence. Anxiety will serve as a starting point that will also
connect Heidegger to Kierkegaard on related concepts such as Heidegger’s concept
of “fallenness” to Kierkegaard’s “objective sin,” and the concepts of “repetition”
and “the moment” that appear in both works. Historical background concerning
Heidegger’s early academic career will also be given in order to gain insight on how
Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard’s thought and why Heidegger was reluctant
to disclose this influence. It will be shown that while the background contexts of
Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety differ greatly, the concept of anxiety is
functionally similar between the two works.
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Introduction
It is generally accepted that Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was influenced
by Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) in his magnum opus Being and Time (1927).
Scholars and commentators range widely on how much influence took place. Some
believe that even though the influence is identifiable, it is slight and Kierkegaard’s
ideas only served as seeds for ideas that Heidegger developed in a different context.
Others claim that Kierkegaard’s ideas appear practically verbatim in Being and
Time without due acknowledgment, and that this amounts to plagiarism. The
latter view is supported by the fact that Heidegger only minimally acknowledged
Kierkegaard in Being and Time, and never stated explicitly that the latter had any
influence on his thought. Why was this the case? It is thought that Heidegger was
attempting to distance himself from the thought of Kierkegaard, who happened to
be in vogue at the time Heidegger was teaching at Freiburg and Marburg. Another
reason might have stemmed from Heidegger’s larger project of separating theology
and metaphysics from philosophy. Since Kierkegaard was viewed as a theologian,
Heidegger did not want to appear to be influenced by him. Regardless, the problem
remains: how much influence did Kierkegaard’s writings have upon Heidegger in
Being and Time? Is it valid to assume that Heidegger simply appropriated several
of Kierkegaard’s concepts without credit to the latter? I will side with those that
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believe Heidegger did indeed appropriate several Kierkegaardian themes in Being and
Time without enough acknowledgment. I will be focusing on the concept of anxiety
and related themes that Kierkegaard laid out in his 1844 pseudonymous work, The
Concept of Anxiety. I will show that these themes are present and recognizable
and often have a similar function in Being and Time. I will not however, claim
that there is an exact identity between how the themes are presented in Concept of
Anxiety and Being and Time. The former is a work of psychology (according to
the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis), and the latter concerns “the question of the
meaning of Being.” The fields that these works propound to belong dictate the roles
that the ideas within them play. Sometimes anxiety and related themes function in
a similar way between the two works, but there are times when they do not. I will
point out these similarities and differences. From the textual evidence I will point
out, it will become apparent that Being and Time was significantly influenced by
Concept of Anxiety. In addition, from the historical context provided on Heidegger’s
early academic career in Chapter 1, it will be clearer why Heidegger appropriated
themes from Kierkegaard without due acknowledgement.
Why Anxiety?
Anxiety is commonly seen as the primary locus of the the
Kierkegaard/Heidegger connection. This is due to the oft-cited feature in
the Kierkegaard and Heidegger definitions that anxiety is the “fear of nothing.”
This shared characteristic of anxiety is played up in commentaries as the central
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essential attribute of anxiety common between the concepts of the two men. I will
show that there are several other attributes of anxiety that are equally if not more
important than the “fear of nothing” attribute, and in these areas there is sometimes
a considerable difference between the concepts. The differences have to do mainly
with how Heidegger emphasizes “Being-in-the-world” in the first half of Being and
Time, versus Kierkegaard emphasizing physical embodiment in the first half of
Concept of Anxiety; as well as how Heidegger operates within finite temporality in
the second half of Being and Time while Kierkegaard is focused on the eternal in
the second half of Concept of Anxiety. I will show that this parallel structure of the
development of the concept of anxiety is the most prominent “missed appropriation”
in the literature concerning the Heidegger/Kierkegaard connection to date.
An example of another attribute of anxiety common to both is that it is
associated with the Fall of Adam. In Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety, anxiety is
directly connected with “hereditary sin.” In Being and Time, Heidegger precedes
his discussion of anxiety with a description of his concept of “falling.” He claims
that falling has nothing to do with the Judeo-Christian idea of the fall or original
sin. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how this point has also caused some
commentators to posit a strong connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger with
regards to anxiety. It will become apparent that even though certain attributes
of anxiety are shared, these attributes appear in different contexts and may have
different ends. This work will trace the appearances and contexts of anxiety and
related themes in Being and Time and compare those to Kierkegaard’s articulation
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of anxiety as put forth primarily in Concept of Anxiety. Any of Heidegger’s or
Kierkegaard’s themes which are essential or prior to an understanding of their
concepts of anxiety will be examined as well.
In this work I will be following Dan Magurshak’s view1 that the theme of
anxiety bears the most fruit in the putative Heidegger/Kierkegaard connection in
Being and Time, and that Concept of Anxiety is the best place to look at the
shared concept. Anxiety will serve as a starting point that will further connect
Heidegger and Kierkegaard on several related themes such as authenticity, guilt, and
temporality. While I concur with Magurshak’s assessment that Concept of Anxiety
is the “…cornerstone of the relationship between the two thinkers,”2 I disagree with
Vincent McCarthy’s more extreme statement that “…in Being and Time, Heidegger
followed Kierkegaard nearly step-by-step in the exposition and exploration of
anxiety.”3 The vagueness of “nearly” is at question here. I agree there is a parallel
structure between the development of anxiety in Concept of Anxiety and Being and
Time, but to say the latter follows the former step-by-step is an overstatement.
The other chief reason for focusing on anxiety and specifically looking at
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety has to do with the three footnotes in Being
1 Dan Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger
Relationship,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Concept of Anxiety, ed. Robert
L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), 165.
2 Ibid., 191.
3 Vincent McCarthy, “Heidegger: Kierkegaard’s Influence Hidden and In Full View,” in
Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. Jon Stewart (Farnham, Surrey; Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2011), 106.
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and Time in which Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard, albeit in a somewhat
backhanded way. In the first two footnotes Concept of Anxiety is directly mentioned.
In the third footnote, Kierkegaard’s temporal concept of “the instant” is referred
to, and although this concept appears in a few of Kierkegaard’s works, it is in
Concept of Anxiety where the concept is is laid out in full, and not surprisingly, it is
intimately related to anxiety.
The Approach of the Current Work
This work will follow the appearance, development, and the major themes
connected to anxiety in the texts of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety. While
this may not seem like the most exciting way to proceed, and indeed at times
may verge on being ponderous, I believe it is the only way to thoroughly elucidate
Heidegger’s putative appropriation of anxiety and related themes from Kierkegaard,
and it is work that has not been done thoroughly in the literature to this point. For
the most part I will proceed seriatim through the primary texts. This is necessary
not only to follow the argument in each work, but also to show the parallel structure
of the development of anxiety between the two works. I will rely very little on
secondary texts and commentaries. The exception to this will be in Chapter 1, where
I focus on Heidegger’s encounter with Kierkegaard’s texts early in his teaching career
before 1927 when Being and Time was published. Here I will be working primarily
out of historical monographs on Heidegger by Van Buren, Kisiel, and Sheehan. I
will also refer to several articles on the Kierkegaard/Heidegger connection, first and
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foremost Dan Magurshak’s 1985 article on the importance of Concept of Anxiety in
this connection. I dedicate two chapters to Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety
respectively because I have found a mirrored structure between the development of
anxiety between Divisions One and Two of Being and Time with Chapters I-II and
III-V of Concept of Anxiety respectively. I believe this finding to be novel, as I have
not seen evidence of recognition of this common structure in the literature.
It is my hope that by focusing very closely on small areas of the primary
texts, in some cases just a phrase or even a particular word, that the connection
between Heidegger and Kierkegaard will be clarified in a way that has not yet been
seen. This exegetical approach may seem labored at times, but it is my impression
that too many commentaries have parroted previous opinions and inundated this
particular subject with “glosses of glosses.” Some commentaries are colored by the
particular author’s judgment of Heidegger’s later political activities and seem to
be looking for more evidence of his flawed character. This work will steer clear of
passing judgment on Heidegger’s personal or political scruples.
A difficulty arises when examining a particular theme such as anxiety
common to both thinkers: it becomes readily apparent how the theme in question
is connected to other themes, and before long the issue of having to explain the
greater part of Being and Time or of Concept of Anxiety becomes an issue. As much
as either man (especially Kierkegaard) might balk at having their work viewed as a
“system,” none of the themes explored here can be considered “standalone.” They
are intertwined in a web that connects to other themes which may or may not be
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common to the other thinker. This is perhaps more true of Heidegger, since he is
the more systematic of the two. Because of this we are aided by the fact that for
the most part he defines his terms, although these definitions rely on other terms
that must then be defined, etc. This is less the case with Kierkegaard, as will be
discussed in Chapter 1. He rarely provides a single clear definition, which may be a
purposeful part of his style.
With anxiety in particular it is impossible to merely skip around in the
primary texts where anxiety appears without also expositing related themes such
as spirit, sin, temporality, death, and care. The need to unravel these related
and dependent themes is necessary, and the danger of having to explain a large
portion of each man’s work becomes a reality. While it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to be a short course on Kierkegaard or Heidegger, some in-depth
analysis of disparate areas of their work will at times be necessary. This perceived
“danger” may prove to be a useful way of proceeding however, since it will serve
to uncover fundamental similarities or differences on how a concept is used by
providing context that in turn may differ or bear similarity to the background in
which it is set by the other thinker. If the context differs greatly, then the concept in
question can also be considered to differ. Because the present work cannot explain
everything about Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time, especially the latter, it
will have to be assumed that the reader has a basic level of familiarity with the
two works. Since Being and Time is a much larger work in length and scope this
assumption will apply more on that side.
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This work will utilize Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s texts directly as much
as possible. For Heidegger, the 1962 Macquarrie and Robinson translation of
Being and Time will be used, and on the Kierkegaard side the latest 2014 Alastair
Hannay translation of Concept of Anxiety will be used. Also, in Chapter 5 the
1983 Hong translation of Repetition will be referenced. Unless otherwise noted,
in quotations any text emphasis, capitalizations, or spellings will be as they
appear in the translations of the works cited. In the original texts in German and
Danish, both authors, especially Heidegger, made liberal use of the « » symbols
to denote emphasis. Word capitalization is more of issue in Being and Time. An
important example of this is how Macquarrie and Robinson (and many Heidegger
commentators) capitalize Being when referring to the ontological concept (Sein)
and use lowercase being when referring to particular (ontical) entities or beings
(Seiendes). In Chapter 1, some of Heidegger’s lectures and letters pre-dating Being
and Time will be examined, to show how he was aware of Kierkegaard’s works and
of their influence at Freiburg and Marburg and where he was teaching at the time.
At times a German or Danish translation of a word or short phrase will be given. It
will be assumed that the reader has some familiarity with German and less or none
with Danish. Since the two languages share many cognates, the Danish term will be
given so that the German reader may benefit by seeing the resemblance.
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Where to Place this Work
There are a plethora of general commentaries on Being and Time, and
relatively few on Concept of Anxiety. It is not my hope for this work to be counted
among these. My goal is to focus on the similarities and differences in anxiety and
the dependent themes in these two works and not to stray into unrelated territory.
However, since Concept of Anxiety centers on anxiety, my Chapters IV and V may
come close to resembling a more general commentary on that work.
Since Heidegger is a controversial figure in twentieth century Western
philosophy, it is worth considering where the current work might fit in the
conservative-liberal spectrum of Heidegger scholarship. Thomas Sheehan delineates
four gradations along this spectrum: the ultra-orthodox, the orthodox, the liberal
assimilationists, and the rejectionists.4 The ultra-orthodox is the most conservative
and unapologetic school, represented by the journal Heidegger Studies and the
Heidegger-Gesellschaft. The orthodox position is “dedicated to getting Heidegger
right” and emphasizes the historical/exegetical approach exemplified in the work
of Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren. The liberal-assimilationists engage
Heidegger with other contemporary philosophers, e.g. Derrida, Levinas, and Hubert
Dreyfus. The rejectionist school are the “Heideggerian’s against Heidegger,” and
are motivated by his National Socialist party membership and John D. Caputo’s
4 Thomas Sheehan, “A paradigm shift in Heidegger research,” Continental Philosophy Review 34
(2001): 184–185.
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1993 book Demythologizing Heidegger. The current work, with its emphasis on close
textual analysis could presume to be placed in the orthodox school, but since it
also acknowledges contemporary works and is in dialogue with another—although
historical rather than contemporary—philosopher, i.e. Kierkegaard, it could be seen
as assimilationist. While I deplore the idea of Heidegger’s Nazi involvements, I do
not see this as cause to reject his work wholesale, especially Being and Time, which
was completed well before January 30, 1933.
Western philosophy has a rich tradition of men appropriating from their
predecessors. Starting with Plato appropriating from Pythagoras. This was
particularly common in in German Idealism, e.g., Fichte from Kant, and Schelling
from Hegel. Why then is the Heidegger’s appropriation of Kierkegaardian concepts
deemed as being controversial? Some commentators point to Heidegger’s alleged
appropriation of Kierkegaardian themes to serve as yet another example of
Heidegger’s flawed character. There was certainly a kind of appropriation that
occurred, but it must be remembered that the concepts in question did not
originate with Kierkegaard nor terminate with Heidegger. There was certainly much
appropriation of both Heidegger and Kierkegaard in Sartre’s 1943 work Being and
Nothingness, although Sartre was far better than Heidegger about acknowledging his
influences. Anxiety in particular, especially in the Christian context, was described
by Augustine in his Confessions and is essential to Luther’s idea of Anfechtungen
in his works. Both Kierkegaard and Heidegger were obviously influenced by their
predecessors in the long history of western philosophy and theology, so to say that
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Heidegger’s appropriation of anxiety was only from Kierkegaard is presumptive.
Nevertheless, as we will see there is a considerable amount of resemblance between
the concepts of anxiety and related themes between Being and Time and Concept of
Anxiety. Anxiety will be seen to generally function in a similar way in the two works,
although the contexts, mainly in terms of embodiment and temporality, differ.
Before we continue it is worth considering the first two words of the title of
this work: “Missed Appropriations.” I intentionally did not use “missappropriations”
since that would indicate that Heidegger was wrong or incorrect in the way he
used Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety and related themes in Being and Time.
My aim in using “missed appropriations” is to see it in two senses: the first and
more obvious sense is that there are things which Heidegger appropriated from
Kierkegaard that have been missed by scholars to this point; the second sense is
that Heidegger himself “missed” certain aspects of Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety
and thus his version of anxiety and related themes is lacking when compared to
that of Kierkegaard. If that is the case, can Kierkegaard’s version of anxiety be
thought of as being more complete and Heidegger’s version as merely a derivative?
As indicated by the remainder of the title, the bulk of this work will be dedicated to
elucidating the first sense of missed appropriations, the aspects and themes related
to anxiety that have been missing in the literature to this point. By the end of this
work we will have accrued enough textual evidence to see that the second sense of
missed appropriations also bears out. By looking at both senses we will target two
issues: 1) The degree to which Heidegger appropriated from Kierkegaard, i.e., was it
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tantamount to plagiarism on Heidegger’s part or was it merely a case of him being
loosely influenced by Kierkegaard? 2) Can Kierkegaard finally be “freed” from the
designation sometimes given to him as the philosopher that influenced Heidegger in
Being and Time?
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Chapter I: Propaedeutics
There are several general preliminary topics that should be examined before
we look more specifically at the concept of anxiety. The bulk of this chapter will be
dedicated to a historical background of Heidegger’s early career emphasizing how
he encountered Kierkegaard while teaching at Freiburg and Marburg. We will also
look at how Heidegger categorized theology as a science, since this will be a point of
relation to Kierkegaard. We will then look at the issue of commensurability between
Heidegger’s ontology and Kierkegaard’s theology. We will then shift to Concept
of Anxiety, and the difficulties presented in its interpretation. Finally, before we
delve into Division One of Being and Time, we will look briefly at current common
notions of anxiety.
Heidegger Preliminaries
A brief biographical sketch of Heidegger prior to 1927 is necessary here to
accentuate his religious upbringing and penchant for theological studies. Heidegger
was born in Messkirch, a small town in the Black Forest region of southern
Germany in 1889. His father was the sexton of a local Catholic church. Young
Martin attended a Catholic boarding school and was on track for clerical studies.
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Heidegger’s interest in philosophy begins at age seventeen he is given a copy of
Franz Brentano’s Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles
(“On the Manifold Meaning of Being According to Aristotle”) by a mentor at
Berthold-Gymnasium in Freiburg. He was deeply affected by this book, which he
read over the summer break of 1906. He entered the noviate with the Jesuits in
1909, but was discharged in October of that year with heart problems. From the
end of 1909–1911 he studied theology at Freiburg. His Catholic training ended at
that point and be began studies in philosophy, humanities, and natural sciences at
Freiburg. According to Van Buren, his first encounter with Kierkegaard’s works
is in 1911, although which works he read is not known.1 In 1913 he received his
doctorate, with a thesis titled “The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism.” In 1915
he received his habilitation and title of Dozent with his dissertation “Duns Scotus’s
Doctrine of Categories and Meaning.” From 1915–1918 he was in the army, but never
saw combat in World War I. His duties while in the army included postal censorship
and meteorology. He married Elfride Petri (a Protestant) in 1917. Their first son,
Jörg is born in 1919, and their second, Hermann in 1920. In 1919 Heidegger breaks
with Catholicism. From 1918–1923 he is a Privatdozent and assistant to Edmund
Husserl. His friendship with Karl Jaspers begins in 1920. In 1923 he is appointed to
Marburg. This is also the year that he is known to have read some of Kierekegaard’s
edifying writings, “The Anxieties of the Heathen” and “The Lilies of the Field and
1 John Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1994), 150.
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the Birds of the Air”2. In 1927, Being and Time is published, and in 1928 Heidegger
succeeds Husserl at Freiburg.
Heidegger’s status as a Christian has been a subject of speculation, however it
is clear that he was “thrown”3 into a conservative Catholic family and community. It
is also clear that in his youth he intended to become a Catholic cleric. Even though
that plan did not pan out, he pursued education as a theologian before turning to
philosophy and phenomenology. How much did his youth and early academic career
affect his thought and and writings? I would contend that his religious upbringing
was in some ways underlying his thought, and was still influencing him even as a
man of thirty-eight years when Being and Time was published.
Heidegger and Jaspers
As far as his exposure to Kierkegaard is concerned, this is believed to have
occurred mainly in the period of his friendship and correspondence with Karl
Jaspers (1883–1969). They were academic colleagues during the 1920s and mutually
influenced one another’s philosophical positions and both highly critical of one
another’s work. Heidegger and Jaspers were working amidst the dominance of
neo-Kantianism in the philosophy departments at German universities during that
time. They were both reacting against it, Heidegger perhaps more so than Jaspers.
Both men had a shared appreciation of Kierkegaard, but it took them in different
2 Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 171–172.
3 “Thrownness” will be covered in depth in Chapter 2.
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directions. “ ‘We also shared a passion for Kierkegaard,’ wrote Jaspers about his
visits with Heidegger from 1920 onward.”4
From 1919–21, Heidegger was working on a review essay titled Anmerkungen
zu Karl Jasper’s Pyschologie der Weltanschauungen (Comments on Karl Jaspers’
Psychology of Worldviews), which Van Buren believes he used as an occasion to
reflect on rethinking ontology via Jasper’s reading of Kierkegaard.5 In this review,
Heidegger acknowledges Kierkegaard’s methodological rigor:
Concerning Kierkegaard, we should point out that such a heightened
consciousness of methodological rigor as his has rarely been achieved in
philosophy or theology… One loses sight of nothing less than the most
important aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought when one overlooks this
consciousness of method, or when one’s treatment of it takes it to be of
secondary importance.6
This is high praise indeed for Kierkegaard. It is a markedly different tone than
Heidegger takes toward Kierkegaard in the footnotes of Being and Time. Although
it is a little odd: Kierkegaard is not particularly well known for his methodological
rigor, if that means being rigorously systematic. Perhaps Heidegger is simply
admiring the novelty of Kierkegaard’s methods and his tenacity for sticking to his
methods. We could assume these methods include those of indirect communication
and the use of pseudonyms. Van Buren contends that Kierkegaard’s influence on
Heidegger was filtered through Jaspers’ interpretations:
4 Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 150.
5 Ibid., 155.
6 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William MacNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. press,
1998), 36.
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Heidegger’s initial reception of Kierkegaard came through his 1919–21
review-essay of Jasper’s book… and in the following years he continued to rely
heavily on Jasper’s detailed expositions here of such Kierkegaardian concepts
as Existenz…‘the individual,’ ‘subjective truth,’ ‘passion,’ ‘anxiety,’ ‘death,’
‘dispersion,’ ‘curiosity,’ ‘being closed off,’ ‘conscience,’ ‘guilt,’ ‘becoming
manifest,’ ‘indirect communication,’ ‘time,’ and the moment (Augenblick).7
Of this list of concepts, in the current work we will be focusing of course on anxiety,
but will also be examining concepts of the individual, death, conscience, guilt, and
the moment.
Quoting Kierkegaard
As an example of Kierkegaard’s influence in Heidegger’s early teaching career
at Freiburg, an instance of Heidegger quoting Kierkegaard’s works can be given.
Heidegger quotes Kierkegaard directly in the notes to his first Aristotle lecture
course at Freiburg, Winter Semester 1921. On a page with the heading “Motto and
Grateful Indication of Sources” there are two Kierkegaard citations.8 The first is
from Kierkegaard’s Training in Christianity, published in 1850 under the pseudonym
Anti-Climacus—the same pseudonym responsible for 1849 work, The Sickness Unto
Death—it reads,
…philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. Instead of
admitting this and so directing (individual human beings) to the ethical, the
religious, the existential, philosophy has created the illusion that human
7 Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 170.
8 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 61: Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu
Aristoteles, Einfuhrung in die phanomenologische Forschung (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994),
182.
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beings could, as one prosaically says, speculate themselves out of their own
good skin and into pure light.9
The second quote is from Kierkegaard’s 1843 work Either/Or (as the pseudonym
Victor Eremita): “But what philosophy and the philosopher find difficult is
stopping…(Stopping at the genuine beginning!)”10 These two quotes highlight
Heidegger’s agreement with Kierkegaard’s opinion of how philosophy is frivolous and
misguided. The first quote indicates that Heidegger concurs with Kierkegaard that
the ethical, religious, and existential are superior categories to philosophy. With
Kierkegaard’s use of the word “speculate” we can assume that he is referring for the
most part to Hegel. In the second quote Kierkegaard is ridiculing the garrulous
nature of philosophers. Heidegger also agrees that philosophy fails to start at the
beginning. Part of his ethos as a philosopher is to return to the these primordial
beginnings.
Theologian or Philosopher?
In order to again emphasize the theological side of Heidegger, and thus his
possible sympathy towards Kierkegaard, we will explore how he viewed himself in
terms of being a theologian or a philosopher. Heidegger may have viewed his project
as akin to that of Luther. Where Luther was trying to free Christianity from the
grips of scholasticism, Heidegger was trying to free philosophy from the grips of
9 Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse Which “Accompanied”
It, 1st ed., trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 83.
10 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. Walter Lowrie, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1972), 38.
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Aristotelian metaphysics and Neo-Kantiansim. Kierkegaard also wrote in this spirit,
trying to free philosophy from Hegelianism and theology from dogmatism. As Kisiel
notes,
…the young Heidegger saw himself… as a kind of philosophical Luther of
Western metaphysics… Heidegger modeled his project on Kierkegaard and
especially on Luther’s destruction, from which he derived his odd
philosophical term ‘destruction.’ 11
In his 1919/1920 lecture course entitled “The Basic Problems of Phenomenology”
Heidegger outlines his views concerning how scholasticism corrupted Christianity.
Here he points to certain points in history when certain figures allowed the
“Christian achievement” to reassert itself:
…the ancient Christian achievement was distorted and buried through the
infiltration of classical science into Christianity. From time to time it
reasserted itself in violent eruptions (as in Augustine, in Luther, in
Kierkegaard).12
Here he classes Kierkegaard amongst the greatest theologians as one of those who
was able to restore the original “Christian achievement.”
In Freiburg in the early 1920s while Heidegger was working as Husserl’s senior
assistant it is clear that he viewed himself more as theologian than as philosopher
or even as a phenomenologist. Heidegger taught two religion courses in the 1921 at
Freiburg: “Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion” in the winter semester, and
“Augustine and Neoplatonism” in the spring semester. These two courses exemplify
11 Theodore Kisiel, Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1994), 171–172.
12 Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, Band 58: Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20)
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2010), 205.
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Heidegger’s attempts towards a phenomenology of religion. After he taught the
spring semester course in a letter to his student and friend Karl Löwith, Heidegger
reveals his orientation toward theology, where he states that it is fact of his life:
I work concretely factically out of my ‘I am,’ out of my intellectual and
wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me
from these as a vital experience in which I live…To this facticity of mine
belongs what I would in brief call the fact that I am a ‘Christian
theologian.’ 13
It may come as a surprise that Heidegger actually writes to his friends in a style
similar to that in Being and Time. The above is his obtuse way of telling Löwith
that he views himself as a Christian theologian. In the original letter, Heidegger
emphasized -logian. By doing this, Kisiel believes that Heidegger was pointing to
the philosophical foundations of theology, specifically the phenomenology of religious
life. Kisiel further notes that Heidegger believed that philosophy and theology had
been deeply intertwined in a history “…in which philosophy (Greek, scholastic,
modern) had contributed to a degeneration of the original Christian experience while
at the same time nourishing itself from that experience.”14 Heidegger also thought
that Christianity needed repeated renewal, which occurred through figures such as
Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard.15 We see this theme again in a transcription
of a theological discussion that Heidegger participated in in 1923: “…it is the true
task of theology, which must be discovered again, to find the world that is able
13 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Paperback ed. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), 78.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 101.
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to call one to faith and to preserve one in faith.”16 Here Heidegger emphasizes
the idea that theology is something that has been corrupted, and that there is a
“world” of true theology that must be rediscovered, freed from the ossifications of
Aristotelean/Thomistic interpretations. In his Summer 1925 course, again along
these lines he says, “Theology is seeking a more original interpretation of the being
of the human being toward God, prescribed from the meaning of faith and remaining
within it.”17 We see from the above that Heidegger believed vehemently in the fact
that Christianity had lost sight of its original meaning. His thrust is that there
must be a restoration of the primordial Christian experience. He also believed that
Kierkegaard was engaged in a similar task.
Heidegger also admires Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the fact that modern
Christianity is “too easy.” This view is expounded by Kierkegaard particularly in
Fear and Trembling (1843) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). Caputo
writes,
Home fresh from the war, the young philosopher was very much taken with
Kierkegaard’s sense that Christianity has not been brought into the world in
order to comfort us in our old age and allow us to sleep at night. Christianity
had to do with the terror of Abraham and the battle of the night of faith.18
16 Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 154.
17 Ibid.
18 John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger., Indiana series in the philosophy of religion
(Indiana University Press, 1993), 61–62.
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Kisiel confirms this view: “Heidegger loved the rhetoric of vigor and robustness,
of the ‘difficulty of life.’ ”19 This sentiment is not particularly apparent in Being
and Time, indeed the only time the theme of “passion” arises is in the context of
his concept of Being-towards-death. However, we will see Kierkegaard’s version of
“terror” in Concept of Anxiety.
Even though Heidegger viewed himself as a “theologian” in the early 1920s,
there is also evidence that indicates he was at times frustrated with being labelled
as such. In another letter to Löwith, Heidegger indicates dissatisfaction with
being assigned to the position of philosopher of religion by Husserl. He viewed
this assignment “…with great reluctance, and even antipathy.” He expresses his
annoyance to Löwith, “I myself am no longer even regarded as a ‘philosopher’, I am
‘still really a theologian’.”20 Here it is apparent that Heidegger believed “philosopher”
had a higher status than theologian. He seems to have wanted to be both philosopher
and theologian, which does not seem like too much of a stretch, but apparently
in the German university structure this was difficult. Nevertheless, apparently he
attempted as much in his courses, whether or not they were philosophy courses or
religion courses:
The phenomenologist of religion was also an ontologist, the ontologist also a
theologian. In his philosophy courses he talked about theology, and his
religion courses he talked about philosophy. There was a particular
back-and-forth, cross-fertilizing movement in his youthful thought between
19 Kisiel, Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, 328–329.
20 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 150.
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religion and ontology, such that each was supposed to make the other
possible.21
Van Buren continues describing Heidegger’s desire to have it both ways:
Heidegger thought that he could simultaneously be both an ontological and
theological thinker… since the conceptual basis of theology had after all been
provided originally by Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, theological
reform presupposed philosophical reform.22
Here again is the thesis that Heidegger viewed himself as Luther’s analogue, trying
to reform theology by stripping it of flawed metaphysical thinking.
Part of his frustration at being labeled a theologian or at best, a philosopher
of religion may have been due to the new found popularity of Kierkegaard at the
time in Freiburg. Heidegger apparently bore some animosity towards students
who wanted to study Kierkegaard with him, mainly because these students were
typically not well prepared and unable to keep up, as Kisiel notes, “He complains
about the poor theological grounding of his seminar students, who nevertheless
want to study Kierkegaard or Descartes with him.”23 For Heidegger, Kierkegaard
was a theologian, or at least could only be talked about in theological terms, as
he states in correspondence with Löwith: “Kierkegaard can be truly exposed only
theologically.”24
21 Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, 150–151.
22 Ibid., 153.
23 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 150.
24 Ibid.
23
Heidegger found that the students who were interested in Kierkegaard rarely
brought anything of substance to seminar discussions. This frustrates Heidegger
to the point of causing him to cancel a planned seminar in the phenomenology of
religion. He writes about this in letter to Löwith. He first complains about being
identified with Kierkegaard. He claims that his thought has been mistakenly taken
as Kierkegaardian:
What is of importance in Kierkegaard must be appropriated anew, but in a
strict critique that grows out of our own situation. Blind appropriation is the
greatest seduction… Not everyone who talks of ‘existence’ has to be a
Kierkegaardian. My approaches have already been misinterpreted in this
way. But I at least want something else… namely, what I vitally experience
as ‘necessary’ in today’s factic situation…25
Here is evidence of a key point of my thesis, that Martin Heidegger did actively and
knowingly appropriate the thought of Søren Kierkegaard. I qualify this however: this
letter was dated September 1920, long before the publication of Being and Time
in 1927, and was in the context of his teaching career. He himself qualifies the
appropriation, saying that it must not be a “blind appropriation.” Appropriating
Kierkegaard’s thought is only valid as it applies to the situation in 1920s Germany.
He acknowledges that the circumstances of his place and time are different than
those of Kierkegaard, and that simply appropriating Kierkegaard’s thought at face
value would contradict his belief that philosophy and theology are only useful as
they apply to the current, concrete, spatiotemporal situation.
25 Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, eds., Becoming Heidegger on the Trail of His Early
Occasional Writings, 1910 - 1927 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 98.
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He then turns to the frustrations of his unfulfilling experience in teaching
phenomenology of religion: “…I myself want to learn something in my seminars, by
way of objections and difficulties, which are posed with the necessary acuity only
when the participants are equal to the matter at hand…”26 The students he has been
getting in these seminars—those wanting to study Kierkegaard—have not been up
to the task of providing enough of a challenge to Heidegger. He decides to cancel
the upcoming seminar because, “…all that would come of it is the kind of babble in
the philosophy of religion that I want to eliminate from philosophy, this talk about
the religious that is familiar to us from reference works.”27 Here it appears that he is
associating Kierkegaard’s thought with the “babble” in the philosophy of religion.
So at one point in this letter to Löwith, Heidegger is recognizing the value in
appropriating Kierkegaard’s thought for his own time, but then just a few sentences
later laments how the students wanting to study Kierkegaard are only superficially
interested in his thought, what could easily be gained from “reference works” and
are not up to the challenge of applying Kierkegaard’s thought to the situation of
their own time.
At some point, anyone engaged in pedagogy has experienced a degree of
Heidegger’s frustration with ill-prepared students. Heidegger takes it to the point of
not bringing up Kierkegaard or using terminology that might evoke Kierkegaardian
themes in his classes. Kisiel notes how this avoidance began in the summer of 1923
26 Kisiel and Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger on the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910 -
1927, 98.
27 Ibid.
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and lasted through 1927: “He thus establishes a pattern, which lasts until the
very last draft of Being and Time, of diligently avoiding existentialist terminology
in public… he is apparently still wary of the modishness of ‘Kierkegaardism’ at
this time.”28 The modishness of Kierkegaard was also present in Marburg when
Heidegger arrived there in 1923:
Why this diligent evasion of the vocabulary Heidegger began to develop in
his early Freiburg period and which will eventually inundate Being and Time
itself? The reasons are obscure, but one reason can be gleaned from
Heidegger’s correspondence at this time is a strong aversion, which he
apparently developed upon first arriving in Lutheran Marburg, to the
‘Kierkegaardism’ then en vogue in theological circles.29
Apparently Heidegger could not escape Kierkegaardism even with his move to
Marburg, so he continues to be a “non-Kierkegaardist,” at least publicly. Although,
as Kisiel notes, the existentialist and Kierkegaardian vocabulary again appears full
force in Being and Time.
Theology as a Science
We will change focus slightly to look at how Heidegger classifies theology
in the realm of academic and scientific categories. This will be important later
when we look at Kierkegaard’s discussion of the sciences of psychology, ethics,
and dogmatics. It will also shed more light on Heidegger’s views on theology and
specifically the relationship between philosophy and theology that he had at the
28 Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 275.
29 Ibid., 316.
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time of the writing of Being and Time. He wrote the following in his 1927 lecture
entitled “Phenomenology and Theology,” comparing the philosophy and theology:
Philosophy is that interpretation of the world and of life that is removed
from revelation and free from faith. Theology, on the other hand, is the
expression of the creedal understanding of the world and of life—in our case
a Christian understanding.30
There is nothing too controversial here, he is simply stating that philosophy is a
secular way of describing our world and our role in it. This contrasts with theology,
which may also describe our world and our place, but through the lens of Christian
belief. He sees relationship between philosophy and theology as “a question about
the relationship of two sciences.”31 Because he classifies philosophy and theology as
sciences, it is necessary to understand what he believes a science to be. He presents
this definition of science in his 1927 lecture:
We offer only as a guide the following formal definition of science: science is
the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of disclosure, of a self-contained
region of beings, or of being. Every region of objects, according to its subject
matter and the mode of being its objects, has its own mode of possible
disclosure, evidence, founding, and its own conceptual formation of the
knowledge thus arising…32
This is essentially the same definition of science that he gives in Being and Time.
Without delving into Heidegger’s idea of “disclosure” at this point, some further
explanation of his definition of science is needed. He envisions each science as
self-contained sphere of knowledge or disclosure, with well defined boundaries. Each
30 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 40.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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science has its particular subject realm and each science has its own methodologies
for managing and incorporating new disclosures or discoveries. He then delineates
the two types of sciences: “…there are two basic possibilities of science: sciences of
beings, of whatever is, or ontic sciences; and the science of being, the ontological
science, philosophy.”33 The former type are what we would typically call the sciences,
e.g., physics, biology, medicine, etc. These are focused on entities in the world. He
uses the word “ontic” here to describe these sciences. This term will appear many
times in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work, so this will serve as its definition. The
latter type of science is ontology, the science of capital B Being itself, and what
Heidegger is engaged with in Being and Time. He presumptively calls this science
“philosophy,” even though there are many fields or “regions” within philosophy as
we know it. Here he is making a return to Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics
as πρώτη φιλοσοφία, “first philosophy” or the study of being qua being: “Hence
to investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is
generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific
parts of the science.”34 Heidegger’s definition differs from that of Aristotle in that
Aristotle divides the one science into parts which would correspond to Heidegger’s
ontic sciences.
Heidegger will go on to classify theology as an ontic “positive science.” A
positive science is that which posits: “We call the sciences of beings as given—of a
33 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 40.
34 Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, The Modern Library classics
(New York: Modern Library, 2001), 732.
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positum—positive sciences.”35 Any positive science has a relative difference with any
other positive science. Philosophy—the science of being itself—is not a positive
science, and does have a relative position to those sciences, so the difference between
it and any positive science is absolute. Since theology is a positive science, the
difference between it and philosophy is thus absolute: “Our thesis, then, is that
theology is a positive science, and as such is absolutely different from philosophy.”36
He goes as far to say that “…theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to
chemistry and mathematics than to philosophy.”37
The Commensurability Issue
As a segue from Heidegger to Kierkegaard and to further elucidate the
problem of Heidegger’s edict that ontology stands above all other sciences as
absolutely separate, we will look at the idea of commensurability, particularly
between that of Heidegger and Kierkegaard’s thought. To do this We will look at
Dan Magurshak’s 1958 article, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the
Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship.”
Magurshak begins by summarizing the status of the view of many in 1985
regarding the Kierkegaard/Heidegger relationship: “In the opinion of many, the
relationship between the thought of Søren Kierkegaard and that of Martin Heidegger
35 Heidegger, Pathmarks, 40.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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hardly needs further investigation.”38 These scholars believe that in the three
footnotes in Being and Time, Heidegger “generously acknowledges that debt.”39.
They also agree with Heidegger’s characterization of Kierkegaard as a merely
ontical thinker mired in the structure of Western metaphysics. Magurshak sees
matters differently, claiming that a close study of Kierkegaard’s works will lead to
the conclusion that the Being and Time footnotes do not adequately acknowledge
Heidegger’s debt; that Heidegger’s existential analysis is at times less fundamental
that Kierkegaard’s religious reflections; and finally that “any complete study of the
relationship between the thinkers must acknowledge the multi-leveled complexity of
that relationship”40. What then, are these multiple levels of complexity? Magurshak
is suggesting that the issue goes beyond the binary ontical/ontological distinction.
In addressing the multiple levels of complexity Magurshak raises the issue of
whether the ideas of Heidegger and Kierkegaard are “commensurable” and/or if one
of their approaches is “subordinate” to the other:
…are existential phenomenological investigations based upon a concern for
being Christian commensurable with those arising from a quest for being?
Can they be compared to and contrasted with one another on an equal
footing or must the findings of one approach inevitably be subsumed as a
subordinate, less profound portion of the other?41
38 Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger
Relationship,” 167.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 168.
41 Ibid.
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The point regarding commensurability shall be dwelt upon here because it is a useful
heuristic in understanding the Heidegger/Kierkegaard relationship. One thinker
cannot be precisely mapped on to the other because of the issue of commensurability.
The first and still widely recognized definition of commensurability is
from Euclid’s Elements, Book X, Definition 1: “Those magnitudes are said
to be commensurable which are measured by the same measure, and those
incommensurable which cannot have any common measure.”42,43 Commensurability
should not be understood as “equality,” but rather more as “compatibility.” It is
expressed simplistically in the cliché, “It’s like comparing apples and oranges.” One
quantity cannot be divided evenly by another, e.g., the circumference of a circle
cannot be divided by its radius. The irrational number π is incommensurable with
the set of rational numbers.
Something like commensurability has been used in the context of the
science vs. religion debate, manifesting in extreme form as Stephen Jay Gould’s
Non-Overlapping Magisteria (NOMA),44 where science and religion are taken to
have dominion over completely separate domains. Here, however, it is posited that
Kierkegaard and Heidegger operate in similar domains, yet that these domains may
42 Euclid, The Thirteen Books of the Elements, Vol. 3, trans. Thomas Heath (Mineola, NY:
Dover, 1956), 10.
43 The Greek for ‘commensurable’ (σύμμετρα) and ‘incommensurable’ (ἀσύμμετρα) have the
English cognates ‘symmetrical’ and ‘asymmetrical’ respectively.
44 Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), 6.
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in the end be incommensurable. There is no implication that one of the domains is
superior or inferior to the other.
It isn’t clear that Magurshak differentiates between commensurabilty and
subordination. His wording suggests that he understands commensurability to be
“equal to” and incommensurability to be “not equal to,” which is a misunderstanding
of the concept. He clearly views the domains of Heidegger and Kierkegaard as being
quite different, however:
When one explores the relationship between Kierkegaard’s thought and
Heidegger’s existential analysis one must face squarely the radical difference
between their projects. Kierkegaard reflects upon the existing individual as
capable of genuine and complete existential integrity or wholeness only
through a God-relationship based upon the belief in a divine redeemer.
Heidegger, on the other hand, thinks about human being in its distinctive
relation to the truth of being itself.45
Here, Magurshak does not posit one project as superior or inferior to the other, but
he does indicate a “radical difference,” not unlike Gould’s NOMA. Whether or not
this is the case will be explored later in the present work.
Kierkegaard Preliminaries
The Difficulty of Concept of Anxiety
Concept of Anxiety is regarded as one of Kierkegaard’s most difficult works
to understand. Gordon Marino of the St. Olaf Kierkegaard Library comments,
45 Magurshak, “The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger
Relationship,” 171.
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“The Concept of Anxiety is a maddeningly difficult book.” He continues, “In one of
the central images… anxiety is likened to dizziness. One reader of Kierkegaard has
commented that the book attempts to evoke the very dizziness that it describes.”46
That reader, Roger Poole, elaborates at length on the impenetrability of Concept
of Anxiety. He suggests that Kierkegaard deliberately takes an obstructive stance
towards his reader:
…there is something quite unusually forbidding in the style of The Concept of
Anxiety, as if the author is doing all in his power to outwit the reader, or to
make his job actually harder than it needs to be. The text generates this
sense of being against the reader rather than for him. The text labors, it
would seem, to refuse even the elements of courtesy or elementary helpfulness
to a reader who is, after all, tackling a new book on a difficult subject. In
fact, it is not very long before the reader suspects that he is being
manipulated by Vigilius Haufniensis, that he is being humiliated, forced into
a reading position where he is helpless.47
This criticism could certainly be leveled at particular writers and works of philosophy
since Kierkegaard’s time, the “later” post-Kehre Heidegger is prime example of
obscurantist style. Poole continues, emphasizing that at times Concept of Anxiety
approaches sheer nonsense:
The text pullulates with ambiguities, paradoxes, oxymorons, apparent
selfcontradictions, varieties of time and of history, types and subtypes of
explanations and clarification, and yet the effect on the reader is one of
evergrowing incomprehension. None of these terms seems to follow naturally
after the other…the terms are given multiple redefinition, so that each time a
46 Alastair Hannay, The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 308.
47 Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, Studies in religion and culture
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 85.
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key term recurs, it is put in a new context in which it cannot help but mean
a new thing.48
Many of Kierkegaard’s works are quite difficult for the reader, but Concept of
Anxiety in particular is rife with non sequiturs and contradictions. At times it reads
like a rough first draft or of stream of conscious journal entries strung together.
Part of this, is due to Kierkegaard’s attempt to ridicule and trivialize the Hegelian
dialectic, i.e., thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Kierkegaard strives to show how this
mode of thinking is insufficient to address the issues facing the existing individual.
In mimicking Hegel’s dialectical method, he frequently juxtaposes pairs of seemingly
unrelated concepts as theses-anthitheses then will reconcile them until a third
idea which does not appear to be related to the first two. Unfortunately, with
Kierkegaard’s simultaneous use and parody of Hegelian dialectic, the reader can
begin to feel like the victim of a joke.
Marino’s comment on the book jacket of Hannay’s 2014 translation of
Concept of Anxiety reads, “A book at once so profound and byzantine that it seems
to aim at evoking the very feeling it disects.” One of the issues with reading any of
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works is his pervasive use of irony, making it difficult
for any reader, including even prominent Kierkegaard scholars, to know for sure if
Kierkegaard is being serious or sarcastic. The use of irony is especially prevalent in
Concept of Anxiety. Marino readily admits, “In all honesty, I must confess that
there are many passages in The Concept of Anxiety the meaning of which completely
48 Poole, Kierkegaard, 100.
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escapes me. Worse yet, Kierkegaard scholars are silent on most of these passages.”49
In his translator’s introduction of Concept of Anxiety, Alastair Hannay cites an early
review of the work: “This book is interesting to the psychiatrist mainly because it
inadvertently presents strong evidence that the writer is a psychiatric case.”50
The other issue that must be taken into account in interpreting Kierkegaard
is his use of pseudonyms for the majority of his oeuvre. There is much scholarship
devoted to this problem, and I will not dwell on it much here. It is generally
accepted that Kierkegaard used pseudonyms as a means of implementing his
tenet of “indirect communication.” It is his tenet that truth cannot be effectively
communicated definitively and directly, but is better communicated “poetically” in
the form of parables, narratives, or by distancing the author from the audience by
using pseudonyms. Kierkegaard used ten different pseudonyms across his twelve
pseudonymous works, with two related pseudonyms being used twice: Johannes
Climacus and Anti-Climacus. In some of his works, e.g. Either/Or or Stages on
Life’s Way, the pseudonym will relate a narrative told by another person, and that
narrative will contain even further narrators and/or parables. In some cases the
reader is four or five steps removed from Kierkegaard. Trying to keep track of who
is saying what and what position Kierkegaard himself is taking on a particular issue
also contributes to the “dizzying” experience for the reader.
49 Hannay, The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 308–309.
50 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation
in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, First Edition, trans. Alastair Hannay (New
York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2014), xxx.
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The pseudonym used in Concept of Anxiety is Vigilius Haufniensis, which
translates as “the watchful Copenhagener.”51 This pseudonym is only used once
in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, and holds a special position in relation to the other
pseudonyms. This is from the appendix “A Glance at a Contemporary Effort
in Danish Literature” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript: “The Concept of
Anxiety differs essentially from the other pseudonymous works in that its form
is direct and even somewhat didactic… Perhaps the author thought that at this
point a communication of knowledge might be necessary…”52 Hannay believes that
“Anxiety’s ‘Vigilius Haufniensis’… comes closest to describing Kierkegaard as he saw
himself, as a rather special kind of writer…”53 Apparently Kierkegaard very nearly
signed the completed work as himself.54 The original draft of Concept of Anxiety
has “S. Kierkegaard” as the author.55 It is reasonable to assume that Vigilius
Haufniensis is unique among Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms: he represents a more direct
communication of Kierkegaard’s views than any of the other pseudonyms. We have
51 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, xxxiii.
52 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 269–270.
53 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, xxxiii.
54 Ibid.
55 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation
on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin., ed. Reidar Thomte (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1980), 221.
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the arduous task of opposing the meandering style of Concept of Anxiety to its
“antithesis:” Heidegger’s Kantian archtectonic style in Being and Time.
The point of going on at length here about just how difficult it is to glean
anything definite from Concept of Anxiety is not to frighten the reader of this
current work, nor to make excuses about my own interpretation of it, it is rather to
emphasize that even a thinker like Heidegger probably did not have a crystal clear
understanding of the work himself. Karl Jaspers, Heidegger’s chief interlocutor on
the work would have faced similar difficulties.
A Primer on Anxiety
Kierkegaard and Heidegger both have specific meanings for anxiety that do
not necessarily correspond to our current definition of the concept. In order to
prepare to delve into their respective concepts, it will be helpful to look at some of
our current common notions regarding anxiety. We will also look at specific current
definitions of anxiety, as well as the etymology of the word and the translation of
the German and Danish words Angst and Angest as anxiety.
We currently think of anxiety either in it’s relatively mild everyday form, as
in being anxious about an upcoming event such as a public speaking engagement,
or we think of it in in its more extreme form as a psychological disorder, i.e., one
“suffers from anxiety.” In western culture there is currently a great industry in
pharmaceuticals and self-help books centering around alleviating anxiety. In severe
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cases, anxiety can be associated with panic attacks, which present to the sufferer as
an intense and very real feeling that death or disaster is imminent.
When one is said to be “feeling anxious,” the feeling is usually directed at
a particular thing that is perceived as negative or unpleasant, e.g., “I am feeling
anxious about having the surgery.” In this sense, feeling anxious is synonymous
with worry. In most contexts, anxiety is seen as negative, however, being anxious
can also be about anticipating a positive event, e.g. “I am anxious to begin my
vacation.” The first meaning for anxiety in the OED is, “The quality or state of
being anxious; uneasiness or trouble of mind about some uncertain event; solicitude,
concern.” The fourth meaning, in the psychiatric context: “A morbid state of
mind characterized by unjustified or excessive anxiety, which may be generalized
or attached to particular situations.” The etymology is Latin anxietatem, noun of
quality from anxius, “troubled in mind.” This is further traced to angere, “to choke,
distress,” and finally to the Greek root ἄγχω (ankhō): “to compress, press tight,
esp. the throat, to strangle, throttle, choke.” The angere and ἄγχω roots are also
those of ‘anguish,’ ‘anger,’ the German Angst, and Danish angest. However, ἄγχω
is not connected with the word commonly translated as anxiety in ancient Greek:
μελέδημα (meledema), which is usually seen in context of “the cares of the gods.”
Anxiety as a concept of being generally troubled about an uncertain event is rarely
seen in ancient Greek literature of Homer, the plays of Euripides and Sophocles, or
in the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle.
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In Being and Time, Macquarrie and Robinson have obviously translated
Angst as anxiety, even though our word “angst” is the direct English cognate. They
probably chose not to leave it untranslated as the term angst is usually associated
with rebelliousness in teens coming of age, which has little to do with Heidegger’s
concept. The translation of the Danish Angest is not so straightforward. In his
highly respected 1944 translation of Concept of Anxiety (Begrebet Angest), Walter
Lowrie translated Angest as “dread.” While this is a correct translation, I believe
it has negative connotations of foreboding and doom that color the concept too
darkly and may mislead the reader. Although, as we will see, Kierkegaard’s version
of anxiety does at times seem more like dread. Nevertheless, I will always use the
more neutral term anxiety, because it is the related English cognate, and is the more
common translation.
Now that we have covered these preliminaries, namely the historical
background concerning Heidegger’s early academic career, the issue of
commensurability, the issues surrounding the difficulty in interpreting Concept of
Anxiety, and a discussion on what we consider the current definition of anxiety, we
are prepared to begin our look at anxiety and related concepts in Division One of
Being and Time.
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Chapter II: Anxiety in Division One
In order to get at Heidegger’s notion of anxiety, we will examine where
anxiety appears in Division One of Being and Time and how it is defined. As noted
earlier, anxiety is inseparably connected to several other major concepts, so those
concepts will need to be examined as well. As preparation, it will also be helpful
to define a few central concepts, namely ontology, Dasein, and Being-in-the-world.
Then, before getting to anxiety itself, we will need to understand key concepts that
are intimately related to anxiety, which are: state-of-mind, mood, thrownness, fear,
understanding, discourse, and falling. This may seem a circuitous course, but it
is necessary to show what role anxiety plays in Heidegger’s system as well as to
distinguish his version of anxiety from that of Kierkegaard.
Anxiety is introduced at a critical juncture in the work: in the last chapter of
Division One, the “Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein.” This is half way
through Being and Time, in Chapter VI entitled “Care as the Being of Dasein.” In
Chapters I—V Heidegger laid out the broad concept headings of Being-in-the-world,
the worldhood of the world, Being-with, Being-one’s-Self, Being-there, the ‘they,’
and Being-in. At this point in Chapter IV Heidegger is summarizing and preparing
to transition into Division Two, “Dasein and Temporality.” To some degree we will
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have to familiarize ourselves with the ideas of the previous chapters as well, but as
our starting point we shall look at where anxiety first appears in Being and Time.
The discussion of anxiety begins to take shape in ¶40 Anxiety as a Distinctive
Way in which Dasein is Disclosed. Just prior to this section is the first occurence of
the word “anxiety” (Angst) in Being and Time. Heidegger states, “…we shall take
the phenomenon of falling as our point of departure, and distinguish anxiety from
the kindred phenomenon of fear.”1 Thus in order to prepare for our exploration of
anxiety, we will first need a description of falling and fear. Since Heidegger then first
discusses fear we shall also look at fear first. However, before we can even begin to
look at fear, we must understand that Heidegger defines fear as a “state-of-mind.”
Another reason to fully understand what Heidegger means by state-of-mind is that
anxiety is also defined as a state-of-mind, in fact it is the most “primordial” state of
mind. Therefore we will need to back up even further to look at Heidegger’s concept
of state-of-mind. Finally, since Heidegger says that state-of-mind is “equiprimordial”
(equally fundamental) to both understanding and discourse, and since these two
concepts are also tied to anxiety, we will need to have a look at his concepts of
understanding and discourse as well. Before we can tackle any of that however, we
must get a handle on the difference between ontical and ontological and then define
Heidegger’s ubiquitous concept of Dasein.
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper, 1962), 227.
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Ontical (ontisch) is taken in contrast to ontological (ontologisch):
“Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of
the positive sciences.”2. The ontic positive sciences are the “sciences of beings” as
opposed to ontology—what Heidegger is doing in Being and Time —as the “science
of Being.” Macquarrie and Robinson note that Heidegger never explicitly defines
ontical or ontological, but that the former “is concerned primarily with entities and
the facts about them” and the latter with Being itself.3 Ontical typically has to do
with “everyday” attributes of a thing, e.g., the size, weight, and color of a hammer.
Some commentators have used “thing-ish” or “thingly” in exchange for ontical.
Dasein
Dasein is one of Heidegger’s more well-known concepts, and any encounter
with Being and Time requires an understanding of it. The first use of Dasein in
a philosophical context was in Hegel’s Science of Logic.4 The German is literally
“there-being,” Da-Sein, and is now commonly taken to mean “existence.” Heidegger
of course, has a more specific meaning in mind, and fortunately for the reader
provides a fairly succinct and clear definition of Dasein:
2 Heidegger, Being and Time, 31.
3 Ibid.
4 Stanley Rosen, The Idea of Hegel’s Science of Logic (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2014), 99.
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Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it
is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an
issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being,
and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that
Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further
that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and
that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that
with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of
Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s Being. Dasein is ontically
distinctive in that it is ontological.5
What is Dasein? For all practical purposes, Dasein is a generalized term for human
being, with the emphasis on being, i.e., being in the universal capital B sense.
Heidegger avoids using human being as this term would imply that the project of
Being and Time is merely an ontic investigation, defining human existence in the
“thingly” ways that other sciences do. Dasein is an ontological term which describes
the way in which persons are rather than what they are. At the center of the concept
of Dasein is how Dasein exists. Heidegger calls this existence “Being-in-the-world,”
and since this also an essential concept it should be explained here.
Being-in-the-world
What is “Being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein)? A large portion of Division
One of Being and Time centers on this concept and only a cursory treatment of it can
be given here. Put succinctly, Being-in-the-world is the way Dasein exists alongside
and is involved with other entities as an entity that is aware of and concerned with
its own being. Being-in-the-world is an existentiale (essential existential attribute)
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
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of Dasein. It is an a priori condition6 of Dasein’s existence. It is a “unitary
phenomenon,” as opposed to the traditional subject-object/observer-observed
duality of modern metaphysics. Dasein is fundamentally embedded in and affected
by its world. The two cannot be taken as separate.
In his analysis of Being-in-the-world, Heidegger splits off the Being-in
(In-Sein) aspect for special examination. It denotes how Dasein resides or dwells in
the world unlike the way other entities are merely “in” the world.7 Being-in is not
Dasein’s spatio-temporal location. Dasein is not in the world the way water is in a
glass. Generally speaking, “Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by some
ontical characterization”8 rather, Dasein’s Being-in is involved. Dasein’s involvement
is characterized by
…having to do with something, producing something, attending to something
and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and
letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating,
considering, discussing, determining. . . . All these ways of Being-in have
concern as their kind of being.9
Heidegger makes much of the concept of concern (Besorgen) and the related concept
of care (Sorgen). We will return to these two concepts later when we look at Division
Two. For now, we will take concern as Dasein’s “being directed toward something.”
6 Heidegger, Being and Time, 78.
7 Ibid., 80.
8 Ibid., 82.
9 Ibid.
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State-of-Mind
We are now better prepared to return to the idea that anxiety is the
primordial state-of-mind. This is how Heidegger introduces his phenomenon of
anxiety: “As a state-of-mind which will satisfy these methodological requirements,
the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis.” The methodological
requirements that this state-of-mind must fulfill are that it be “…one of the most
far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure,” and that it allows
Dasein to be “…accessible as simplified in a certain manner.”10 It is important to
dwell here on why Heidegger categorizes anxiety as a state-of-mind and how states
of mind provide “possibilities of disclosure” since this will be a significant point of
difference between his definition of anxiety and that of Kierkegaard.
What does it mean that anxiety is a state-of-mind? In non-Heideggerian
terms, this seems fairly straightforward, i.e., anxiety is a particular psychical state.
This would be an oversimplification however, since Heidegger’s definition is of course
more specific and nuanced. State-of-mind is introduced earlier in Chapter V of Being
and Time: “What we indicate ontologically by the term ‘state-of-mind’ is ontically
the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood, our Being-attuned.”11
Macquarrie and Robinson translate Befindlichkeit as the idiom state-of-mind,
10 Heidegger, Being and Time, 227.
11 Ibid., 172.
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whereas Stambaugh translates it as “attunement.”12 Some commentators translate it
as disposedness or disposition. Befindlichkeit is literally “how one finds oneself to
be.” It has the general meaning of sensitivity, feeling, or affectivity. The German for
mood is Stimmung, but Macquarrie and Robinson note that is also has the meaning
of “tuning,” as in tuning a musical instrument.
As noted in Chapter 1 of this work, Heidegger usually classifies concepts
as as either ontic or ontological. Initially it looks that he may be doing that here,
with state-of-mind as the ontological underpinning of the ontic mood, however not
too much farther along in the text he seems to be using the terms interchangeably
which confuses the issue. It would seem that if Heidegger where adhering to his
stricture of using language etymologically he would be more careful with his use of
these two terms to preserve the distinction between Befindlichkeit and Stimmung.
The former has the flavor of being a passive undirected state, while the latter is
active, directed and focused. For now we will take state-of-mind as referring to the
general background ontological state, and moods as particular instantiations of
states-of-mind in Dasein’s everyday world.
Moods are how Dasein is attuned to Being and “Dasein always has some
mood.”13 There is never an absence of mood. Even plain apathy or boredom are
moods. Moods bring Being to the fore: “A mood makes manifest ‘how one is, and
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 126.
13 Heidegger, Being and Time, 173.
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how one is faring’. In this ‘how one is’, having a mood brings Being to its ‘there’.”14
A state-of-mind is a kind of hook by which Dasein can find itself, not in terms of
self perception, but as something that is in a particular mood: “In a state-of-mind
Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense
of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the
mood that it has.”15 This is an interesting reformulation of Descartes’ cogito: for
Heidegger it is “I am in a mood, therefore I am.”16
Three Essential Attributes of States-of-Mind
Heidegger claims that a state-of-mind or mood is an existentiale that
has three components: 1) it discloses Dasein in its thrownness 2) it discloses
Being-in-the-world as a whole, and 3) it allows what Dasein encounters in the world
to ‘matter’ to it. According to the first attribute, states of mind “…disclose Dasein in
its thrownness, and …in the manner of an evasive turning-away.”17 i.e., moods reveal
the particular circumstances of a person’s lived situation in a mode of avoidance.
What does Heidegger mean by “disclose” here? This is the translation of
erschliessen or Erschlossenheit as “disclosedness”. Although the term is prominent
in Being and Time, a clear definition is not provided. We commonly use disclose
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 173.
15 Ibid., 174.
16 Or perhaps more correctly: “Dasein is in a mood, therefore Dasein is.”
17 Heidegger, Being and Time, 175.
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or disclosure to mean making public something that is intentionally held private or
secret. Heidegger uses it in the sense of “to lay open”18 or lay bare. There is not the
sense in Being and Time that what is disclosed is of a private or secret nature but
there is the sense of its having been covered, hidden, or forgotten. Laying open or
laying bare is not an epistemological function that leads to knowledge of an entities’s
ontic attributes: “‘To be disclosed’ does not mean ‘to be known as this sort of
thing’.”19 Heidegger designates that kind of knowing as “discovery” (Entdeckheit).
Dasein is able to discover entities because “Dasein is its disclosedness,”20 This
attribute of Dasein is perhaps more confusing than clarifying. The best way to
understand this and relate it to the first essential attribute of states-of-mind is that
Dasein is both that which discloses entities, and, through its moods, is that which is
itself disclosed.
Thrownness
States-of-mind disclose Dasein in its thrownness. Essentially, thrownness is
Heidegger’s term for describing how Dasein is placed into a set of circumstances over
which it has no control. He defines it in the context of state-of-mind as,
This characteristic of Dasein’s Being—this ‘that it is’—is veiled in its
‘whence’ and ‘whither’, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call
18 Heidegger, Being and Time, 105.
19 Ibid., 173.
20 Ibid., 171.
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it the ‘thrownness’ of this entity into its ‘there’… The expression ‘thrownness’
is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.21
From this awkward passage we can take that thrownness can be “veiled” by the
“from where and to where” of Dasein’s existence if whence and whither are seen
as mere spatio-temporal data. If the whence and whither are taken as integral to
Dasein’s existence in its “there,” then Dasein’s thrownness is disclosed. The there is
the Da of Da-sein.
What does it mean that thrownness is the facticity (Factizität) of being
delivered over (Überantwortung)? Facticity is a key component of Heidegger’s
description of Being-in-the-world as the basic state of Dasein. It is more than just
“the fact of” something. It is defined early in Being and Time:
Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain ‘factual
Being-present-at-hand’. And yet the ‘factuality’ of the fact of one’s own
Dasein is at bottom quite different ontologically from the factual occurrence
of some kind of mineral, for example. Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact;
and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein’s ‘facticity’.22
Dasein is not like a stone. Dasein is aware of the fact of its existence. Facticity is,
simply put, “the fact of the fact of Dasein” or, the fact that the fact of Dasein’s
existence matters to it. Heidegger continues, “The concept of ‘facticity’ implies
that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can
understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those entities which
it encounters within its own world.”23 Facticity is not only the factuality of Dasein,
21 Heidegger, Being and Time, 174.
22 Ibid., 82.
23 Ibid.
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but the fact that Dasein is intimately involved with other beings. We shall return to
the concept of destiny when we look at Division Two of Being and Time.
A point should be addressed here: what does Heidegger mean by
“Being-present-at-hand?” The concept of present-at-hand (vorhanden) and
the related concept, ready-to-hand (zuhanden), will appear again later in our
exploration of anxiety. These two concepts are central to Heidegger’s concept of
the worldhood-of-the-world, i.e. the world as it presents itself to Dasein as an
environment. For now we will understand present-at-hand as “…a kind of Being
which is essentially inappropriate to entities of Dasein’s character.”24 It is the
kind of being which is appropriate to entities that are not aware of their being,
and constitute a background environment for Dasein, e.g, stones and trees. It
is differentiated from entities that are ready-to-hand: the latter are entities that
Dasein deals with directly as “useful” or as “equipment.”
Thrownness is introduced in the context of the given condition of Dasein
having to be amongst the “they.” This concept is tied closely with what he terms
“falling” (Verfallen):
…Dasein is its ‘there’—the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As definite
existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help
to make up its Being. In these, and in the way they are interconnected in
their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to
everydayness; we call this the ‘falling’ of Dasein.25
24 Heidegger, Being and Time, 67.
25 Ibid., 219.
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Heidegger is careful not to disparage falling, as we will see later, but rather points
out that it is simply a condition of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world, alongside other
entities. Although, he does point out that it “…has mostly the character of Being-lost
in the publicness of the ‘they’ ” and is associated with inauthenticity. The “they”
are the masses, similar to Nietzsche’s “herd,” but in a less pejorative sense. He calls
their influence on Dasein a “real dictatorship” whose power Dasein can fall under
by default: “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read,
see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink
back from the ‘great mass’ as they shrink back; we find ‘shocking’ what they find
shocking.”26 The “they” encourages averageness where no one stands out from the
crowd. We will see later similarities between this and Kierkegaard’s “spiritlessness.”
How is thrownness the “facticity of being delivered over?” The “delivery” is
of Dasein into its “there.” If we take facticity as the “fact of the fact” then we have
thrownness as the “fact of the fact of being delivered over,” i.e., it isn’t simply the
delivery of a person into particular spatiotemporal circumstances, it is rather the
fact that Dasein has to exist in these circumstances, in its “there.”
Thrownness is more than the sum of the spatio-temporal and biological
facts that a person is born with. It is an essential attribute of Dasein’s Being. As
Heidegger notes later in Division Two:
To Dasein’s state of Being belongs thrownness; indeed it is constitutive for
Dasein’s disclosedness. In thrownness is revealed that in each case Dasein, as
26 Heidegger, Being and Time, 164.
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my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a
definite range of definite entities within-the-world.27
Throwness personifies and individualizes each and every Dasein. It is to a certain
extent, inescapable. Dasein finds itself as thrown into having to take responsibility
for itself, yet not being responsible for being in that position. One can endeavor
to extract themselves from their initial thrown circumstances, however even if one
succeeds to the extent possible, new thrown circumstances will have been created
from which one will eventually attempt to flee. Thrownness is thus not something
that exists only in the past or is ever finally “over and done with” (except upon
death). Thrownness persists. Dasein is always “in the throw.”28 The fact that
Dasein tends to avoid facing up to its thrownness is the “evasive turning away”
(ausweichenden Abkehr) that Heidegger described earlier. It is avoidance of the
here and now and avoidance of what should or must be done in Dasein’s given
circumstances. It is the reluctance to face up to Dasein’s Being: “Dasein for
the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood.”29 It isn’t hard
to understand the turning away in the case of bad moods, but how is turning
away present in good moods? Good moods merely alleviate the burden of being30
so are also a a kind of turning away. The second essential attribute of a mood
is that a “…mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a
27 Heidegger, Being and Time, 264.
28 Ibid., 223.
29 Ibid., 174.
30 Ibid., 173.
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whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.”31The
third essential attribute of mood or state-of-mind is closely related to the second
attribute, and is that “…a state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world,
out of which we can encounter something that matters to us.”32 Heidegger’s use
of “submission” (Angewiesenheit—also dependence or reliance) here is interesting,
what does he mean? Is he inferring that Dasein is at odds with or oppressed by the
world?33 Regardless, this disclosive submission allows the experience of something
“mattering” to Dasein. It isn’t clear how this differs from the second attribute
wherein state-of-mind allows Dasein to direct itself toward something. Perhaps it is
simply that the “directing” of the second attribute is prior to the “mattering” of the
third attribute.
With the three essential attributes of states-of-mind, it is worth noting
what is being disclosed/disclosive. In the first attribute Dasein is disclosed; in the
second, Being-in-the-world is disclosed; and in the third we have Dasein’s disclosive
submission to the world. With these three attributes, Heidegger has effectively
(although circuitously) shown how states-of-mind or moods are a central feature
to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and provide the “most primordial possibilities of
disclosure.”
31 Heidegger, Being and Time, 176.
32 Ibid., 177.
33 Hubert Dreyfus emphasizes the theme of Dasein’s “coping” in his commentary
Being-in-the-World (1991).
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Fear
We are now ready to return to our starting point and look at anxiety’s
kindred phenomenon of fear (Furcht). Heidegger’s first concrete example of a
state-of-mind is fear. There are three aspects of fear: 1) that in the face of which we
fear or the “fearsome,” 2) fearing as such, and 3) that which fear fears about.34
The first aspect of fear is what he calls “the fearsome.” It is an entity that is
characterized as threatening or detrimental to Dasein. Heidegger points out that it
is not something that is within “striking distance,” but is something that is drawing
close or looming. The second aspect, fearing as such is what makes the fearsome
clear, or what discloses the fearsome. Heidegger calls this aspect of fear “…a
slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind…”35 The third aspect
of fear, “that which fear fears about” is simply Dasein itself. “Fearing discloses this
entity as endangered and abandoned to itself.”36 Heidegger notes that one can fear
about others, but primarily the third aspect of fear is directed and discloses Dasein
and it’s Being-in-the-world.
There are various subspecies of fear. When the fearsome thing is “altogether
unfamiliar” the fear becomes dread.37 When dread is combined with “…the
34 Heidegger, Being and Time, 179–181.
35 Ibid., 180.
36 Ibid.
37 The German for dread is Grauen, it is distinctively different than Angst. This is mentioned
because as noted in the Introduction the Danish cognate Angest has been translated as dread.
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suddenness of the alarming” then dread becomes terror.38 There are also milder
forms of fear such as, “…timidity, shyness, misgiving, becoming startled.”39 All these
forms of fear, Heidegger believes, show that Dasein is fearful. Fearfulness is “…an
existential possibility of the essential state of mind of Dasein in general…”40
Fear is thus an effective example of state-of-mind. The aspects of fear make
clear how states-of-mind disclose entities in the world (the fearsome) as well as
Dasein’s involvement with entities in the world, and how Dasein can direct itself
towards entities, and how entities can matter to Dasein. As we will see in contrast
to anxiety later, the main point of difference between the state-of-mind of fear and
the kindred phenomenon of anxiety is that the latter lacks a counterpart to the first
aspect of fear, i.e. the fearsome.
In the sections following his discussion on fear, Heidegger describes two other
existentiale conditions that are equiprimordial with state-of-mind: understanding
(Verstehen) and discourse (Rede). First let us get a better handle on what is meant
by equiprimordial. Heidegger believes that it has been a mistake in the field of
ontology to search for a single, primordial condition or organizing principal. He
believes that several conditions can be equally fundamental:
“…the fact that something primordial is underivable does not rule out the
possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive
for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial.
38 n.b. The themes of “the sudden” and the terrifying are attributes of Kierkegaard’s concept of
anxiety
39 Heidegger, Being and Time, 182.
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The phenomenon of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been
disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency
to derive everything and anything from some simple ‘primal ground’.”41
In this case, state-of-mind, understanding, and discourse are equiprimordial. Since
anxiety is also a component of the latter two conditions, understanding and discourse
are worth briefly outlining here.
Understanding
Heidegger states the reciprocal relationship between state-of-mind and
understanding as follows: “A state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it
merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood.”42 Understanding
involves the for-the-sake-of-which: “In the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’, existing
Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called
‘understanding’.”43 In the general sense, for Heidegger, the for-the-sake-of-which is
not unlike the Aristotelian τέλος (telos) or purpose of a particular entity. Of course,
Heidegger must put his own obfuscating twist on it: “The ‘for-the-sake-of-which’
signifies an ‘in-order-to’; this in turn, a ‘towards-this’; the latter, an ‘in-which’ of
letting something be involved; and that in turn, the ‘with-which’ of an involvement.”44
Suffice it to say, for-the-sake-of-which has to do with a thing’s purpose in a
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 170.
42 Ibid., 182.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 120.
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network of involvements with other things, e.g., the for-the-sake-of-which of a
hammer is to pound nails, the for-the-sake-of-which of nails is to fasten boards
together, the for-the-sake-of-which of the boards is as structure for a house, and the
for-the-sake-of-which of the house is to provide protection. Understanding then, is
the comprehension of the purpose of a thing and the relationship of that purpose as
it is involved with the purposes of other things.
Dasein’s self-understanding has more to do with its comprehending its own
potentiality or possibilities: “In understanding, as an existentiale, that which we
have such competence over is not a ‘what’, but Being as existing. The kind of Being
which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding.”45
Dasein’s self-understanding is its competence in knowing what it is capable of and
what it is incapabable of: “As such understanding it ‘knows’ what it is capable
of—that is, what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of.”46 and “Understanding is
the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a
way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.”47
Heidegger asks, why understanding always looks forward into possibilities?
“It is because the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we
call ‘projection’.”48 Recall, that thrownness has the character of projection: “…as
45 Heidegger, Being and Time, 183.
46 Ibid., 184.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 184–185.
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thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call ‘projecting’.”49 This
projection into its possibilities is a characteristic of Dasein and of how it understands
itself: “…any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is,
it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always
will understand itself in terms of possibilities.”50 The aspect of projecting into
possibilities ties understanding to anxiety, since the later is also focused on Dasein’s
possibilities. We see that Heidegger’s concept of understanding is interrelated with
state-of-mind in that the both are attributes of one another. Understanding is the
forward looking aspect of state-of-mind that projects Dasein into its possibilities.
Discourse
The final fundamental existentiale that is equiprimordial with state-of-mind
and understanding is discourse. As one would expect, discourse has to do with
language and communication: “The existential-ontological foundation of language is
discourse or talk.”51 Heidegger defines discourse thus: “Discourse is the Articulation
of intelligibility.”52 It is tied to state-of-mind and is the expression of the intelligibility
of Being-in-the-world: “The intelligibility of Being-in-the-world—an intelligibility
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 185.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 203.
52 Ibid., 203–204.
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which goes with a state-of-mind—expresses itself as discourse.”53 Discourse does not
always refer to the actual act of talking, it can also involve hearing and silence:
“Hearing and keeping silent are possibilities belonging to discursive speech.”54
Hearing and silence will be important features of the ‘call of conscience’ in Division
Two.
Discourse usually communicates through what is said: “In any talk or
discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such—something said as such
whenever one wishes, asks, or expresses oneself about something. In this ‘something
said,’ discourse communicates.”55 However, there is more to discourse than merely
what is said. There are in fact, four features of discourse: “The items constitutive
for discourse are: what the discourse is about (what is talked about); what is
said-in-the-talk, as such; the communication; and the making-known.”56 Heidegger
does not explicitly delineate difference between these attributes. The first two
attributes are not difficult to understand. We can take the what is talked about
as the subject of the conversation. The what is said is the description of that
subject. The communication is the transference of what is said to what is heard.
The making-known is not explained, however we could posit that it has to do with
with the hearer understanding the assertions made in the what is said.
53 Heidegger, Being and Time, 204.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 205.
56 Ibid., 206.
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As we have noted, a key component of discourse is hearing: “We can
make clear the connection of discourse with understanding and intelligibility by
considering an existential possibility which belongs to talking itself—hearing…
Hearing is constitutive for discourse.”57 All ‘hearing’ involves our Being-in-the-world.
Everything we hear is already imbued with meaning:
What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking
waggon [sic], the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north
wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial
and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’.58
This is a rare occasion where Heidegger provides real, easily understood, everyday
examples in plain language. Indeed, one hardly hears something that is not already
laden with a context of meaning. This becomes apparent when an unfamiliar sound
is heard: one immediately attempts to fit it into the realm of likely sounds that
would be heard in the current environment. Unfamiliar sounds, e.g., the bump in
the night, arouse fear or at least curiosity.
A final yet important attribute of discourse which is related to the
phenomenon of sound is the absence of sound or talk:59
Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse… In talking with
one another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ (that is,
he can develop an understanding), and he can do so more authentically than
the person who is never short of words.60
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, 206.
58 Ibid., 207.
59 This will be a component of Heidegger’s definition of resoluteness
60 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208.
60
The person who remains silent can at times communicate more effectively than
someone who constantly seeks to fill the silence with words. Being silent does not
mean that Dasein doesn’t have something to say. Indeed, in Heidegger’s version of
keeping silent Dasein must have something to say. “To be able to keep silent, Dasein
must have something to say—that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and
rich disclosedness of itself.”61 This type of silence indicates Dasein’s authenticity.
Heidegger calls such silence reticence (Verschwiegenheit): “In that case one’s
reticence makes something manifest, and does away with ‘idle talk’.”62 Space does
not permit an exploration of idle talk here, but we can understand it at face value,
it is mere chatter or talk about trivialities used to pass the time, e.g., gossip, the
weather. Reticence allows true listening: “…reticence Articulates the intelligibility of
Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a Potentiality-for-hearing which
is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent.”63 Reticence is the
primordial communicative silence that allows Dasein to “hear” in an authentic way.
Discourse and particularly the concept of reticence appear again in Division Two
where they are related to anxiety by the role they play in the “call of conscience”
and Heidegger’s definition of resoluteness.
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 208.
62 Ibid.
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Falling
We now turn to the key concept of falling. Heidegger describes falling as an
essential existential characteristic of Dasein, and something that belongs to Dasein’s
everydayness.64 He’s careful to note that falling is not to be evaluated negatively.
It primarily signifies that “…Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside
the world of its concern.”65 He calls it an “absorption in” and says that it has “…the
character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’.”66 He claims it has nothing
to do with anything like the fall of Adam or original sin:67 “So neither must we
take the fallenness of Dasein as a ‘fall’ from a purer and higher ‘primal status’.
Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any
possibilities or clues for Interpreting it.”68 He makes a stronger statement about this
in his summary on falling at the end of the chapter:
“…our existential-ontological Interpretation makes no ontical assertion about
the ‘corruption of human Nature’… Ontically, we have not decided whether
man is ‘drunk with sin’ and in the status corruptionis, whether he walks in
the status integritatis, or whether he finds himself in an intermediate stage,
the status gratiae. But in so far as any faith or ‘world view’, makes any such
assertions, and if it asserts anything about Dasein as Being-in-the-world, it
must come back to the existential structures which we have set forth,
64 Heidegger, Being and Time, 219.
65 Ibid., 220.
66 Ibid.
67 C.f. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety. There is much discussion of the link between
anxiety and what Kierkegaard refers to as “hereditary sin”.
68 Heidegger, Being and Time, 220.
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provided that its assertions are to make a claim to conceptual
understanding.”69
Here Heidegger is essentially bracketing out the issue of the Fall of Adam and
any sort of theological anthropology. He claims there is no ontical experience of
the corruption of human Nature, and that any claim of this must adhere to his
existential structures. Falling always involves the temptation of the “they.”70 This
temptation is towards the security promised by the they. Dasein is lured into a
sense of tranquility,71 but this tranquility is in fact alienating. It leads Dasein to
becoming entangled in itself,72 which he calls the “downward plunge” into itself
and out of itself. The movement of falling is always “turbulent.” It is interesting
that he attributes actual physical attributes to falling, when we do not not ontically
experience these physical events.73 Falling is essentially the means by which one
avoids anxiety by returning to the comfort and familiar world of the they.
Anxiety and Fleeing
Now that we have completed the propaedeutic and have at least working
definitions of the concepts integrally related to anxiety, we are finally prepared to
69 Heidegger, Being and Time, 224.
70 Ibid., 221.
71 Ibid., 222.
72 Ibid., 223.
73 c.f. Concept of Anxiety, the dizziness of freedom and the metaphor of falling into the abyss.
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turn to ¶40 where Heidegger begins to speak directly about anxiety. Recall that
anxiety is a state-of-mind that discloses Dasein, or brings Dasein before itself, but
how does anxiety accomplish this, or, how does Dasein’s bringing itself before itself
occur? Heidegger proceeds by showing how it occurs in a negative way, i.e., in
Dasein’s fleeing (Flucht74)in the face of itself:
Dasein’s absorption in the “they” and its absorption in the ‘world’ of its
concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of
itself—of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self… to bring itself
face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does not do when it thus
flees. It turns away from itself in accordance with its ownmost inertia of
falling.75
A problem arises due to the fact that this fleeing is actually “the privation of a
disclosedness,” since Heidegger is trying to get at disclosing Dasein in its Being.
Heidegger solves this problem by making the following move: “Only to the extent
that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner
through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can it flee in the face of that in the
face of which it flees.”76 In other words, the act of fleeing discloses the thing that
it is fleeing from. This is a kind of via negativa approach to disclosing Dasein, i.e.,
a negation is used to elucidate existing attributes. It is also dangerously close to a
Cartesian duality where there is the observer and the observed in Dasein, in this
case there is the part of Dasein that flees and there is a part that is fled from. Which
part of Dasein is disclosed in fleeing, the part that flees or the part that is fled
74 Literally, “flight.”
75 Heidegger, Being and Time, 229.
76 Ibid.
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from? Heidegger seems to be suggesting that both aspects of Dasein are disclosed.
Even though a duality is suggested, it is de-emphasized and the focus is placed on
the activity that holds together that which flees together with that which is fled
from. Heidegger concludes that even though Dasein’s fleeing in the face of itself
is ontical, it disloses Dasein ontologically: “This existentiell-ontical turning-away,
by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp
existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees…”77 For now we will
accept Heidegger’s formulation that Dasein has not just been bifurcated into a
traditional Western subject (that which flees) and an object (that which is fled
from).
Distinction Between Anxiety and Fear
Heidegger then turns to the distinction between anxiety and fear. He claims
that in common usage there’s not been a distinction between the two.78 He says that
fear involves a “shrinking back” from something threatening, i.e., the fearsome. This
shrinking back has the character of fleeing, but in the case of anxiety and falling,
Dasein is fleeing in the face of itself, not from any external threatening entity: “That
in the face of which it [Dasein] thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity
with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the
77 Heidegger, Being and Time, 229.
78 Ibid., 230.
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one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself.”79 Thus a key distinction between fear and
anxiety centers on the fact that the fleeing involved in falling/anxiety is not a fleeing
or shrinking back from external fearsome or threatening entities in the world (as
with fear), but rather is Dasein’s shrinking back or turning away from itself. Both
fear and anxiety have the characteristic of being threatening. On the relationship
between falling, anxiety, and fear he further says that “The turning-away of falling
is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.”80
Thus anxiety is prior to or is the grounds for the possibility of falling and fear. This
will be an important point of comparison between Heidegger’s concept of anxiety
and that of Kierkegaard.
Anxiety and Indefiniteness/Nothing
Heidegger then gives an essential attribute of anxiety: “That in the face of
which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such.81 Recall that Being-in-the-world
is not being in general, rather it is Dasein’s way of existing alongside other entities
as an entity aware of and concerned about its own being. So here, the very way that
Dasein exists in the world is the object of anxiety. Because the object of anxiety is
not an entity, Dasein cannot have any definite involvement with it: “That in the
face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially
79 Heidegger, Being and Time, 230.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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incapable of having an involvement…That in the face of which one is anxious is
completely indefinite.”82 One could take Heidegger to task here, since he has just
said on the previous page that the fleeing involved in anxiety is Dasein fleeing in
the face of itself. Is Dasein then something that is “completely indefinite?” We will
leave this issue for now, but note that it may leave a hole showing that Heidegger is
not fully prepared to deal with the implications that anxiety is about the completely
indefinite.
In an important move he then claims that the indefiniteness causes all
entities to lose their relevance: “Not only does this indefiniteness leave factically
undecided which entity within-the-world is threatening us, but it also tells us that
entities within-the-world are not ‘relevant’ at all.”83 This anticipates the central
and oft-cited putative Kierkegaardian appropriation, that anxiety is about nothing
(Nichts): “Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world
functions as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious.”84 With this Heidegger
further embellishes his idea that the indefiniteness or nothingness of anxiety causes
the world to implode into insignificance: “Here the totality of involvements of the
ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of
no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely
82 Heidegger, Being and Time, 231.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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lacking significance.85 One could raise the issue that if all entities lose significance,
then all entities become indefinite and thus the totality of insignificant entities
contribute to further anxiety.
Anxiety does not recognize any kind of spatial characteristics of “here” or
“yonder” of that which is threatening, yet “…it is so close that it is oppressive and
stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere.”86 This “nothing and nowhere” of anxiety
has the character of “obstinacy” (Aufsässigkeit): “The obstinacy of the ‘nothing
and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a phenomenon that the world as such is
that in the face of which one has anxiety.”87 Heidegger does not use Aufsässigkeit
accidentally. He has a specific meaning in mind. Obstinacy refers back to the section
near the beginning of Being and Time on the “worldhood of the world” where he
discusses the phenomenon of when ready-to-hand entities are unusable, missing, or
when something stands in the way of that which concerns us.88 As noted earlier,
ready-to-hand entities are those entities which are “handy” for Dasein as useful
equipment: “The kind of Being which equipment possesses—in which it manifests
itself in its own right—we call this ‘readiness-to-hand’ ”89 Ready-to-hand entities
serve a purpose for Dasein, as opposed to present-at-hand entities which merely fill
85 Heidegger, Being and Time, 231.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 102–104.
89 Ibid., 98.
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out the background environment. There are three conditions in which something
ready-to-hand can become un-ready-to-hand, i.e. viewed as non-functional: these
are conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. The first two are quite easy to
understanding: conspicuousness occurs when the entity is broken and in need or
repair before it can be used; obtrusiveness is the situation in which the ready-to-hand
entity which we require is missing or unavailable. Obstinacy is a bit more difficult to
grasp because the obstinate entity is more ambiguous. Obstinacy is manifest when
an entity or entities are standing in the way or blocking access to the ready-to-hand
entity or entities of concern.90 An obstinate entity is
“…something un-ready-to-hand which is not missing at all and not unusable,
but which ‘stands in the way’ of our concern. That to which our concern
refuses to turn, that for which it has ‘no time’, is something
un-ready-to-hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of what has
not as yet been attended to. Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way
is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we
must concern ourselves in the first instance before we do anything else.”91
Obstinacy occurs when things are a mess, when ready-to-hand entities are in a state
of disorder and being able to access the object of our concern is blocked by this
mess. The whole world of our concerns seems to rebel and we can’t proceed any
further until the mess is cleaned up or sorted out. How is it that anxiety exhibits
the character of obstinacy? Can it be possible for something that is “nothing and
nowhere” to block or deny access to our concerns? In anxiety “the world as such,”
or the world as a whole has a recalcitrant nature.
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, 102–104.
91 Ibid., 103.
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Heidegger then shifts emphasis from actuality to possibility: “What oppresses
us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it
is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the
world itself.”92 It is not readily apparent how the possibility of the ready-to-hand
in general constitutes the world itself, but if we consider “world” here as Dasein’s
environment, then it makes some sense that the ever-present possibility of the
disorder of ready-to-hand entities causes anxiety.
He then returns to the relationship between nothing and anxiety. Now,
however it is nothing ready-to-hand:
That in the face of which anxiety is anxious is nothing ready-to-hand
within-the-world. But this ‘nothing ready-to-hand,’ …is not totally nothing.
The ‘nothing’ of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial
‘something’—in the world.93
Recall that anxiety has caused all ready-to-hand entities to become insignificant, so
that “nothing” remains ready-to-hand. This is different from nothingness in general.
There is still something that remains when all readiness-to-hand is removed. That
remaining something is the world-as-such, i.e., the world that is behind the world
that is Dasein’s ready-to-hand environment. Heidegger then draws the conclusion
that this nothing is what causes Dasein to have anxiety about its Being-in-the-world:
“So if the ‘nothing’—that is, the world as such—exhibits itself as that in the face of
92 Heidegger, Being and Time, 231.
93 Ibid., 231–232.
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which one has anxiety, this means that Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of
which anxiety is anxious.”94
He restates the fact that “Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly,
the world as world.” and reminds us that anxiety is a state-of-mind: “…the world as
world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind.”95 Then
he reasons that anxiety as a state-of-mind must be about something: “Anxiety is not
only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind, it is also anxiety about
something.”96 It is not clear why this is the case, and the suggestion that anxiety
must be about something or have an object makes it sound like anxiety is just a
species of fear. As if anticipating this objection, Heidegger reminds us that anxiety
is not about anything definite:
That which anxiety is profoundly anxious about is not a definite kind of
Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it. Indeed the threat itself is
indefinite, and therefore cannot penetrate threateningly to this or that
factically concrete potentiality-for-Being.97
What can we conclude about anxiety having an indefinite object? It is critical to
note that even though many commentators point to Heidegger’s concept of anxiety
as being about nothing, it is a specific type of nothing. Since in anxiety the whole
of Dasein’s ready-to-hand environment is obstinate, one could say that anxiety is
about everything instead of nothing.
94 Heidegger, Being and Time, 232.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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Heidegger then returns to the role of possibility in anxiety, and now claims
that this individualizes Dasein:
Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its
authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein
for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands,
projects itself essentially upon possibilities… anxiety discloses Dasein as
Being-possible…98
Anxiety faces up to possibilities and allows Dasein to embrace them, thus making
that Dasein an authentic individual. This aspect of anxiety also brings to light
that Dasein has for choosing itself: “Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its Being
towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its Being-free for the freedom of
choosing itself and taking hold of itself.”99,100
Uncanniness
Heidegger then introduces one of his most notable attributes of anxiety,
that it makes one feel uncanny: “…a state-of-mind makes manifest ‘how one is’. In
anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’.”101 The translators note that uncanny is the translation
of unheimlich, which literally means ‘unhomelike’. This un-homely feeling stems
98 Heidegger, Being and Time, 232.
99 Ibid.
100 This shift, at least the theme of being free for the freedom of choosing, is seen as one of the
points that Heidegger appropriates from Kierkegaard.
101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 233.
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from how anxiety pulls Dasein back from its comfortable, familiar, and tranquilized
everyday Being-at-home amongst the “they.” With anxiety,
…as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the world.
Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but
individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential
‘mode’ of the ‘not-at-home’.102
Here we have two contributing factors to the uncanny feeling. The first is the
collapse of the familiar ready-to-hand environment into obstinacy. The second is the
individualization of Dasein through its choices.
Anxiety is the opposing force to Dasein’s falling into the “they.” Falling or
fleeing is Dasein’s run for the comforting and familiar environment of the “they.”
In falling or fleeing Dasein “…does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world;
these are precisely what it flees towards—as entities alongside which our concern,
lost in the ‘they’, can dwell in tranquillized familiarity.”103 Falling/fleeing is a
running toward the they and a running away from the not-at-home of individuality:
“When in falling we flee into the ‘at-home’ of publicness, we flee in the face of the
‘not-at-home’; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein—in
Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world.”104Anxiety is always lurking in the background
and “…can arise in the most innocuous Situations.”105. Falling/fleeing can never
completely alleviate anxiety, but it can ameliorate its effects: “When Dasein
102 Heidegger, Being and Time, 233.
103 Ibid., 233–234.
104 Ibid., 234.
105 Ibid.
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‘understands’ uncanniness in the everyday manner, it does so by turning away from
it in falling; in this turning-away, the ‘not-at-home’ gets ‘dimmed down’.”106.
Heidegger returns briefly to the subject of fear and contrasts it with
authentic anxiety: “…only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world,
can such Being-in-the-world… ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’,
inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.”107. Anxiety is always present in the
background, and this the possible grounds for Dasein to be afraid or be in a state of
fear. Fear is the fallen state of anxiety in the world of the the “they.” This reconciles
somewhat with the definition of fear given earlier, i.e., that it always involves being
threatened by some entity in the world. Here it is the context of being fallen into
the “they” world. Authentic anxiety is hidden from itself in the “they” world, i.e.,
one can never experience true anxiety in the “they” world. Fear can appear to
be anxiety, but in the end is directed at objects in the “they” world, so therefore
remains inauthentic. Real anxiety is not possible, or at best, rare in the the “they”
world: “…under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, ‘real’ anxiety is rare.”108
Because falleness so sucessfully “dims down” anxiety it is rarely seen. Instead, ontic
fears pass as anxiety but are not the actual anxiety.
In a rare occurrence in Being and Time, Heidegger briefly acknowledges
Dasein’s physical embodiment: “Anxiety is often conditioned by ‘physiological’
106 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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factors… Only because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it
become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically.”109 He does not describe
how anxiety is exhibited physiologically or provide any examples. We are familiar
with the symptoms of everyday inauthentic anxiety: sweaty palms, dry mouth,
elevated blood pressure, stomach butterflies, etc. Are these also the symptoms
of ‘real’ anxiety, or are those symptoms more deep seated and long term like
psychosomatic disorders? Since Heidegger does not develop this thought further, or
ever mention Dasein’s embodiment, again we cannot know.110
The First Footnote
We have come nearly to the end of Heidegger’s initial analysis in ¶40 and
to the first point in Being and Time where he acknowledges Kierkegaard in a
footnote. At this point Heidegger is continuing to play with the idea of the rarity
of authentic anxiety. He believes that an existential analysis of anxiety has been
neglected: “Even rarer than the existentiell Fact of ‘real’ anxiety are attempts to
Interpret this phenomenon according to the principles of its existential-ontological
Constitution and function.”111 Here he is suggesting that he is the first to do such
an analysis. What distinguishes his analysis from previous analyses of anxiety?
109 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234.
110 This is a key point of difference between Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s respective concepts of
anxiety. Kierkegaard readily acknowledges the individuals embodiment, particularly the sexual
aspect and its role in anxiety.
111 Heidegger, Being and Time, 234–235.
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The key factor according to Heidegger is that no one has yet identified anxiety
as a state-of-mind: “The reasons for this lie partly in the general neglect of the
existential analytic of Dasein, but more particularly in a failure to recognize the
phenomenon of state-of-mind [Kierkegaard footnoted here]”.112 We will return to the
failure to recognize anxiety as a state-of-mind and how that relates to Kierkegaard
in a moment, but first let us see where Heidegger is going with regards to the issue of
the rarity of authentic anxiety: “Yet the factical rarity of anxiety as a phenomenon
cannot deprive it of its fitness to take over a methodological function in principle for
the existential analytic.”113 Heidegger is addressing the possible objection that since
real anxiety is such a rare phenomenon it cannot be used as the pivotal point of the
existential analytic. He addresses this issue in the following way:
On the contrary, the rarity of the phenomenon is an index that Dasein, which
for the most part remains concealed from itself in its authenticity because of
the way in which things have been publicly interpreted by the ‘they’,
becomes disclosable in a primordial sense in this basic state-of-mind.114
The primordial state-of-mind of anxiety can serve as an index because authentic
Dasein is for the most part concealed, i.e., the disclosure of authentic Dasein is itself
a rarity. Therefore, the rarity of real anxiety serves as an appropriate sign of the
disclosure of authentic Dasein.
Returning now to the Kierkegaard footnote: it is a lengthy footnote that
begins with Heidegger further affirming his belief that anxiety and fear have never
112 Heidegger, Being and Time, 235.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
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been properly analyzed, and previous analyses, though faulted and incomplete have
only appeared in a theological context:
It is no accident that the phenomena anxiety and fear, which have never
been distinguished in a thoroughgoing manner, have come within the
purview of Christian theology ontically and even (though within very narrow
limits) ontologically.115
As shown in Chapter 1 of this work, Heidegger firmly believed that theology
was an ontic science. The footnote continues: “This has happened whenever the
anthropological problem of man’s Being towards God has won priority and when
questions have been formulated under the guidance of phenomena like faith, sin,
love, and repentance.”116 Here he is contrasting the ontical context of Being towards
God, faith, sin, love, and repentance with his positioning of anxiety as an ontological
state-of-mind. After mentioning Augustine’s and Luther’s analyses as examples of
theological analyses of anxiety he acknowledges Kierkegaard: “The man who has
gone farthest in analysing the phenomenon of anxiety—and again in the theological
context of a ‘psychological’ exposition of the problem of original sin—is Søren
Kierkegaard.”117 He references the 1844 Diederichs German translation of Concept
of Anxiety. Again Heidegger points out that Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety is
within the realm of the ontic sciences of theology and psychology. Kierkegaard
would likely object to the characterization of Concept of Anxiety as theological,
but the subtitle of the work is “A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in
115 Heidegger, Being and Time, 492, fn. iv.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
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View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin”. Since Kierkegaard himself clearly
places his “deliberation” in the psychological context, Heidegger was also correct in
this description. Whether or not “dogmatic” can be conflated with “theological”
in Kierkegaard’s writings is debatable. Nevertheless, because Kierkegaard was
working in an ontic science Heidegger believes he never would have arrived at the
classification of anxiety as a state-of-mind. We will see later that while there are
many aspects of anxiety for Kierkegaard, being a mood or state-of-mind is not
among them.
Heidegger then concludes ¶40 with a restatement of the function of anxiety
in the existential analytic:
…in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive;
for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its
falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are
possibilities of its Being.118
Again, anxiety’s primary function is that it serves to individualize Dasein. The
individualization brings Dasein out of its everyday absorption in the “they” and
exhibits to Dasein the choice of authenticity or inauthenticity.
Care
Before looking at how anxiety appears in Division Two, we will need to
prepare by taking a brief side excursion into Heidegger’s concept of “care” (Sorge)
since anxiety plays a fundamental role in care. As noted earlier, the section of
118 Heidegger, Being and Time, 235.
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Being and Time we have just been examining is from Chapter VI entitled “Care
as the Being of Dasein.” Heidegger introduces care in ¶41 immediately after
the section on anxiety. As a segue from anxiety into care he says, “…the entire
phenomenon of anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing Being-in-the-world. The
fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity, and
Being-fallen.”119 Heidegger is looking for a unity that holds existentiality, facticity,
and Being-fallen together, a totality of the structural whole:
These existential characteristics are not pieces belonging to something
composite, one of which might sometimes be missing; but there is woven
together in them a primordial context which makes up that totality of the
structural whole which we are seeking.120
The members of this triad are all always present and interdependent, no one of them
can go missing. The totality of existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen will be his
concept of care.
The totality itself has two components. The first component, which is
founded in anxiety, is “Being-ahead-of-itself.” Heidegger recalls that “Being-free
for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of
authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial, elemental concreteness,
in anxiety.”121 This potentiality/possibility is future oriented, and is where Dasein
gets ahead of itself: “…Being towards one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being means
119 Heidegger, Being and Time, 235.
120 Ibid., 235–236.
121 Ibid., 236.
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that in each case Dasein is already ahead of itself…”122 Dasein gets ahead of itself
by being in a state of anticipation or expectation about future possibilities. We
have already seen how possibility is related to anxiety. Heidegger further refines
“Being-ahead-of-itself” by adding on the aspect of Dasein’s thrownness and reminds
us that this too is founded in anxiety: “To Being-in-the-world, however, belongs the
fact that it has been delivered over to itself—that it has in each case already been
thrown into a world. The abandonment of Dasein to itself is shown with primordial
concreteness in anxiety.”123
The second component of the totality of care is “Being-alongside” which
involves Dasein’s absorption in the world of the “they,” falling, and fleeing—which
also involves anxiety. Dasein is
…always also absorbed in the world of its concern. In this falling
Being-alongside…, [sic] fleeing in the face of uncanniness (which for the most
part remains concealed with latent anxiety, since the publicness of the ‘they’
suppresses everything unfamiliar), announces itself…124
Being-alongside is the attempt to flee uncanniness by being together with others
in the comforting world of the “they.” He then brings the two components of care
together: “Ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-a-world essentially includes one’s falling
and one’s Being alongside those things ready-to-hand within-the-world with which
122 Heidegger, Being and Time, 236.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid., 237.
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one concerns oneself.”125 With this he believes he has established the structural
unity of care that holds together existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen:
The formally existential totality of Dasein’s ontological structural whole
must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein
means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside
(entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification
of the term ‘care’, which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner.126
This is all well and good, but what does this actually mean? Why is he using the
term “care” here, or why at least have the translators translated Sorge as care? This
word can also mean worry or concern. Care is perhaps not the best translation,
since it has the primary meaning of love for a person or persons and of attending to
their welfare, especially when they are ill. Here care should be taken in the sense
of “having cares” in the world, or of having things to maintain in working order.
Heidegger does in fact delineate care further into concern (Besorgen) and solicitude
(Fürsorge): “…Being-alongside the ready-to-hand could be taken in our previous
analyses as concern, and Being with the Dasein-with of Others as we encounter it
within-the-world could be taken as solicitude.”127 So, care as maintenance of the
ready-to-hand is concern whereas care as attending to another’s welfare is solicitude.
We thus end our look at the role played by anxiety in Division One of
Being and Time. We initially saw it classified as a state-of-mind or how Dasein
is “attuned” to the world. We explored the relationship between anxiety and
125 Heidegger, Being and Time, 237.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
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Heidegger’s concepts of thrownness, understanding, discourse, and falling into the
world of the “they.” We also looked at the distinction between fear and anxiety, i.e,
how fear directed at something definite, while anxiety is directed at the indefinite or
nothing in particular. Related to this, we explored how Dasein’s being in anxiety
reduces ready-to-hand entities in the world to a state of insignificance. We looked at
Heidegger’s emphasis on uncanniness, and finally we saw the role that anxiety plays
in the concept of care. We will now look at the role played by anxiety in Division
Two, in issues related to Dasein’s temporality.
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Chapter III: Anxiety in Division Two
The Second Footnote
Before getting into Division Two, we will need to look at the second place in
Being and Time where Kierkegaard is acknowledged in a footnote. This at the very
end of ¶45, the short introductory section to Division Two, where Heidegger lists
the titles of the six chapters in this second half of the book. Here, he inexplicably
cites Kierkegaard with the following footnote:
In the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the
problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a
penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him
that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel
and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is more to be learned
philosophically from his ‘edifying’ writings than from his theoretical
ones—with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety.1
What is odd about this citation is that it has nothing to do with the sentence or
the paragraph to which it is attached, nor to the content of ¶45. Why then did he
include it here? Regardless of his reasons, there are a few points to cover in this
footnote.
Heidegger claims that Kierkegaard’s analysis of the problem is existence
was as an existentiell problem, meaning it was about existence as an ontic, rather
1 Heidegger, Being and Time, 494, fn. vi.
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than ontological issue. This hearkens back to Heidegger’s edict that ontology is
the absolute science which stands above all others, and Kierkegaard was not an
ontologist.2 Although he credits Kierkegaard for a “penetrating” analysis, he
believes that Kierkegaard was hopelessly mired in Hegelian metaphysics an that a
true grasp of existential problems was completely alien to him. It is not clear why
Heidegger thought that this meant Kierkegaard’s edifying writings were of more
value than his pseudonymous works. The former are entirely theological, which,
according to Heidegger is an ontic science. He notably makes the exception of
Concept of Anxiety, however, even though it contains only an existentiell analysis of
anxiety.
Since we are in ¶45, it will be helpful to briefly look at what Heidegger
is laying out as the purpose of Division Two. He believes that the existential
analysis of Division One has fallen short: “One thing has become unmistakable:
our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality.”3
The purpose of Division Two is to introduce temporality into the analysis, because
he believes that “…the primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s existentiality is
temporality.”4 The concept of care that ended Division One, must now incorporate
time: “If temporality makes up the primordial meaning of Dasein’s Being, and if
moreover this entity is one for which, in its Being, this very Being is an issue, then
2 It appears that Heidegger thought of himself as the only true ontologist, at least since the
pre-Socratic Greek philosophers.
3 Heidegger, Being and Time, 276.
4 Ibid., 277.
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care must use ‘time’ and therefore must reckon with ‘time’.”5 Thus, Heidegger now
turns to describing the essentially temporal aspect of Dasein’s Being.
Being-towards-death
The first chapter in Division Two concerns “Being-towards-death” and
it is in this context that anxiety reappears. Here, Heidegger suggests that
Being-towards-death is revealed in anxiety: “Thrownness into death reveals itself
to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state-of-mind which
we have called ‘anxiety’.”6 Part of Dasein’s thrownness is the fact that Dasein will
eventually cease to exist. Heidegger seems to be positing a species of authentic
anxiety that is directed towards death: “Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety ‘in
the face of’ that potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational, and
not to be outstripped.”7 This anxiety about death has a specific “in the face of”
which makes it seem like fear. However, as with the anxiety of Division One, this
“in the face of” is a nothing, and perhaps more truly “nothing” than the anxiety of
Division One, i.e, it is the possibility of Dasein’s non-existence. It is also indefinite,
since one can never know for certain when one will die. However, it is also very
definite that everyone knows with utmost certainty that they will die. These three
5 Heidegger, Being and Time, 278.
6 Ibid., 295.
7 Ibid.
85
factors taken together make the anxiety involved in Being-towards-death particularly
powerful and Heidegger goes to great lengths to emphasize this.
The phrase “potentiality-for-Being which is one’s ownmost, non-relational,
and not to be outstripped” is Heidegger’s rather cumbersome way of defining death
in ontological-existential terms. It is one’s ownmost because every Dasein’s death
belongs only to oneself. No other Dasein partakes directly in another’s death.
Because of this it is non-relational. It is not to be outstripped in that it is inevitable,
unavoidable, and inescapable. There is no getting around it, Dasein must necessarily
experience it. Heidegger continues in this context, distinguishing anxiety about
death from the mere fear of death:
Anxiety in the face of death must not be confused with fear in the face of
one’s demise. This anxiety is not an accidental or random mood of ‘weakness’
in some individual; but, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it amounts to the
disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end.8
Here, authentic anxiety about death is contrasted with the inauthentic fear of
death. The latter is something that can randomly occur or may occur when one’s
life is immediately threatened. Authentic anxiety towards death, like the generalized
anxiety of Division One, is a primordial, persistent, and essential background state
that signals the fact that Dasein must come to an end.
Several sections later, Heidegger continues describing the mistaken perception
that anxiety towards death is often taken as fear and a weakness. This view is
8 Heidegger, Being and Time, 295.
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purported by the “they” regarding how one behaves in facing death. The accepted
behavior robs Dasein of the courage to authentically face death:
The “they” does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death…
The “they” concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face
of an oncoming event. In addition, the anxiety which has been made
ambiguous as fear, is passed off as a weakness with which no self-assured
Dasein may have any acquaintance.9
Authentic anxiety about death is simplified by the “they” into fear about the definite
threatening event of death. This fear is downplayed and viewed as undesirable or as
a sign of cowardliness; one does not dwell on death. It better not to think about
death, but to flee from these thoughts is also a seen as a weakness.
Heidegger ends the chapter on Being-towards-death with a restatement of
the role of anxiety: “…the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant
threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety.”10
Again, the key here is the persistent nature of anxiety, it is not a temporary
or random fear. The “utter” or ultimate threat is death which may not seem
immediate, but it nevertheless persistent. He continues in this thread,
In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the
possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the
potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses
the uttermost possibility.11
Here again he reinforces the attributes of anxiety as a state-of-mind directed toward
the “nothing,” which is seen as an impossibility. Indeed, in death all possibility
9 Heidegger, Being and Time, 298.
10 Ibid., 310.
11 Ibid.
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ceases. Death is given as a potentiality or possibility because Dasein never
actually experiences it, or at best it is only actualized in an instant, since at the
moment it is actualized Dasein’s ceases to be. In his next sentence, in what might
seem to be a misprint, Heidegger substitutes “anticipation” in place of anxiety:
“Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization
of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.”12 Recall
in ¶40 of Division One he spoke of anxiety as that which individualizes. Why
has he switched now to anticipation? Not surprisingly, Heidegger has a specific
meaning for anticipation, which we must now examine. This exploration will also be
important later in this work when we explore Heidegger’s concept of “anticipatory
resoluteness,” which echoes Kierkegaardian themes.
Anticipation and Expectation
Heidegger contrasts anticipating with expecting. Anticipation is being open
to any possible outcome in a given uncertain situation, while expecting is being
focused on a specific, preconceived, outcome. With death, the common way of
relating to it is in the form of expectation. We might expect that we will live into
our eighties, or if we’re lucky into our nineties, and will likely die of a cause similar
to one of our parents’ deaths. Expectation concerning death can also be a brooding
over it: “Indeed, it always gets brooded over as something that is coming; but in
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
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such brooding we weaken it by calculating how we are to have it at our disposal.”13
In this brooding we try to “have” death by calculating when it will occur. We try
to claim it or to know specifically how it will transpire. This kind of expectation
amounts to waiting for it:
To expect something possible is always to understand it and to ‘have’ it with
regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand.
Expecting is not just an occasional looking-away from the possible to its
possible actualization, but is essentially a waiting for that actualization.14
Expecting something is waiting for a particular actualization, it tries to annul the
possibility—and the anxiety associated with the possibility—that the outcome may
be different. On the other hand, Anticipation is the openness to any possibility, i.e.,
the openness to the indefinite as the possibility of possibility. Heidegger introduces
anticipation in the context of our Being towards death:
…Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to comport
ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death reveals itself as a
possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards this possibility is
‘anticipation’ of this possibility.15
Anticipation is an asymptotic “coming-close” but never a final actualization. Instead
of diminishing the outcome, the coming-close of anticipation makes the thing, in
this case death, greater rather than weakening it the way expecting does: “In this
kind of coming close, however, one does not tend towards concernfully making
available something actual; but as one comes closer understandingly, the possibility
13 Heidegger, Being and Time, 305–306.
14 Ibid., 306.
15 Ibid.
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of the possible just becomes ‘greater’.”16 In anticipation there is no intent to realize
something definite and thus annul the possibility: “In accordance with its essence,
this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’
to oneself the actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”17
Anticipation does not imagine a particular outcome, it is an opening up to possibility
instead of the closing down of expectation which focuses on an imagined outcome.
Then, mirroring how he spoke about anxiety in Division One ¶40, Heidegger
claims that an anticipatory stance is necessary for authentic existence:
In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein discloses
itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility…Anticipation turns out to
be the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost
potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence.18
Further, anticipation, like anxiety, is the individualizing factor: “Anticipation utterly
individualizes Dasein, and allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become
certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.”19 Is he justified in substituting
anticipation for anxiety? Anticipation cannot be exactly the same as anxiety.
Anticipation appears to be anxiety in the context of Being-towards-death. Both are
directed at nothing: anxiety was directed at the nothing of the insignificance of
the ready-to-hand world; anticipation is directed at the nothing of Dasein’s own
non-existence.
16 Heidegger, Being and Time, 306.
17 Ibid., 307.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 310.
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Heidegger makes this flat claim regarding the relationship between
Being-towards-death and anxiety: “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety.”20
How are we to take this? At least as “all Being-towards-death is anxiety.” However,
is the reverse true? “All anxiety is Being-towards-death.” This surely cannot be
the case, since there are other varieties of authentic anxiety which are not directed
toward’s Dasein’s end. Being-towards-death is a type of anxiety, but anxiety is
not a type of Being-towards-death. Anxiety is the larger category which contains
Being-towards-death. Anticipation is the analogue of anxiety in the context of
Being-towards-death.
Heidegger wraps up the relationship between anticipation, death, and anxiety
in one of his most emphatic statements21 in Being and Time:
…anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face
to face with the possibility of being itself… in an impassioned freedom
towards death—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the
‘they’, and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious.22
Here again we see the substitution of anticipation in one of the key roles of anxiety,
of being lost in they-self. Now also anticipation takes the role of anxiety in facing
death. Here, Heidegger presents it as “an impassioned freedom towards death”. This
is one of the few locations where Heidegger employs the extreme state of passion.
Until now anxiety has been seen as a mild to moderate yet persistent state-of-mind.
Here he is portraying it as almost a violent emotion. Is Being-towards-death the
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, 310.
21 All text emphases from the Macquarrie and Robinson translation are preserved here.
22 Heidegger, Being and Time, 311.
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exemplar of anxiety? Can one ever have an impassioned freedom towards death?
Perhaps he is stretching the point a bit far here, we will take from his discussion
about being-towards-death that it is a complete openness towards the possibility of
death coming at any moment and letting go of expecting or imagining to die at a
particular time and place.
The Call of Conscience
The next appearance of anxiety in Being and Time is in the context of “the
call of conscience”. First we will need to generally understand what Heidegger
means by conscience (Gewissen), then what he means by the call of conscience.
Then we will need to understand what role conscience plays in this chapter of
Division Two entitled “Dasein’s Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-for-Being,
and Resoluteness.” First he frames conscience in terms of authenticity: “…an
authentic potentiality-for-Being is attested by the conscience… Dasein has an
authentic potentiality-for-Being in that it wants to have a conscience.”23 Conscience,
or the want of a conscience is something we can readily identify, and is a sign of
its cause, the authentic potentiality-for-Being. Conscience attests to the authentic
potentiality-for-Being: “…this potentiality is attested by that which, in Dasein’s
everyday interpretation of itself, is familiar to us as the ‘voice of conscience’.”24
23 Heidegger, Being and Time, 277.
24 Ibid., 313.
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Heidegger wants to make it absolutely clear that his analysis is conscience is
ontological: “The ontological analysis of conscience on which we are thus embarking,
is prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience, and
likewise lies outside of any biological ‘explanation’ of this phenomenon…”25 His
version of conscience belongs in no way to any ontic science. In the same way, it
does belong in the realm of theology: “…it is no less distant from a theological
exegesis of conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God or
for establishing an ‘immediate’ consciousness of God.”26
Conscience, like anxiety, discloses Dasein: “Conscience gives us ‘something’
to understand; it discloses. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way,
we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the disclosedness of Dasein.”27 It is
interesting to note here that conscience provides us “something” to understand.
Soon Heidegger will claim that the content of the call of conscience is “nothing.”
It is no accident that Heidegger elicits the idea of the “voice” of conscience.
Conscience is a “call” which brings Dasein back to its authenticity:
If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a call… The call
of conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of
summoning it to its ownmost Being-guilty.28
25 Heidegger, Being and Time, 313.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 314.
28 Ibid.
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We shall return the concept of Being-guilty later, as this is a key point relating to
Kierkegaard. An important component of the mechanism of the calling is that the
call is heard: “To the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing.”29
The call can be made, but it may not necessarily be not heard. The call can be
drowned out by the noise made by the ‘they’ and the they-self: “Losing itself in the
publicness and the idle talk of the ‘they’, it fails to hear its own Self in listening to
the they-self.”30 In other words, Dasein can get so occupied and absorbed in the
chatter of the “they” that the call is silenced. How then, can Dasein ever hear the
call? First, Dasein must find itself: “If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from
this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it
must first be able to find itself—to find itself as something which has failed to hear
itself…”31 Here Heidegger has made the odd move similar to what he did with fleeing.
Dasein is disclosed or found because it is the entity that, in the case of fleeing was
being fled from, and here is the entity that has failed to hear itself. Next, listening to
the ‘they’ must be interrupted so that Dasein can hear the call: “This listening-away
must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing
which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself…”32 Dasein must be open
to hearing the call, i.e., Dasein must be listening-toward it. The listening-toward
29 Heidegger, Being and Time, 314.
30 Ibid., 315.
31 Ibid., 315–316.
32 Ibid., 316.
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is opposed to the listening-away, and thus is able to break the listening-away:
“…this listening-away gets broken by the call if that call… arouses another kind of
hearing, which, in relationship to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every
way opposite.”33 The call arouses the listening-toward, so that hearing the call
takes place. When all these things happen, we have the call of conscience: “That
which, by calling in this manner… is the conscience.”34 So, the call of conscience is
not merely the call from the conscience, but is also the breaking off of listening to
they-self, and the act of hearing the call. Calling is a mode of discourse: “We take
calling as a mode of discourse.”35 Recall that Heidegger placed special emphasis on
silence as an essential part of authentic discourse. As with discourse, in the case of
calling, a physical voice is not required: “Vocal utterance, however, is not essential
for discourse, and therefore not for the call either…”36 Even though there may not
be an utterance, the character of the call is of a sudden nature:37 “In the tendency
to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push—of an abrupt
arousal.”38,39
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 316.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 This will be relevant in our exploration of ‘the moment’ later.
38 Heidegger, Being and Time, 316.
39 c.f. The “sudden” character of anxiety about the good in Concept of Anxiety.
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Heidegger is careful to point out that he has avoided attributing the common
“psychical” attributes to conscience or construing it as a mental faculty:
…we have from the beginning avoided the first route which offers itself for an
Interpretation of conscience—that of tracing it back to some psychical
faculty such as understanding, will, or feeling, or of explaining it as some sort
of mixture of these.40
The call is ontological-existential, not an ontic phenomenon of psychological science.
Heidegger then launches into an in-depth phenomenological analysis of the discourse
behind the call of conscience. The questions he explores are, “What is the content
of the call?” and “Who or what does the calling?”
In answer to the question, “What is the content of the call?” Heidegger
points out that similar to anxiety, conscience is about nothing:
What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly,
nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events,
has nothing to tell…‘Nothing’ gets called to this Self, but it has been
summoned to itself—that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.41
Does this not seem problematic, especially since Heidegger said earlier that
conscience gives us “something” to understand? How can we be given something
with nothing as its content? Surely there must be some positive content in the call
of conscience. In the common everyday notion of conscience as the regulative inner
moral voice there is, e.g. “You shouldn’t do that!”, or as Heidegger would describe
the call, “You shouldn’t listen to the ‘they’, you ought to be more true to yourself!”
40 Heidegger, Being and Time, 317.
41 Ibid., 318.
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However, this should/ought language attaches ontic ethical attributes to conscience,
which Heidegger is trying to avoid.
The question, “Who or what does the calling?” is addressed next. The call
originates from some part of Dasein and is directed towards another part of Dasein:
“In conscience Dasein calls itself.”42 The act of the caller is not ‘willed’ by any part
of Dasein: “Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither
planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’
calls, against our expectations and even against our will.”43 The “it” is the caller.
Heidegger refers to “it” several times in the context of this discussion. Macquarrie
and Robinson note the indefinite nature of the German Es ruft instead of Der ruft,
which would refer to the call itself. The call is involuntary, and sometimes counter
to our wishes at the time of the call.
Heidegger then reminds us of Dasein’s thrownness and of the primordial
state-of-mind that discloses Dasein, i.e., anxiety, and of the uncanniness produced
by this state-of-mind:
Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety;
and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world face to face with the “nothing” of the world; in
the face of this “nothing”, Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being.44
42 Heidegger, Being and Time, 320.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 321.
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Note the emphasis on ‘nothing’ which connects anxiety with the content of the call
of conscience. Heidegger then finally asks the question that he has been leading
up to all along: “What if this Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its
uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience?”45 It is ‘uncanny Dasein’
that is the caller of conscience. Heidegger further describes this ‘nothing’ caller:
“In its ‘who’, the caller is definable in a ‘worldly’ way by nothing at all. The
caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the
‘not-at-home’—the bare ‘that-it-is’ in the ‘nothing’ of the world.”46 Here we have
Heidegger describing the caller in very similar language to that which he used
in describing anxiety. Heidegger further describes this calling voice as alien to
everyday inauthentic Dasein: “The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it
is something like an alien voice.”47 He then finally offers a helpful description of the
‘nothing’ that is the content of the call of conscience, here again, the “it”: “‘It’ calls,
even though it gives the concernfully curious ear nothing to hear which might be
passed along in further retelling and talked about in public. But what is Dasein
even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? What else remains for it
than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety?”48 The ‘nothing’ of the
call of conscience and of anxiety is not nothing per se, but nothing in that it is not
45 Heidegger, Being and Time, 321.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 322.
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communicable in a public way. It is nothing in the ontic sense, there is no ‘material’
or ‘form’ that is communicated, but ‘something’ is communicated in the ontological
sense: the summoning of Dasein back to its authenticity. Heidegger’s gives his final
statement on the role of anxiety in the call of conscience: “The call whose mood has
been attuned by anxiety is what makes it possible first and foremost for Dasein to
project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”49 The potentiality-for-Being
recalls what was said about anxiety and anticipation of Being-towards-death earlier.
Resoluteness
The next point in Being and Time where anxiety appears is in the context
of resoluteness. As may be expected, resoluteness is closely tied to conscience.
Resoluteness melds anxiety, conscience, and guilt. So first, as promised earlier, we
must take a detour into guilt.
Recall that Heidegger’s initial definition of the call of conscience involved
summoning Dasein “to its ownmost Being-guilty.” Heidegger further elaborates on
that aspect of conscience: “All experiences and interpretations of the conscience
are at one in that they make the ‘voice’ of conscience speak somehow of ‘guilt’.”50
What is the nature of guilt for Heidegger? He runs through the common notion that
guilt involves indebtedness, or owing something to others. Heidegger gives this as
49 Heidegger, Being and Time, 322.
50 Ibid., 325.
99
“Being-the-basis for a lack of something in the Dasein of an Other…This kind of
lacking is a failure to satisfy some requirement which applies to one’s existent Being
with Others.”51 Heidegger terms this kind of lacking as moral guilt, and he thinks
little of it: “If one takes ‘laden with moral guilt’ as a quality of Dasein, one has
said very little.”52” Heidegger wants to move toward the existential definition of
guilt. First though, the ordinary sense of morality must be removed: “…the idea of
‘Guilty!’ must be sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of ‘guilt’
which are related to our concernful Being with Others, will drop out.”53
Heidegger transforms the ontic, moral lack to an ontological “not” or nullity:
Nevertheless, in the idea of ‘Guilty!’ there lies the character of the
“not”…Hence we define the formally existential idea of the ‘Guilty!’ as
“Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a ‘not’ ”—that is to
say, as “Being-the-basis of a nullity”.54
His purpose is to disentangle guilt from the ontic sense of morality: “‘Being-guilty’
cannot be defined by morality, since morality already presupposes it for itself.”55
Being-guilty is a primordial and essential aspect of Dasein’s existence: “That this
primordial Being-guilty remains proximally and for the most part undisclosed, that
it is kept closed off by Dasein’s falling Being, reveals only the aforesaid nullity.
51 Heidegger, Being and Time, 328.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 329.
55 Ibid., 332.
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Being-guilty is more primordial than any knowledge about it.”56 Being-guilty is
often hidden by Dasein’s falling but nevertheless is an a priori state of Dasein’s
existence.57
Heidegger then connects guilt with the call of conscience. Dasein needs to be
in a state of readiness before it is able to hear the call of conscience or be “free” for
the call: “When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility,
this includes its becoming free for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of
getting appealed to.”58 Dasein cannot choose to have a conscience, but it can choose
to want to have a conscience which is the connection with owning up to being guilty:
Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience,
which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is having-a-conscience as
Being-free for one’s ownmost Being-guilty. ‘Understanding the appeal’ means
‘wanting to have a conscience’.59
Owning up to guilt and wanting to have a conscience is related to anxiety:
The uncanniness… becomes genuinely disclosed by the state-of-mind of
anxiety… The fact of the anxiety of conscience, gives us phenomenal
confirmation that in understanding the call Dasein is brought face to face
with its own uncanniness. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness
for anxiety.60
Here Heidegger has equated wanting-to-have-a-conscience with readiness for
anxiety. It would seem then that wanting-to-have-conscience must occur
56 Heidegger, Being and Time, 332.
57 c.f. Kierkegaard’s concept of objective sin.
58 Heidegger, Being and Time, 334.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 342.
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prior to Dasein having any real experience of anxiety. That would make
wanting-to-have-a-conscience a more primordial state than the state-of-mind of
anxiety. This is problematic given that anxiety was supposed to be the most
primordial state-of-mind. This inconsistency will arise again in the context of
anticipatory resoluteness.
Readiness for anxiety will be what Heidegger will call resoluteness. He moves
toward the definition of resoluteness by re-introducing understanding as projection,
and reticence: “The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus
constituted by anxiety as state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself
upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence.”61 What role does
reticence play in resoluteness? Recall that reticence is the primordial authentic
silence of discourse. In reticence, the call of conscience is heard and authentic Dasein
is disclosed. Heidegger connects conscience, reticence, Being-guilty, and readiness
for anxiety to define resoluteness: “This distinctive and authentic disclosedness,
which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—this reticent self-projection
upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety—we call
‘resoluteness’.”62 Resoluteness is the state of disclosedness that results from the
silent acknowledgement of one’s guilt. It is the state of readiness for anxiety.
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 343.
62 Ibid.
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Anticipatory Resoluteness
The next significant appearance of anxiety in Being and Time is in the
context of anticipatory resoluteness. This concept is the joining of anticipation, the
authentic Being-towards-death, with resoluteness:
As Being-towards-the-end which understands—that is to say, as anticipation
of death—resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness
does not just ‘have’ a connection with anticipation, as with something other
than itself. It harbours in itself authentic Being-towards-death…63
In this context, Heidegger recalls the definition of resoluteness given earlier, but
rearranges the constituents and gives this slightly altered definition of resoluteness:
“We have characterized resoluteness as a way of reticently projecting oneself upon
one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and exacting anxiety of oneself.”64 Earlier, anxiety was
the necessary background state-of-mind for resoluteness, but here Heidegger has
shifted the emphasis to position anxiety as something that resoluteness demands.
It isn’t clear why Heidegger makes this move. It is inconsistent with his previous
definitions of anxiety as an a priori state behind the disclosure of authentic Dasein.
Here it is given as something one demands of oneself, almost as something produced
by owning up to Being-guilty.
Perhaps this demand is not for anxiety as a product, but is a demand to not
run away or flee from anxiety but to face up to it. In the next mention of anxiety
63 Heidegger, Being and Time, 353.
64 Ibid.
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Heidegger remains with the theme of death, but here anxiety is the agent that
exacts resoluteness:
The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this
primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the
way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to
itself. The “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the
nullity by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined; and this basis itself is as
thrownness into death.65
Here, anxiety serves to clear the way for Dasein to face its nullity, and in so doing
exacts resoluteness of itself. Anxiety demands resoluteness. This is more in line
with Heidegger’s previous descriptions of the role of anxiety as the prior state. Yet
in a later passage he switches again to anxiety as being demanded by resoluteness:
“Dasein is authentically itself in the primordial individualization of the reticent
resoluteness which exacts anxiety of itself.”66 The point of comparing these quotes
is to show that Heidegger switches the role of anxiety in relation to resoluteness:
sometimes anxiety is prior and exacts resoluteness, and at other times resoluteness
is the prior state that exacts anxiety. If Heidegger were being consistent with how
anxiety is defined in Division One as the most primordial state-of-mind, it should
always be the case that anxiety exacts resoluteness.
In the next mention of anxiety, for the first time Heidegger mentions one of
its positive side effects: “Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face
with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 356.
66 Ibid., 369.
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possibility.”67 What is this joy? He gives a hint, but then quickly shuts down any
possible exploration of it:
In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ with which busy
curiosity keeps providing itself—primarily from the events of the world. But
the analysis of these basic moods would transgress the limits which we have
drawn for the present Interpretation by aiming towards fundamental
ontology.68
Apparently the joy of being freed from worry about the trivialities of world of the
“they” is not relevant to fundamental ontology.
The Temporality of Anxiety
Heidegger then turns to describing the temporal nature of Dasein in its
everyday world. Anxiety plays a key role in this. He first goes through the
temporality of disclosededness and understanding, and then begins his description
of the temporality of state-of-mind. As we would expect, his explanation of the
temporality of anxiety appears in the section on state-of-mind. He uses fear and
anxiety as the prime examples of state-of-mind: “Our temporal Interpretation will
restrict itself to the phenomena of fear and anxiety, which we have already analysed
in a preparatory manner.”69 He will contrast the temporality of anxiety with that of
fear, so we shall first explore his description of the temporality of fear.
67 Heidegger, Being and Time, 358.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 391.
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Heidegger recalls that fear is an inauthentic state-of-mind and that fearing is
always in the face of some definite thing. In temporal terms, fear is oriented towards
something threatening coming towards oneself, so in this sense is futural: “Has
not ‘fear’ been rightly defined as ‘the expectation of some oncoming evil’ (‘malum
futurum’)? Is not the primary meaning of fear the future, and least of all, one’s
having been?”70 This is a characterization of the everyday or ontical sense of fear as
fear was described in Division One. Here Heidegger is considering the “existential
temporality” of fear. It is strange that he is doing this, since fear was downplayed as
merely reaction to the everyday world in Division One, he called it an “inauthentic
state-of-mind.” Why should he be considering it in existential terms here? It is
because fear is a mood, and even if moods are “…ontically well known to us, they
are not recognized in their primordial existential function.”71 He goes on to say
that such moods are “fleeting Experiences” and “Anything which is observed to
have the character of turning up and disappearing in a fleeting manner, belongs to
the primordial constancy of existence.”72 Because of this he claims that the task is
“…to exhibit the ontological structure of having-a-mood in its existential-temporal
Constitution.”73 The key to this existential-temporal Constitution is the idea of
“having-been,” i.e. of returning from an inauthentic ecstasis to an original authentic
70 Heidegger, Being and Time, 391.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
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state: “The thesis that ‘one’s state-of-mind is grounded primarily in having been’
means that the existentially basic character of moods lies in bringing one back
to something.”74 While Heidegger is not explicitly admitting it, he is suggesting
that it is nearly impossible for Dasein to remain authentic all of the time. After
all, “falling” is an existentiale of Dasien. Authentic Dasein cannot help but to
occasionally fall back into the “they” world, but it recognizes this falling and strives
to return to authenticity.
The existential temporality of fear is forgetting oneself. Here Heidegger
emphasizes the importance of bewilderment (Verwirrung):
When one’s Being-in-the-world has been threatened and it concerns itself
with the ready-to-hand, it does so as a factical potentiality-for-Being of its
own. In the face of this potentiality one backs away in bewilderment, and
this kind of forgetting oneself is what constitutes the existential-temporal
meaning of fear.75
The bewilderment or confusion that takes place in the fearful state blocks out
possibilities, much like the obstinate nature of anxiety as described in Division One.
The forgetting of oneself thwarts Dasein in its attempt to grasp any particular
possibility: “When concern is afraid, it leaps from next to next, because it forgets
itself and therefore does not take hold of any definite possibility.”76 Heidegger finally
defines the temporality of fear succinctly as follows: “The temporality of fear is a
74 Heidegger, Being and Time, 391.
75 Ibid., 392.
76 Ibid.
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forgetting which awaits and makes present.”77 It is interesting that he returns to
using the term “awaits” which is associated with “expecting” and inauthenticity.
Heidegger then begins his examination of the existential temporality of
anxiety by asking, “How is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear?”78 He
recalls the various attributes of anxiety, such as how anxiety is not about facing
something definite, how anxiety makes Dasein’s immediate environment become
insignificant, how anxiety is anxious in the face of nothing and in the face of
Being-in-the-world. Being anxious “in the face of” has a temporal aspect:
To be anxious in-the-face-of…[sic] does not have the character of an expecting
or of any kind of awaiting. That in-the-face-of which one has anxiety is
indeed already ‘there’—namely, Dasein itself. In that case, does not anxiety
get constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future of
awaiting.79
Like fear then, anxiety has a futural character, but it is constituted by authentic
anticipation of possibility instead of expecting a particular event or entity that one
stands in-the-face-of in the case of fear.
Another important characteristic of the temporality of anxiety relates to how
anxiety causes things in the world to lose significance. Heidegger reintroduces this
theme from Division One:
Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance
reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself—or, in other
words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being
77 Heidegger, Being and Time, 392.
78 Ibid., 393.
79 Ibid.
108
which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one’s objects
of concern.80
In what Heidegger is attempting to pitch as a kind of revelation, anxiety reveals
in a radical way the impossibility of basing one’s existence solely on things in the
world, however this impossibility opens the door to the possibility of authenticity:
“The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the
possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up.”81 Here Heidegger reuses
the motif of something being ‘lit up’ or disclosed. It first appears in the context
of the worldhood-of-the-world in the case of a ready-to-hand thing becoming
unready-to-hand when it is broken. This brokenness causes the whole network
of dependencies in the workshop to be “lit up” or disclosed. Here, in the case
of anxiety, which causes the whole world to appear in a state of brokenness, the
possibility of authenticity is lit up. Heidegger then considers the temporal nature
of this revelation: “What is the temporal meaning of this revealing?”82 He ties the
“bringing back” associated with anxiety to a new temporal concept, repeating or
repetition:
Anxiety… brings one back to the pure ‘that-it-is’ of one’s ownmost
individualized thrownness. This bringing-back has neither the character of
an evasive forgetting nor that of a remembering… On the contrary, anxiety
brings one back to one’s thrownness as something possible which can be
repeated.83
80 Heidegger, Being and Time, 393.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 394.
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Unlike the temporality of fear, Heidegger claims anxiety is not a forgetting.
With how he describes repetition however, it does seem to be something akin to
remembering.84
Heidegger gave a definition of repetition a few pages earlier. It is important to
understand this concept, as it is another point of relation to Kierkegaard. Repetition
has its basis in the coming-back to oneself associated with anticipatory resoluteness:
The authentic coming-towards-oneself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the
same time a coming-back to one’s ownmost Self, which has been thrown into
its individualization… In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its
ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call
it ‘repetition’.85
Repetition is Dasein’s returning from being in world of the “they.” It recognizes itself
in its individualization and again takes over itself. Repetition has characteristics
of past time as the coming back to the having-been, but it also has futural
characteristics in that it brings forth Dasein into its potentiality.
Anxiety allows Dasein to stand authentically in the face of its thrownness,
not just once, but any number of times. Heidegger elaborates further on the futural
character potentiality-for-Being revealed by anxiety: “…it also reveals the possibility
of an authentic potentiality-for-Being—a potentiality which must, in repeating,
come back to its thrown ‘there’, but come back as something futural which comes
towards.”86 This is not easy to understand: it appears that the futural aspect of
84 c.f. The relationship between recollection and repetition for Kierkegaard.
85 Heidegger, Being and Time, 388.
86 Ibid., 394.
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anxiety is that which comes back. It is not clear what makes potentiality-for-Being
futural. In the simplest sense, potentiality always implies the future, i.e., the
actualizing of a potentiality will occur at a future time. However, in the next
sentence Heidegger emphatically writes, “The character of having been is constitutive
for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability
is the specific ecstatical mode of this character.”87 He has switched from speaking
of the futural nature of the potentiality-for-Being to the “having been” or “in the
past” nature of anxiety. The difficulty of this passage stems from the temporality of
repetition being of both past and future, which seems contradictory.
Heidegger then elucidates another important difference between the
temporality of fear and anxiety which centers on the temporality of the present
moment and what he calls the “moment of vision” (Augenblick) Fear lets Dasein
“…drift back and forth between ‘worldly’ possibilities which it has not seized
upon.”88 However, unlike fear anxiety does seize the present: “In contrast to this
making-present which is not held on to, the Present of anxiety is held on to when
one brings oneself back to one’s ownmost thrownness.”89 The present moment seized
by anxiety signals a readiness for a moment of vision:
…even though the Present of anxiety is held on to, it does not as yet have the
character of the moment of vision, which temporalizes itself in a resolution.
Anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. The
87 Heidegger, Being and Time, 394.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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Present of anxiety holds the moment of vision at the ready; as such a
moment it itself, and only itself, is possible.90
As in the case of the call of conscience, where anxiety is a prerequisite which holds
Dasein open for receiving the call, here anxiety holds Dasein open for the possibility
of the moment of vision. Again, as with repetition, the moment of vision is a key
point of relation to Kierkegaard, so it must be explored more in depth here.
As with repetition, the moment of vision is an authentic form of temporality
with both past and future temporal elements. However, in addition to past and
future the moment of vision also encompasses the present moment:
To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a Present… In
resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the
objects of one’s closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having
been. That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is
authentic itself, we call the ‘moment of vision’.91
Again, as with repetition we have the motifs of “being brought back” and of “having
been.” This is the revelatory moment spoken of earlier wherein anxiety reveals the
impossibility of existence based solely on things of the world and the possibility
of authentic existence based on owning up to oneself and one’s death: “It means
the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities
and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern,
but a rapture which is held in resoluteness.”92 The aspect of the present moment in
the moment of vision is not temporal in the traditional sense: “ ‘In the moment
90 Heidegger, Being and Time, 394.
91 Ibid., 387.
92 Ibid.
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of vision’ nothing can occur; but as an authentic Present or waiting-towards, the
moment of vision permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’
as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.”93 This is indeed a “momentous” statement. It
sounds like Heidegger is saying that a moment of vision is necessary before anything
can be experienced in time at all.
The Third Footnote
This is the final point in Being and Time at which Heidegger acknowledges
Kierkegaard in a footnote:
S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon
of the moment of vision with the most penetration; but this does not signify
that he has been correspondingly successful in Interpreting it existentially.
He clings to the ordinary conception of time, and defines the ‘moment of
vision’ with the help of ‘now’ and ‘eternity’. When Kierkegaard speaks of
‘temporality’, what he has in mind is man’s ‘Being-in-time’94
Saying that Kierkegaard has provided the “most penetration” is the highest praise
that Heidegger will give him in Being and Time. It is very quickly cut short by
criticism that Kierkegaard is not operating in the ontological realm, and therefore
his analysis of the present moment is not up to par. Later we shall see if Heidegger
is justified in his criticism.
Returning to the point of how anxiety prepares Dasein for the moment of
vision we again see anxiety as a prerequisite state, here it holds Dasein open for a
93 Heidegger, Being and Time, 388.
94 Ibid., 497, fn. iii.
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moment of vision. In a rare moment Heidegger acknowledges the strangeness of
these ideas:
The temporality of anxiety is peculiar; for anxiety is grounded primordially
in having been, and only out of this do the future and the Present
temporalize themselves; in this peculiar temporality is demonstrated the
possibility of that power which is distinctive for the mood of anxiety.95
The peculiarity of the temporality of anxiety is that it is constituted of past,
present, and future. To further explain this peculiarity, we are reminded that,
“Fear is occasioned by entities with which we concern ourselves environmentally.
Anxiety, however, springs from Dasein itself.”96 This internal spring of anxiety is
a mounting of anxiety, which, “When understood temporally, this ‘mounting’ of
anxiety out of Dasein, means that the future and the Present of anxiety temporalize
themselves out of a primordial Being-as-having-been in the sense of bringing us back
to repeatability.”97 Again, the “having been” is emphasized as the most fundamental
characteristic of the temporality of anxiety. The authentic “having been” is
necessary before the coming back of repetition can take place. In a summary of this
section Heidegger clarifies the difference between the temporality of anxiety and fear:
Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of state-of-mind, are grounded
primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to
their own temporalization… Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness,
while fear springs from the lost Present…98
95 Heidegger, Being and Time, 394.
96 Ibid., 395.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
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The only futural aspect of fear is that the threatening entity is approaching. Fear
has no future “hope” that resolution provides.
There is only one more time that anxiety is mentioned in Being and Time,
and that is in the section on historicality, specifically in Heidegger’s description of
the concept of fate (Schicksals). No new aspects of anxiety introduced here, but
it bears brief mention because fate is also something that appears as a theme in
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety: “Fate is that powerless superior power which
puts itself in readiness for adversities—the power of projecting oneself upon one’s
own Being-guilty, and of doing so reticently, with readiness for anxiety.”99 This
sounds very much like his definition of resoluteness. The difference here is that fate
involves heritage, and Dasien’s “handing down” of itself to itself: “This is how we
designate Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and
in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it
has inherited and yet has chosen.”100 Heritage and handing down have to do with
Dasein being historical, that is, having existed over time. It is a completion of the
concept of repetition in the context of Dasein’s being historical. At this point, late
in Being and Time, there is so much “repetition” that the language is stacking up so
much as to become cumbersome. Heritage and handing down add slight nuances to
resoluteness, and thrownness:
99 Heidegger, Being and Time, 436.
100 Ibid., 435.
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The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current
factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the
heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back
resolutely to one’s thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of
the possibilities that have come down to one…101
The idea of handing down serves to flesh out the temporality of “having been” that
was introduced with the concept of repetition. It takes into account Dasein’s actual
existence over time and how Dasein learns from its previous experiences.
In Division Two we have seen the role that anxiety plays in Dasein’s
temporality. This occurred in three contexts. The first was Being-towards-death,
where anxiety is not to be confused with fear of death. We saw how anxiety was
involved in Dasein’s authentic anticipation of death or freedom towards death. The
second context in which anxiety appeared was that of conscience. This involved the
call of conscience, guilt and resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness then combined
authentic anticipation of death with resoluteness. The third context in which
anxiety appeared was temporality. The temporality of fear was differentiated from
anxiety. The latter involved the concepts of repetition and the instant. We have
now completed our journey through anxiety in Being and Time. We will now turn
to the concept as Kierkegaard presents it in Concept of Anxiety.
101 Heidegger, Being and Time, 435.
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Chapter IV: Concept of Anxiety: the First
Synthesis
As mentioned in the Introduction to this work, we will be looking mainly at
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety. This was Kierkegaard’s fifth major pseudonymous
work and was completed in the second year of authorship, in June of 1844. It was
published in the same month as Philosophical Fragments and the signed1 work Three
Upbuilding Discourses. The full title of the work is The Concept of Anxiety: A
Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of
Hereditary Sin, or in Danish: Begrebet Angest: En simpel psychologisk-paapegende
Overveielse i Retning af det dogmatiske Problem om Arvesynden.
The title provides a starting point for delving into the work. Let us pause for
a moment to look at the first word in the title. Looking at the Danish, Begrebet,
the German reader, and especially a reader of Hegel, will see a close resemblance
between Begrebet and the German der Begriff. This is even more apparent if the
-et suffix, which in Danish denotes the definite article, is removed. While it is
beyond the scope of this work to go into Hegel’s use and development of der Begriff,
which is also commonly translated as “notion,” it is worth noting that Kierkegaard
1 Signed by Kierkegaard as the author.
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chose Begrebet instead of Konceptet. The remainder of the title is dealt with in the
Concept of Anxiety’s Introduction, and will be examined below.
As with in our analysis of anxiety in Being and Time, we will proceed
through Concept of Anxiety seriatim for the most part, specifically examining
sections where anxiety is dealt with at length. Since Kierkegaard does not write in a
linear fashion, at times it will be necessary to skip forwards or backwards in the text
in order to clarify a point. Also, as with Being and Time, we will find that anxiety
is closely associated with and dependent upon various other concepts in the schema
of the work and those will need to be explained as well. Hopefully this can be done
without entangling the reader in the general confusion of Concept of Anxiety. Unlike
working with the fairly systematic Heidegger in Being and Time, at times it will be
quite challenging to nail down even a “working definition” of a concept as it appears
in Concept of Anxiety. For the most part I will use the convention of referring to the
pseudonym Haufniensis as the author rather than Kierkegaard himself.
It is important to understand how Haufniensis categorizes anxiety, since he is
very careful to make sure the reader understands what “sciences” he is considering
in his analysis. He puts forth the project of Concept of Anxiety as follows: “The
present work has set itself the task of treating ‘anxiety’ psychologically in such
a way as to have in mind and view the dogma of hereditary sin.”2 His task is not
merely an exploration of anxiety within the limits of the science of psychology, but
2 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 19.
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it also extends into the religious realm, to include the “dogma of hereditary sin.” He
will soon refer to dogmatics as a science. This project was stated explicitly in the
subtitle of the work: The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented
Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin. Setting it out as
“simple” is perhaps an example of of Kierkegaard’s wry sense of humor. The project
is also iterated in the preamble to the Introduction: “In what sense the subject
of this deliberation is a matter of psychological interest, and in what sense having
interested psychology it points precisely in the direction of dogmatics.”3 From the
three forms of his statement of the project, it would seem the psychology is the
primary context and that dogmatics is secondary. As we will see however, at times
the dogmatic context dominates, especially with regard to hereditary sin.
There are two main points to examine in his project statement. First, what
does Haufniensis mean by “treat psychologically”? This will involve a look at the
state of the science of psychology in Kierkegaard’s time as well as his exposure to it.
Secondly, what is the “dogma of hereditary sin?” This will entail a brief discussion
of Kierkegaard’s view of dogma and dogmatics. Then, since the bulk of Concept of
Anxiety is dedicated to explicating hereditary sin4 (arvesynd), much of this chapter
will hover around that concept.
3 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 13.
4 Indeed, it may have been more appropriate to title the work The Concept of Hereditary Sin.
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Treating Anxiety Psychologically
What is meant by treating anxiety psychologically? At first this sounds quite
reasonable to our modern ears, as psychology or “the psychological” is typically
the context in which we encounter the term anxiety. However, it is not a stretch
to say that the science of psychology in the pre-Freudian days of Kierkegaard
differed considerably from our contemporary science of psychology. Hannay agrees:
“Kierkegaard’s psychology is unlike any scientific disclipline that goes by that name
today.”5 He believes that Kierkegaard’s psychology is “…essentially Hegelian in its
structure and aims,” but it is “anti-Hegelian in its stress on the indivdidual subject.”6
While it is not possible to give even a cursory treatment of Hegel’s psychology here,
suffice it to say that his version of psychology was in support of the progress of
“spirit” through history. Hegel’s concept of spirit will be further explained below.
What was the state of the “science” of psychology like in mid-nineteenth
century Europe? Freud’s works did not appear until the end of the century.
Kierkegaard assumes that the reader understands what psychology is. It is known
that he took coursework in philosophy at University of Copenhagen from Frederick
Christian Sibbern,7 who he respected greatly. Sibbern published psychological works
5 Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography, xix.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 47.
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such as Psychological Pathology (1828)8 Some thinkers historically proximal to
Kierkegaard regarded Kierkegaard himself to be a psychologist, Watkin notes, “…in
a letter to Friedrich Nietzsche in 1881, writer and critic Georg Brandes (1842–1927)
wrote that he regarded Kierkegaard as one of the most profound psychologists who
ever lived…”. She continues by stating that it is “…probably true to say that had
Kierkegaard’s language been French, German, or English, he would have taken the
place in the history of psychology occupied by Sigmund Freud.”9
Whether or not it is true to say that Kierkegaard can be regarded as a
psychologist or proto-psychologist is beside the point, and it is beyond the scope of
the present work to investigate the state of the psychology in Kierkegaard’s time. It
is not particularly salient to the purpose of comparing Kierkegaard and Heidegger
either. It is my opinion that Kierkegaard was at least to some degree using irony
in classifying Concept of Anxiety as psychological. It is important to note that
Kierkegaard regarded psychology to be a science with set boundaries, and in this, he
is in agreement with Hegel’s and Heidegger’s definition of a science.
By setting anxiety in the context of what Heidegger would classify as an
ontic science, i.e. psychology, it would seem that at first glance that Heidegger’s
assessment of Kierkegaard’ s analysis in the footnote in Being and Time is correct.
Kierkegaard would agree with Heidegger that psychology is a science devoted to a
8 Julia Watkin, The A to Z of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 233.
9 Ibid., 49.
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particular topic. In fact, the first (long) sentence of the Introduction of Concept of
Anxiety opens by describing the “place” of a problem within a science:
That every scientific problem within the wide embrace of science has its
appointed place, its aim and limit, and for just that reason its harmonious
fusion within the whole, its justified consonance in what the whole tells us,
this consideration is not merely a pium desiderium [pious wish] that ennobles
the man of science with its inspiring or wistful fervor, not merely a sacred
duty that binds him in service to the whole and bids him forsake anarchy
and the adventurer’s urge to lose sight of the land; it is also in the interest of
every more specialized deliberation, because by forgetting where it belongs it
also, as language with its well-aimed ambiguity is wont to put it, forgets
itself, becomes something else, attains a suspect perfectibility in being able
to become whatever it likes.10
In the above quote, Kierkegaard describes the necessity of assigning a particular
problem to a particular science and in so doing keeping the problem within the
boundaries of that science. Much of Concept of Anxiety’s Introduction is devoted to
justifying how Kierkegaard places his analysis within the borders of the sciences of
psychology and dogmatics.
The Dogma of Hereditary Sin
Let us return to the second component of his project, of having “…in mind
and view the dogma of hereditary sin.” First however, it is worth noting the
language that Kierkegaard uses to connect the psychological treatment to the
dogma of hereditary sin. This is his frequently employed motif of having or keeping
something “in mind.” The original text, as it usually with this motif, is the Latin
10 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 13.
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in mente. He uses Latin here to emphasize that this is not trivial, or to elevate it
above the everyday concept. He is endeavoring to express that having something
in mind is more than merely “keeping it in a certain context,” or “having it serve
as the backdrop.” It is more an effort to merge background and foreground, in this
case to show how anxiety is intimately connected or “embedded” in the dogma of
hereditary sin. In the German Idealism tradition, hereditary sin can be thought of
as the “ground for the possibility of” anxiety.
We will need to clarify the terms “dogma” as well as “dogmatics”. It is
close to the standard concept, but Haufniensis applies a few nuances and emphases
that are worth examining. A couple of pages before the quote above, still in his
discussion of science, he points out that “…two sciences, ethics and dogmatics, are
fundamentally confused…”11 This hearkens back to Kierkegaard’s signature concept
of the “spheres of existence” that figures prominently in three of his previous works:
Either/Or (1843), Repetition (1843), Fear and Trembling (1843). The idea of the
spheres are developed further in works after Concept of Anxiety, especially Stages
on Life’s Way (1845) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846). Haufiensis
refers to spheres in a long footnote in Concept of Anxiety12 where he portrays it as
being quite well-known to the general public and thus not necessary to explain. He
refers occasionally to “the religious” or “the ethical” throughout the rest of Concept
of Anxiety, those being two of the three spheres of existence.
11 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 16.
12 Ibid., 22–23.
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The Spheres
In short, there are three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and
the religious. The works prior to Concept of Anxiety feature narratives of characters
that personify a particular sphere of existence. The aesthetic sphere is characterized
by a person living strictly according to his passions and appetites, without concern
for the moral consequences of his actions. The ethical sphere has to do with one’s
duty to society, church, marriage, and to act according to the moral imperative.13
The religious sphere transcends the dictates of ethics and societal duty, it epitomizes
the ideal of the individual standing alone before God. Kierkegaard does not
explicitly state a hierarchy of the spheres, although he indicates that the aesthetic
sphere is the least desirable, and the religious the most. However, there are aspects
of the aesthetic that are admirable, and aspects of the ethical that are points of
ridicule. He also doesn’t prescribe that there is a “progression” or mechanism by
which an individual moves from one sphere to the next, although movement into
to the religious sphere is accomplished via his famous “leap of faith.” While the
spheres are not expounded upon directly by Haufniensis, in this section about the
boundaries of science it is clear that he is reemphasizing Kierkegaard’s claim that
religion is not ethics, and that the two are not to be conflated. This must be kept in
mind as we proceed.
13 In the Kantian sense.
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Hereditary Sin
The next point of concern is what is meant by the dogma of hereditary
sin? Since this question constitutes a large portion of Concept of Anxiety, we
will not define it completely here, but we will at least consider a few attributes
that Haufniensis’ points out initially in his Introduction. He wants to find the
science that is appropriate to the study of sin. Unlike anxiety, its proper place is
not psychology: “Sin, however, is no matter for psychological concern…”14 Then
in a typical de-centering Kierkegaardian move he says, “Sin has its definite place,
or rather it has none at all, but that is its characteristic.”15 So, at this point, the
definite place of sin is no place at all, that is, there is no science proper to it. If it is
treated in the wrong place it’s concept is “corrupted.”
He places much emphasis on the “mood” that a particular science produces.
The Danish word that is translated as mood is Stemning, which can also be
translated as “atmosphere.” In a footnote Haufiensis notes that science in general
assumes a mood: “…science too, as much as poetry and art, assumes a mood on the
parts of both producer and recipient…” This mood or “modulation” (Modulationen)
must be the proper one since, “…an error in modulation is just as disturbing as an
error in the exposition of thought…”16 It is important to note here that the use of
14 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 19.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
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Stemning is quite different that Heidegger’s use of Stimmung as state-of-mind in
reference to anxiety. Here, mood refers to the “mode” of the science in question.
Although the mood of the recipient is mentioned, it is the mood that is the frame
of mind in which a concept is received. I am making much of how mood is used by
Haufniensis because this is one of the few places where mood appears in Concept
of Anxiety. It is clear that Heidegger was not appropriating his Stimmung from
Kierkegaard’s Stemning.
Haufiensis defends his point that sin has no proper science by listing
the “moods” produced by various sciences. He quickly dismisses aesthetics and
metaphysics as improper. If sin is studied under aesthetics, the mood would be
“frivolous or melancholic”;17 if under metaphysics, “…the mood becomes that of a
dialectical parity and disinterest which weighs up sin as something that cannot stand
up to thought.”18 He gives more treatment to psychology, “…the mood becomes that
of the persistent observer, of the dauntless spy, not the victorious flight of earnest
out of it.”19 Psychology has the mood of the observer being detached and not
intimately connected with the trials and tribulations of the individual. Psychology is
not involved enough: “The mood of psychology would be an antipathetic curiosity,
but the right mood is earnest’s stout-hearted resistance.”20 Haufniensis is heading
17 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 19.
18 Ibid., 20.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
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toward “earnestness” as being the most appropriate mood for the study of sin. The
Danish for earnestness, Alvorens, can also be translated as seriousness. We shall
return to earnestness later when Haufniensis develops it more fully.
He reiterates, “Properly speaking, sin belongs in no science.”21 He then
continues, sounding very much like the later pseudonym Johannes Climacus in
Concluding Unscientific Postcript (1846):
It [sin] is a theme for the sermon, where the individual talks as an individual
to the individual. In our own age, scientific self-importance has fooled the
priests into becoming a kind of professorial deacon who also serves science
and thinks preaching beneath his dignity.22
This gives a hint at what is meant by earnestness, i.e., it is an individual talking
to an individual. He then makes explicit “To the concept of sin corresponds the
mood of earnest.”23 He then backtracks and entertains the possibility that sin might
belong to ethics, but that cannot be so because ethics is an “ideal” science, “…it
wants to bring ideality into actuality.”24 He believes that it is also difficult to place
ethics in a science, that “…it is impossible for anyone to write an ethics without
having entirely different categories up his sleeve.”25 There is also the difficulty that
since sin is an “actuality” and ethics is an ideal science, then “If ethics is to include
21 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 21.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 22.
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sin, its ideality is at an end.”26 Luckily, Haufniensis is not analyzing sin in general,
but rather hereditary sin, and thus dogmatics can come to the rescue: “Hereditary
sin… removes the difficulty, not however with the help of ethics but with that of
dogmatics.”27
Dogmatics vs. Ethics
Haufniensis is keen to delineate dogmatics (Dogmatiken) from ethics
(Ethiken), and he attempts to do so in an systematic way. He spends so much
time here because these are the “sciences” where sin, especially hereditary sin, have
been traditionally been placed. His goal is his invention of a new ethics that blends
aspects of dogmatics and traditional ethics. He will call this new ethics the “second
ethics.”28
Why look at dogmatics and ethics at all, since it should be obvious that the
study of sin belongs to one or both of these sciences? Haufniensis initially suggests
(at least momentarily) that ethics is the science which studies sin (synd): “The
science in which sin might most plausibly find a place would surely be ethics.”29
There is a difficulty in placing sin within ethics however, because as noted earlier
26 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 24–25.
27 Ibid., 25.
28 Rather, it is tranlated this way. The Danish is either anden Ethiken, literally, the other ethics,
or nye Ethiken, the new ethics.
29 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 21.
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ethics is an “ideal science,” and sin is far from ideal. Ethics attempts to bring
“ideality into actuality.” The ideal and the actual are either Platonic or Hegelian
categories. The ideal being that of the universal, necessary, and incorruptible forms,
while the actual belongs to the contingent, particular, corruptible, everyday world.
For Haufniensis ethics as a science is concerned with the former, while sin is very
much in the realm of the latter. The approach of ethics is wrong because “…its
movement is not that of raising up actuality into ideality. Ethics points to ideality as
a task and assumes that a person is in possession of the required conditions.”30 The
“top down” directionality of ethics is problematic and makes it an innappropriate
science in which to study sin since “If ethics is to include sin, its ideality is at an
end.”31 The directionality issue is solved in the science dogmatics, since it employs
a bottom up approach: “With dogmatics begins the science which, in contrast to
that ideal science strictly so called, begins with actuality.”32 Instead of applying
ideality to actuality, dogmatics “…begins with the actual in order to raise it up into
ideality.”33 Here, hereditary sin (arvesynden)34 enters the picture, since dogmatics
“…does not deny the presence of sin; on the contrary it assumes it and explains it
30 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 21–22.
31 Ibid., 22.
32 Ibid., 25.
33 Ibid.
34 In Danish, literally “inherited-sin.” In modern Danish, arvsynden is usually translated as
original sin, but Hannay and other translators of Concept of Anxiety use hereditary sin to
emphasize the more literal aspect of inheritance.
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by presupposing hereditary sin.”35 For the science of dogmatics, hereditary sin is
an unquestioned a priori condition, as Haufniensis emphasizes: “Hereditary sin is
therefore not to be explained by dogmatics; the explanation is that it is something
presupposed…”36
Now, in a move similar to a Hegelian Aufhebung Haufniensis merges ethics
and dogmatics to arrive at his new science, what he will call the second ethics:
Here ethics finds its place again as the science that has the dogmatic
consciousness of actuality as a task for actuality. This ethics does not ignore
sin, and its ideality consists not in making demands ideally but in a
penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin…37
Thus, his second ethics, like dogmatics, begins in the realm of actuality. The second
ethics retains ideality as a task from the first ethics and adopts the presupposition
of hereditary sin and the bottom-up directionality of dogmatics:
The new ethics presupposes dogmatics and along with it, hereditary sin, and
now, with that, explains the sin of the individual while at the same time
presenting ideality as a task, not however by a movement downward from
above, but upward from below.38
Why not simply stay with dogmatics instead of creating a new science, the second
ethics? It is because dogmatics takes into account sin as condition for the human
race as a whole, whereas the second ethics addresses the “sin of the individual.”
35 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 25.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 26.
38 Ibid., 27.
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Haufniensis then points to a weakness with the second ethics regarding how
sin comes to be: “…the second ethics can deal with its manifestation, though not
with its coming to be.”39 Granted, the distinction between sin’s “manifestation” and
its “coming to be” is slight, but his point is that while the second ethics is capable of
dealing with the existence of sin, it is not able to articulate the mechanism by which
sin comes into existence. For the latter aspect, he turns to the science of psychology:
…the abiding state out of which sin constantly comes into being, not by
necessity… but by freedom… sin’s real possibility, this is an object of interest
for psychology. What can occupy psychology, and what it can occupy itself
with, is how sin can come to be, not that it comes to be.40
It isn’t made clear why the science of psychology can address the issue of sin’s
coming to be, but a key point here is the introduction of “freedom” and “sin’s
real possibility” Freedom will later be shown to be an essential characteristic of
anxiety, and is according to Haufniensis, a subject of study for psychology. He
reiterates: “With respect to sin, however, the whole content of actuality is properly
denied to it; what belongs to it is only its possibility.”41 Psychology revels in the
possibility of sin: “Psychology, on the other hand, loves it; it sits sketching the
contours and calculating the angles of possibility…”42 Here, psychology is portrayed
39 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 27.
40 Ibid., 28.
41 Ibid., 29.
42 Ibid.
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in a mathematical or Cartesian fashion, attempting to arrive at a formula for the
possibility of sin.
While psychology may be able to address the possibility of sin in terms of
actuality, it cannot complete the study of sin. For that, Haufniensis returns to the
need for dogmatics: “While psychology fathoms the real possibility of sin, dogmatics
explains hereditary sin, that is, the ideal possibility of sin.”43 Where, then does the
second ethics fit? “The second ethics has… nothing to do with sin’s possibility or
with hereditary sin… the second ethics has the actuality of sin within its scope.”44
Let us summarize how the triad of dogmatics, the second ethics, and
psychology work in conjunction to analyze sin. Traditional ethics, or “the first
ethics,” the seemingly obviously place to study sin is tossed out because it is too
focused on ideality. Because of this “The first ethics ran aground on the sinfulness
of the individual.”45 He introduces dogmatics as a possible solution. Dogmatics
addresses the problem of the actuality of sin for the human race by assuming
hereditary sin as a precondition. However, dogmatics is not geared to address the
problem of an individual’s sin. The second ethics is capable of handling the existence
of individual sin in terms of actuality but fails to explain how sin comes to be.
Psychology is able to explain how sin comes into existence, the “real possibility
43 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 29.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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of sin,” in terms of actuality and individual freedom. All three sciences are thus
required to complete the analysis of sin.
In the final sentences of the Introduction, in his own summary and charting
the way forward, Haufniensis directly refers to the Hegelian concepts of subjective
and absolute spirit:
Psychology has been called the doctrine of the subjective spirit. If we pursue
this science a little more closely we will see how, when it comes to the
problem of sin, it must first switch over to the doctrine of Absolute Spirit.
There lies dogmatics.46
This is a prime example of how Kierkegaard operates within Hegel’s System, even
though he frequently criticizes it. It is far beyond the scope of the present work to
outline Hegel’s concepts of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. An attempt
will be made to at least give the reader a cursory understanding of these concepts,
however.
In the Philosophy of Mind section of Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences,
Hegel divides spirit (Geist) into three parts: subjective, objective, and absolute. The
study of subjective spirit is further divided into three parts: anthropology (the soul),
phenomenology (consciousness), and spirit or mind (psychology). Haufniensis will
be operating primarily within psychology, but will also touch on phenomenology.
Hegel’s psychology is more akin to epistemology than today’s science of psychology.47
It deals with mental faculties such as attention, memory, imagination, and judgment.
46 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 30.
47 Glenn Alexander Magee, The Hegel Dictionary (London; New York: Continuum, 2010), 235.
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Subjective spirit describes the subject’s progression towards overcoming or annulling
the otherness of the object, to make it its own. Objective spirit is more concerned
with ethical behavior and adhering to societal norms. Absolute spirit has religion
and art within its realm. It does not appear to be a coincidence that Hegel’s three
levels of spirit map fairly closely on to Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence: the
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
Anxiety and Hereditary Sin
Let us now move out of the Introduction and into the main body of Concept
of Anxiety and look closely at where anxiety is first described. The first chapter is
entitled “Anxiety as Hereditary Sin’s Presupposition and as Clarifying Hereditary
Sin Retrogressively in Terms of its Origin.” Anxiety makes its appearance in “§5
The Concept of Anxiety.” This comes after Haufniensis has gone through sections on
“Historical Hints Regarding the Concept of Hereditary Sin,” “The Concept of the
First Sin,” “The Concept of Innocence,” and “The Concept of the Fall.” Haufniensis
is setting up anxiety in its relation to the account of Adam and Eve in the Garden
of Eden as given in Genesis Chapters 2–3. His chief aim will be to show anxiety
in its dialectical relationship to innocence. We will spend what may seem to be
an inordinate amount of time picking apart a few sentences where anxiety is first
introduced, but this will be important for identifying attributes that will distinguish
Kierkegaard’s anxiety from that of Heidegger.
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Anxiety as Innocence and Anxiety in Dreaming Spirit
Haufniensis begins defining anxiety as innocence: “This is the profound secret
of innocence, that at the same time it is anxiety.”48 How does he get from innocence
to anxiety? This is an example of Kierkegaard’s tendency to tease the reader with a
provocative statement that prima facie may not make complete sense. This is not to
be understood as “innocence is anxiety” in the logical form of A=B. It would have
been clearer (but perhaps less “poetic”) if he had said, “innocence and anxiety occur
simultaneously.” Haufniensis is pointing out that anxiety accompanies the state of
innocence. He never explicitly states that innocence produces or causes anxiety, but
as we will see, he suggests that innocence is prior to anxiety and that anxiety is an
attribute of the state of innocence.
In his previous section on the state of innocence in Adam before that fall he
has concluded that “Innocence is ignorance.”49 This has more the flavor of an A=B
premise than the innocence=anxiety premise above, i.e., innocence is the equivalent
of ignorance. Innocence is ignorance of good and evil or rather even the possibility
of good and evil, i.e., good and evil have not yet been posited.50 Ignorance does not
have negative connotations here, rather it is merely a primitive epistemological state
due to lack of experience.
48 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 50.
49 Ibid., 45.
50 Haufniensis make much use of the verb “to posit”
135
He connects innocence to anxiety via “nothing:”
In this state there is peace and repose, but at the same time there is
something else, something that is not dissension and strife, for there is
nothing against which to strive. What, then, is it? Nothing. But what effect
does nothing have? It begets anxiety.51
Even though in the state of innocence there is idyllic peacefulness there is also the
looming “nothing.” It will be helpful here to understand “nothing” as nothingness,
or as the nothing of Parmenides that was impossible to articulate.52 To borrow a
term from Heidegger, it is the “primordial” nothing. It should not be thought of as
merely “nothing in particular.”
Apparently innocence isn’t complete ignorance, since there is awareness of
nothing. Haufniensis’s innocence/ignorance is only in regards to good and evil.
Nevertheless, we have arrived at the causal factor of anxiety, i.e., the awareness of
nothing. Haufniensis appears to be veering in an ontological direction, however this
kind of ontology differs from that of say, Heidegger, because it is not concerned with
Being vs. non-Being in general, but is rather focused on the self vs. nothing.
The next characteristic of anxiety is its relation to “dreaming spirit”:
“Anxiety is an attribute of the dreaming spirit and belongs as such to psychology.”53
What is spirit and dreaming spirit in particular? Haufniensis will have much to
51 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 50.
52 G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and Malcolm Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical
History with a Selection of Texts, 2nd ed (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press,
1983), 247.
53 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 51.
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say about spirit later, here he does not define it specifically, but he does give
several of spirit’s properties. The opening lines of §5 are: “Innocence is ignorance.
In innocence the human being is not characterized as spirit but is psychically
characterized in immediate unity with its natural condition. Spirit is dreaming in
the human being.”54 Here we see that in the state of innocence, spirit is not yet
present but is “dreaming.” The self is not fully defined as human being. There is
no mediation between the entity and its environment, which is not to say that the
entity is an animal or even plant. The entity is not yet human but is potentially
human in the Aristotelean sense. Spirit is what will imbue the entity with its full
nature as a human being by giving it awareness of self and other, subject and object.
Dreaming spirit takes in the nothing: “Dreaming, spirit projects its own
actuality, yet this actuality is nothing, but innocence always sees this nothing
outside itself.”55 Haufniensis does not define specifically what he means by dreaming
spirit, but it appears to correspond to Hegel’s concept of spirit “in itself,” i.e., spirit
has a vague self awareness, but does not yet fully realize itself in relation to an other.
He further elaborates on the psychological aspects of the waking vs. sleeping, and
dreaming person: “Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited;56
54 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 50.
55 Ibid.
56 Both Hannay and Thomte translate the Danish word sat as “posited.” Sat simply means “set.”
Posited suggests that something is being hypothesized, which is confusing. Sat should be thought
of in the sense of “set in place,” “set forth,” or “given.”
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sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing hinted at.”57 Here is one of the
few occasions were Kierkegaard helpfully shifts away from universal abstraction and
gives the concrete example of “myself” (mig Selv) In waking, the difference between
myself and my other (mit Andet) can be distinguished. The difference is between
an extant particular “thing” that is myself and “a nothing” that is “my other.” In
non-dreaming sleep the difference dissolves. He does not indicate whether in this
state the sense of myself remains or if it too disappears. He then shifts back to using
the universal “spirit” in place of the particular myself/my other: “Spirit’s actuality
appears constantly as a form that tempts its possibility but disappears as soon as it
reaches out for it, and is a nothing that can only bring unease.”58 He is still speaking
about dreaming sleep here. The unease (ængste) is anxiety.
Fear of Nothing / Antipathetic Sympathy
He reaches the distinction between anxiety and fear that is often cited as
being appropriated by Heidegger:
The concept of anxiety is hardly ever seen treated in psychology, so I must
point out that it differs altogether from fear and similar concepts that refer
to something definite; whereas anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the
possibility of possibility.59
57 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 51.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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As Heidegger points out, fear has a definite object or is a result of a particular
threat. Anxiety does not have such an object, but is the result of the full realization
of the vast nothingness of freedom. Later Haufniensis will use the image of looking
into an abyss of freedom and the resulting dizziness as anxiety. As we will also
see, Haufniensis often refers to the ambiguity (Tvetydighed) of anxiety. At first
glance this appears to be similar to Heidegger’s characterization of anxiety as fear of
nothing in particular, but for Haufniensis the ambiguity of anxiety has the character
of confusion, even a terrifying confusion as will be described below in the case of
Adam.
We then arrive at Kierkegaard’s most quoted epigram regarding anxiety:
“Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.”60 This is
Kierkegaard as his best (or worst): providing a definition in seemingly paradoxical
terms. The interpretation of this statement has been along the lines of one being
involuntarily attracted to that which is dangerous.61 Usually the analogy of
looking into an abyss is employed in this interpretation: there is a simultaneous
attraction/repulsion of wanting to get close to the edge and look down into the
gaping maw and be terrified of falling in, but at the same time be fascinated by the
possibility of jumping. Haufniensis helpfully provides an example of sympathetic
antipathy as childlike curiosity:
60 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 51.
61 It is important to note that Heidegger does not appropriate this parodoxical definition of
anxiety.
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When we observe children, we find the anxiety more definitely intimated as a
seeking after the adventurous, the prodigious, and the mysterious…This
anxiety belongs so essentially to the child that the child will not do without
it; although it alarms, in its sweet anxiousness it also captivates.62
In this example, anxiety and curiousity are intertwined, or perhaps, anxiety drives
curiosity in a child. In any case, anxiety is essential and normal: “Only a prosaic
stupidity will think of it as a disorder.”63 Modern psychology and psychiatry treat
anxiety as a disorder, Haufniensis’s version of psychology does not.
He then briefly considers how anxiety is related to guilt, as a continuation of
the theme of his previous section of the current chapter on hereditary sin:
…the person who becomes guilty through anxiety is indeed innocent, for it
was not himself but anxiety, an alien power, that seized him, a power he did
not love but about which he was anxious. And yet he is indeed guilty, for he
sank down in anxiety, which he loved nevertheless in fearing it.64
It is important to note the idea that anxiety is portrayed here as an irresistible
external force. The sympathetic antipathy of anxiety is exhibited here. Anxiety is
not responsible for guilt unless the person sinks down into anxiety and is not able to
control it. Guilt will be considered more closely later.
He then returns to the role played by anxiety in the “synthesis” between soul
and body that constitutes an individual: “Everything depends on anxiety coming
into view. The human being is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical, but a
62 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 51–52.
63 Ibid., 52.
64 Ibid.
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synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit.”65
It is perhaps becoming clearer about what he means by spirit, i.e., it plays a role
in realizing the synthesis of the Cartesian duality of body and soul. Haufniensis is
speaking here about spirit’s role in the primordial state of innocence, “In innocence,
the human being is not merely animal, for if at any moment in his life he were
merely animal, he would never become a human being. So spirit is present but as
immediate, as dreaming.”66 Even in the initial state of innocence a human is more
than just an animal because of the presence of dreaming spirit. Spirit here is an
“ambiguous power” (tvetydige Magt) because it is at once both hostile and friendly:
So far as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly
upsets the relation between soul and body, a relation that does have
subsistence but then doesn’t have it, because it receives it first through
spirit. It is, on the other hand, a friendly power that wishes precisely to
constitute the relation.67
The hostile aspect of spirit disrupts the soul/body relationship even though the
friendly aspect defines that relationship. He then asks the question, “What then
is the human being’s relation to this ambiguous power; how does spirit relate to
itself and to that which conditions it?”68 His answer: “It relates as anxiety.”69 The
relation of spirit to body/soul as anxiety has to do with the very nature of spirit
65 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 53.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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and its simultaneous inability to escape itself or to grasp itself: “To do away with
itself, that spirit cannot do; seize itself, so long as it has itself outside itself, it
cannot do that either. Nor can the human being sink down into the vegetative, for
he is characterized as spirit.”70 Thus spirit is an ever-present ambiguous power in
the human, even if it is only dreaming. Haufniensis reemphasizes the sympathetic
antipathy of anxiety: “Flee from anxiety he cannot, for he loves it; really love
it he cannot, for he flees from it.”71 The human in the state of innocence is in a
predicament, in the perpetual condition of wishing to escape that which it loves. In
pure innocence, the vast nothingness of ignorance is revealed:
Innocence has now reached its peak. It is ignorance, not an animal
brutishness but an ignorance characterized by spirit, and it is as such
precisely anxiety, because its ignorance is about nothing. Here there is no
knowledge of good and evil, etc., but the whole actuality of knowledge
projects itself in anxiety as the enormous nothing of ignorance.72
The zenith of innocence corresponds to the same with anxiety. We should be
convinced by now that Haufniensis does not believe much in the “peace and repose”
of the state of innocence. Indeed he makes this state sound almost torturous.
Haufniensis then shifts back to the scenario of Adam and God’s prohibition
that he should not eat of the tree of knowledge. The prohibition itself causes Adam
to experience anxiety: “The prohibition makes him anxious, because it awakens in
him freedom’s possibility. What innocence let slip as the nothing of anxiety now
70 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 53.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
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enters him, and here again it is a nothing—the anxious possibility of being able.”73
Prohibition, which is a restriction of freedom causes Adam to be aware of his own
infinite freedom. God’s judgment and the ultimate punishment, death: “Following
the word of prohibition comes the word of judgment: ‘Then you shall surely die.’ ”74
Death is an unfamiliar concept to Adam, a condition that would severely limit his
freedom. This leads to a maximizing of anxiety as terror: “Adam of course has no
grasp at all of what it means to die, while on the other hand nothing prevents him,
supposing that it was said to him, from acquiring a notion of the terrifying.”75 It is
the ambiguity of anxiety that causes this terror: “The terror here is simply anxiety,
since Adam has not understood what was said, and so here again there is only the
ambiguity of anxiety.”76 Anxiety has become terror for Adam, even before he takes
of the tree of knowledge.
Haufniensis ends this introductory section on the concept of anxiety by
turning back towards the ethical and the role that anxiety plays in the context of
hereditary sin: “Innocence is brought in this way to its extremity. In anxiety, it is
related to the forbidden and to the punishment. It is not guilty, and yet there is an
anxiety as though innocence were lost.”77 At this extremity of innocence, Adam has
73 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 54.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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not yet eaten of the tree and therefore not yet sinned, but still the prohibition has
caused him so much anxiety that the spectre of guilt is on the horizon.
Objective and Subjective Anxiety
The next chapter of Concept of Anxiety turns full force into the relationship
between anxiety and hereditary sin. Haufniensis states, “The outcome of hereditary
sin, or hereditary sin’s presence in the individual, is anxiety, which differs only
quantitatively from that of Adam.”78 The quantitative difference is due to anxiety
increasing in each subsequent generation: “Anxiety in the later individual will,
on the other hand, be better able to reflect itself than in Adam, because in the
later individual the quantitative accumulation that the race puts behind it now
takes effect.”79 This is key to understanding what Haufniensis means by hereditary
sin (Arvesynden). Although he makes much of the relationship between sin and
“sensuousness,” hereditary sin is more than simply original sin—the doctrine
propounded by Augustine which dictates that Adam’s sin is transmitted to each
subsequent generation by concupiscence. Augustine’s sin does not increase in
each generation, whereas Arvesynden does. “Sinfulness has in this way acquired a
greater power, and hereditary sin is growing.”80 Along with hereditary sin, anxiety
78 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 64.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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is growing: “The anxiety that sin brings in with it is really only present when the
individual itself posits sin, and yet this anxiety is obscurely present as a more or a
less in the quantitative history of the race.”81
In order to get a better understanding of what Haufniensis means by
“quantitative,” we will need to look at it in relationship to “qualitative.” In general,
quantitative can be thought of as continuous, whereas qualitative is discreet.
Quantitative denotes change in small amounts, whereas qualitative is characterized
by large jumps or leaps between stages that may not even be qualitatively the same
or commensurable. With the quantitative, there is a “more or less,” and increase
or decrease is made without hindrance. However with the qualitative, once a leap
has been made there may be no returning to the previous state. An analogue of
the qualitative leap can be seen in subatomic physics, i.e., the quantum leap of an
electron from one energy state to the next. However, quantum denotes quantity,
which is not present in a qualitative leap.82
The exemplar of a qualitative leap—The Qualitative Leap—for Haufniensis
is the fall of Adam: “…the Fall is the qualitative leap.”83 Before the fall, Adam and
all of existence was in a state of innocence. After the fall, i.e., after sin entered
the world and a qualitative difference has been introduced, this universal state of
81 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 66.
82 Perhaps the “unit” of a qualitative leap could be called a “qualtum.”
83 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 66.
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innocence is forever removed. As we will see, each individual also has their own fall
from a personal state of innocence into that of sin and guilt.
Other examples of lesser qualitative leaps (not mentioned in Concept of
Anxiety) in an individual’s life include birth, salvation, marriage, and death. Birth
and death can mark qualitative leaps not only for the individual experiencing the
event, but also for family members and loved ones. Those lives are qualitatively
changed by these events as well so that there can never be a return to the previous
state. Anxiety in relation to sin has both qualitative and quantitative attributes:
Anxiety, then, means two things: the anxiety in which the individual posits
sin through the qualitative leap, and the anxiety that comes in and enters
with sin, and in that respect also enters quantitatively into the world every
time an individual posits sin.84
Because of the qualitative leap of Adam’s fall, there is always a base condition of sin,
but because every individual is capable of further sins, the state of anxiety and guilt
is quantitatively augmented with each sin of the individual. Anxiety is connected to
both forms of sin and increases as they increase.
The qualitative and quantitative aspects of anxiety are distinguishing factors
in what Haufniensis calls objective and subjective anxiety:
Anxiety, as it appeared in Adam, will never return, since it was through him
that sinfulness entered the world. For that reason there are now two
analogues to Adam’s anxiety: the objective anxiety in nature and the
subjective anxiety in the individual…85
84 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 67.
85 Ibid., 70.
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Objective anxiety was brought into the world through the qualitative leap of
the Fall, whereas subjective anxiety is due to the quantitative increasing of sin in
each individual.
Objective Anxiety
Objective anxiety is the “…generational sinfulness of the entire world.”86
Of course, sinfulness originated in Adam’s sin: “…through Adam’s sin, sinfulness
entered the world”87 and this had a irreversible effect on the whole of creation:
“Sin’s entering the world had significance for the whole of creation. The effect of
this sin on the nonhuman aspect of life I have called objective anxiety.”88
This form of universal anxiety is a primordial longing: “What this means
can be indicated by calling attention to the scriptural expression ἀποκαραδοκία της
κτίσεωϛ [the eager longing of creation] (Rom. 8:19).”89 Because of this longing,
“…it goes without saying that creation is in a state of imperfection.”90 This state of
imperfection implies the previous state of perfection, and this is the state which is
longed for:
86 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 70.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 71.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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One often fails to see with expressions and definitions such as longing, eager
longing, expectation, etc., that these involve an antecedent state, and that
this state is therefore present and simultaneously makes itself felt as that in
which the longing unfolds.91
It is interesting to note his tenet that the antecedent state is present and makes itself
felt. This concept will become clearer when we come to Haufniensis’s explanation of
“the instant” later.
The familiar background state of objective anxiety is that into which a
person comes into the world, and because humans are a part of the world, they also
produce anxiety in themselves and thus in turn contribute to this overall state:
This state of expectancy is not one that the person has fallen into by
accident, etc., thus finding himself a total stranger in it; he is producing it
himself at the same time. The expression for such a longing is anxiety; for it
is in anxiety that the state out of which he longs to be proclaims itself.…92
This sounds not unlike Heidegger’s concepts of inauthentic expecting and fallenness.
Haufniensis then connects objective anxiety to sensuousness:
This anxiety in creation can indeed properly be called objective anxiety. It is
not brought forth by creation but by the fact that Adam’s sin placed it in an
entirely different light, and insofar as sin continues to enter the world,
sensuousness is constantly degraded to mean sinfulness.93
He laid out the relationship between sensuousness and sin in an earlier section,
where it also involved the sexual and has to do with human being as a synthesis:
“If man were not a synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit, the sexual could
91 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 71.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 72.
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never have entered with sinfulness.”94 The reasoning behind this is not made clear,
however if we keep in mind that the synthesis is composed of body and soul, and
the former by necessity has a sensuous aspect, and further, that “…the extremity
of the sensuous is precisely the sexual,”95 then perhaps the meaning is clearer.
Sensuousness in its simplest form is not sinful, however, because of Adam’s sin, in
its extreme form as sexuality it became sinful, even though sexuality is required to
further the human race: “Sinfulness is then not sensuousness, not at all; but without
sin, no sexuality96 and without sexuality, no history.”97 Objective anxiety then, in
addition to the “eager longing” also has to do with the fact that sexuality is forever
degraded to being sinful.
Subjective Anxiety
In the section on subjective anxiety we come to one of the more well-known
Kierkegaardian metaphors. It is a physical example of what anxiety feels like in
terms of the leap. Haufniensis likens anxiety to the feeling of dizziness:
Anxiety can be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look
down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy… It is in this way that anxiety is
94 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 59.
95 Ibid.
96 This is a corrected translation of the word Sexualitet. Hannay confusingly translates it as
sensuousness, which would be the Danish word Sandseligheden. The entire sentence in Danish is,
“Syndigheden er da ikke Sandseligheden, ingenlunde, men uden Synden ingen Sexualitet og uden
Sexualitet ingen Historie.” The Thomte (1980) translation is correct here.
97 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 60.
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the dizziness of freedom… and freedom now looks down into its own
possibility and then grabs hold of finiteness to support itself.98
Just as one encounters dizziness when looking over the edge of a cliff one also feels
anxiety when confronted with the infinity of freedom. The anxiety of looking into
the abyss of freedom reaches a point where the individual becomes overwhelmed and
is compelled to find something finite on which to grab hold. Haufniensis then ties
this retreat from the infinite to guilt: “In that very instant everything is changed,
and in raising itself up again freedom sees that it is guilty. Between these two
moments lies the leap, which no science has explained and which no science can
explain.”99 At the moment where finiteness is sought, the personal leap is made
and guilt enters the picture. Like anxiety, this guilt is not directed at a particular
object, but is ambigious: “The person who becomes guilty in anxiety becomes as
ambiguously guilty as it is possible to become.”100 The personal fall occurs when the
person is in a weakened or compromised state: “Psychologically speaking, the fall
into sin always occurs in a state of enervation.”101
In the next section Haufniensis returns to the theme of how anxiety is
connected with sensuousness, and that “…the proportion of sensuousness corresponds
98 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 75.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
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to that of anxiety.”102 Here he focuses on the bodily component of the synthesis of
body and soul. He begins by attempting to show that anxiety was more pronounced
in Eve than in Adam: “…anxiety is more reflected in Eve than in Adam. This is
because the woman is more sensuous than the man”103 Woman apparently has more
anxiety than the man because there is an imbalance in the synthesis. In woman, the
body dominates the synthesis:the body dominates the synthesis:
…it is not a matter of an empirical state, or of an average number, but of the
dissimilarity in the synthesis. If in one part of the synthesis there is a ‘more,’
a result will be that when spirit posits itself, the cleft becomes deeper and in
freedom’s possibility anxiety will find greater scope.104
He names two other causes of anxiety that are related to the body. The first is
modesty: “There is an anxiety in modesty because spirit is defined at the extremity
of the difference of the synthesis in a way that identifies spirit not merely as body
but as body with the sexual difference.”105 Modesty is the first post-Fall form of
anxiety mentioned in Genesis. Before the fall, there was no such anxiety: “And
the man and his wife were both naked, and were not ashamed.”106 However, the
very first action after Eve and Adam ate the fruit of the tree was to exercise sexual
modesty:
102 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 79.
103 Ibid., 78.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., 84.
106 Genesis 2:25 (NRSV)
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…she took of its fruit and ate; and she also gave some to her husband, who
was with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both were opened, and they knew
that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made loincloths
for themselves.107
The first words of Adam to God reflect this anxiety: “He said, ‘I heard the sound
of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself.’ ”108
For Haufniensis the anxiety of modesty has to do with spirit facing up to the sexual
difference: “The real significance of modesty is that spirit cannot, so to speak, own
up to the extremity of the synthesis. That is why the anxiety found in modesty is
enormously ambiguous.”109
The next form of anxiety having to do with the sexed body is the erotic:
“Just as anxiety is posited in modesty, so is it present in all erotic enjoyment…”110
For the same reason as in modesty there is anxiety in the erotic, but there is an
additional aspect to anxiety in the erotic: “But why this anxiety? It is because
spirit cannot take part in the culmination of the erotic.”111 We shall assume that by
culmination he means sexual climax. At that moment, spirit is pushed into the
background and the bodily aspect of the synthesis dominates:
Spirit is indeed present, because it is spirit that establishes the synthesis, but
it cannot express itself in the erotic; it feels alien. It is as though it said to
107 Genesis 3:6-7
108 Genesis 3:10
109 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 84.
110 Ibid., 87.
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the erotic: ‘My dear! Here I cannot be a third party, so I shall go into hiding
for the time being.’ 112
The spirit retreats during the height of erotic enjoyment, but anxiety is present
because of extreme imbalance of the synthesis. The anxiety associated with the
erotic is not necessarily a bad thing: “But when the erotic is pure, innocent, and
beautiful, then this anxiety is friendly and mild, and the poets are therefore right
when they speak of a sweet anxiousness.”113 Haufniensis also gives a similar model
of anxiety present in conception and birth, noting again that spirit is farthest away
so anxiety is at an extreme. This type of anxiety is an indication of the ‘perfection’
of human nature: “Anxiety…is an expression of the perfection of human nature…”114
We again see the refrain of the proportional relationship between anxiety
and sensuousness: “But the more anxiety, the more sensuousness.”115 Haufniensis
now suggests that this increase in what is the objective anxiety of the entire race is
due to the increase in sensuousness in each generation: “The procreated individual
is more sensuous than the original, and this ‘more’ is the common ‘more’ of the
generation for every later individual with regard to Adam.”116 Haufniensis has been
explicating subjective anxiety, which varies in each individual, so in addition to the
112 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 88.
113 Ibid.
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increasing objective anxiety of each generation, there is ‘more and less’ of subjective
anxiety for an individual: “But this ‘more’ of anxiety and sensuousness for every
later individual in relation to Adam may of course signify a more and less in the
particular individual.”117
The increase in sensuousness in each generation leads to greater anxiety in
each generation, and can lead to the “maximum” of anxiety about sin: “Just because
sensuousness here is defined as a ‘more,’ spirit’s anxiety in assuming responsibility
for it becomes a greater anxiety. The maximum here is the dreadful fact that anxiety
about sin produces sin.”118 The individual does not even have to have actually sinned.
It is enough that the individual merely be worried about appearing to have sinned:
“At this point a maximum may appear… that the individual in anxiety about sin
produces sin, in this case: the individual, in anxiety not about becoming guilty but
about being seen as guilty, becomes guilty.”119 This is a key point about anxiety that
will be developed in greater detail later. Haufniensis will call this manifestation of
anxiety “anxiety about the evil.”
In the first half of Concept of Anxiety we have examined how the analysis of
anxiety belongs to the science of psychology, although the sciences of the “second
ethics” and dogmatics are also involved. The first two chapters were dedicated to
anxiety’s role in the first synthesis, that is the synthesis of body and soul. Here we
117 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 89.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 91.
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saw anxiety in the primal state and it’s relationship to innocence and dreaming
spirit. We looked at Haufniensis’s concept of hereditary sin and how it is responsible
for objective anxiety in all creation. We also saw that in addition to objective
anxiety, subjective anxiety is present in each individual. Subjective anxiety largely
involved sensuousness, i.e. the anxiety of existing in a sexed body. We are now
ready to look at the role that anxiety plays in the second synthesis that is exposited
in the next chapter.
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Chapter V: Concept of Anxiety: the Second
Synthesis
Anxiety of Lacking Awareness of Sin
The next category of anxiety Haufniensis discusses is the kind that is due
to the individual or even a society being unaware that they are in the state of
sin. What he calls the sin of “sin-conciousness’s non-appearance.” There are three
components of this category: the anxiety of spiritlessness, the anxiety of fate, and
the anxiety of guilt. This category has to do with the “second synthesis.” The first
synthesis was that of soul and body bound together by spirit. The second synthesis
is that of the temporal and eternal: “The human being was, then, a synthesis of
soul and body, but also is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.”1 Haufniensis
notes there is a difference between these two syntheses. The first synthesis had three
definite components, whereas in the second, the third “binding” component appears
to be missing:
As for this latter synthesis, what immediately strikes one is that it is formed
otherwise than the first. The two factors there were soul and body, and then
spirit the third, although in a way that one could properly speak of a
1 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 104.
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synthesis only when spirit is posited. The latter synthesis has only two
factors, the temporal and the eternal. Where here is the third?2
There is a third component of the temporal-eternal synthesis, though it is not
completely analogous to spirit in the soul-body synthesis. The third component is
“the instant” (Øieblikket)3 The category of anxiety related to the second synthesis
has to do with the failure to realize the eternal nature of the instant.
The Instant/Temporality
In order to have a better understanding of this category of anxiety, we will
need to become familiar with temporality as Haufniensis explains it. He wants
to reject the traditional view of time as merely past, present in future. The
concepts of past and future aren’t particularly problematic, but the traditional
concept of the present moment as the dividing point or discremen between past and
future that Haufniensis finds unacceptable. Sounding very much like Heidegger,
he says, “Thinking that this division can be upheld is due to an instant’s being
spatialized, but this brings the infinite succession to a halt; it is through introducing
representation, by allowing time to be represented instead of being thought.”4
It is the Cartesian “spatial” or mathematical representation of the instant that
Haufniensis rejects. He believes the instant should be thought of as “…eternity’s
2 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 104.
3 This is a key point of the Heidegger/Kierkegaard relationship.
4 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 104–105.
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reflection in time,”5 in effect, “The present is the eternal, or rather, the eternal is the
present and the present is fullness.”6 The instant is where “…time and eternity touch
each other.”7 Haufniensis realizes the difficulty in speaking of the instant in these
terms, and he like Heidegger after him, considers the literal meaning of Øieblikket:
“ ‘The instant’ is a metaphor and in that regard not so good to deal with. But it is
a beautiful word to take heed of. Nothing is as swift as a twinkling of the eye, and
yet it is commensurable with the content of the eternal.”8 The twinkling or glance of
the eye is a reference to I Corinthians 15:51–52, where Paul says, “Listen, I will tell
you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will all be changed, in a moment, in the
twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead
will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed.”9 For Paul, the twinkling of an
eye represents a qualitative leap from death to eternal life.
The instant is also involved in the first synthesis: “The synthesis of the
temporal and the eternal is not another synthesis but the expression for that first
synthesis according to which man is a synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit.
Once spirit is posited, the instant is there.”10 The instant occurs when spirit comes
5 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 104.
6 Ibid., 106.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 108.
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on the scene to form the soul-body synthesis. The two syntheses are united when
the spirit is realized as eternal:
The synthesis of the psychic and the somatic is to be posited by spirit, but
spirit is eternal and the synthesis is accordingly only when spirit posits the
first synthesis as, additionally, the second synthesis of the temporal and the
eternal. As long as the eternal is not posited, the instant is not, or is only a
discrimen.11
In the second synthesis, Haufniensis equates temporality with the bodily or sensous
component of the first synthesis: “As with sensuousness, so with temporality.”12
Like sensuousness, temporality becomes sinfulness once sin is posited: “The instant
that sin is posited, temporality is sinfulness. We do not say that temporality is
sinfulness, any more than that sensuousness is sinfulness; but with the positing of
sin, temporality signifies sinfulness.”13 The idea that temporality is associated with
sinfulness is seen in the following section on spiritlessness.
Death
Before examining spiritlessness, we must pause to look at the footnote that
accompanies the quote above (temporality is sinfulness) that briefly addresses
Haufniensis’s thoughts on the role of anxiety and death. Since this is a point of
connection with Heidegger’s Being-towards-death, it is worth a quick look at this
footnote. He begins by stating, “From the definition of temporality as sinfulness
11 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 111.
12 Ibid., 108.
13 Ibid., 112–113.
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it follows that death is in turn punishment.”14 This follows from God’s judgment
upon Adam’s punishment mentioned here in Chapter 3: “Then you shall surely
die.” As with anxiety, the more “perfect” the organism, the greater the effect of
death: “…death announces itself the more terribly the greater the perfection of the
organism.”15 This is not only true of the human species versus animals, but also true
for individual humans: “…it is indeed true that the more highly the human being is
rated, the more frightful is death.”16 There is the effect of death that corresponds
to objective sin, i.e., it is common to the human race, but there is also the added
terrible effect that takes place in the greater individual, similar to subjective sin.
Haufniensis relates the terrible anxiety of death to the anxiety of birth, generally
when the body-soul synthesis is at an extreme:
“Death’s anxiety therefore corresponds to the anxiety of birth… In the
moment of death the human being finds itself at the extreme point of the
synthesis; it is as though spirit cannot be present for it cannot die, and yet it
must wait because the body has to die.”17
Here again, as in the sexual act, spirit can have no part and must “wait” for the
body. This emphasizes the eternal nature of spirit versus the finite nature of
body. Let us leave this topic for now, we will return to a discussion of the anxiety
14 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, fn. 112.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., fn. 112–113.
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associated with death and Heidegger’s Being-towards-death in the conclusion of this
work.
Anxiety & Spiritlessness
In the next section, Haufniensis discusses anxiety, or rather the absence of
anxiety in what he terms paganism and spiritlessness. His definition of paganism is
not simply non-Christian or non-Jew. A pagan is one who lives in temporality, i.e.,
one who does not realize the eternal. This living in time in the quantifiable sense
is the sin of paganism: “Paganism as it were stretches out time with quantifying
attributes, never arriving at sin in the most profound sense, but this precisely is
sin.”18 Paganism exists within any religion, including Christianity: “The life of
Christian paganism is neither guilty nor not guilty; it recognizes no real distinction
between present, past, future, the eternal.”19
Closely related to paganism is Haufniensis’s idea of spiritlessness.
Spiritlessness is less desirable than paganism because at least the latter is making
an attempt at realizing spirit, even if incorrectly. Spiritlessness is the complete
ignorance or avoidance of any kind of spiritual existence. Because neither condition
realizes spirit, there is no true anxiety:
In spiritlessness there is no anxiety. It is too happy for that, too content, and
too spiritless. But this is a very pitiable reason, and paganism differs from
18 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 114.
19 Ibid.
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spiritlessness in the former being definable as directed toward spirit and the
latter as directed from spirit. Paganism is, if you will, the absence of spirit
and thus differs far from spiritlessness. Paganism is in this respect much to
be preferred.20
The ignorance of spirit can give the spiritless person a false sense of security: “The
perdition of spiritlessness, as well as its security, consists exactly in its understanding
nothing in a spiritual way…”21 Haufniensis reneges a bit on his claim that anxiety
is completely absent in spiritlessness, even though the person is ignorant of it, it is
lurking in the background: “Even if there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because it
is excluded just as is spirit, anxiety is still present except that it is waiting.”22
Anxiety & Fate
In the next section, Haufniensis develops the role played by anxiety in
paganism. Unlike the condition of spiritlessness, there is a type of anxiety present in
paganism: “It is commonly said of paganism that it rests in sin; it might be more
correct to say that it rests in anxiety.”23 The sin of paganism is of resting in finite
temporality and in sensuousness. However, there is a superficial relationship to
spirit: “Paganism is generally speaking sensuousness but a sensuousness that has a
relation to spirit, although without spirit being in the most profound sense posited
20 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 116.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 117.
23 Ibid.
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as spirit. But this possibility is precisely anxiety.”24 Even though the relationship to
spirit is not in the most profound sense, it is in the possibility of the relationship to
spirit where anxiety arises. Haufniensis reminds the reader of his original tenet that
anxiety is directed at nothing. There is a nothing specific to paganism: “…what is
it then, more particularly, that the nothing of anxiety signifies in paganism? It is
fate.”25 The nothing of paganism is fate.
Unlike the true inward relation to spirit, the pagan relates to spirit as
something external: “Fate is a relation to spirit as external to it; it is a relation
between spirit and something other that is not spirit…”26 The pagan relates to
spirit as something finite, temporal, and inconsistent. An example of this kind of
relationship given by Haufniensis is that of the ancient Greeks’ relationship to the
Oracle at Delphi. The Greeks had a necessary relationship to the Oracle because of
their belief, yet this relationship was to something as completely external.
Fate “…is a unity of necessity and contingency.”27 Because of the relation to
something eternal, anxiety appears: “The pagan cannot come into a relation to fate,
because the very instant that it is the necessary, in the next it is the accidental. And
still he is in relation to it, and this relation is the anxiety.”28 This kind of relationship
24 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 117–118.
25 Ibid., 118.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 119.
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is possible within Christianity: “Within Christianity, one finds paganism’s anxiety
with regard to fate wherever spirit, although present, is not essentially posited as
spirit.”29 So even within Christianity, the relationship to spirit can be to something
as external and finite.
The extreme case of a person caught up in fate is “the genius.” Haufniensis
does not define what he means by genius, but it later becomes apparent that here
he is focused on “immediate genius.” This is an attribute of someone who possesses
the height of talent, but bound to exist only temporally and outwardly.30 Immediate
geniuses are those with pronounced aesthetic or political/military talents, e.g.,
Napoleon. Although Haufniensis does not take it as far, this genius can be thought
of as analogous to Aristotle’s great-souled man or Nietzsche’s Ubermensch. The
life of the genius is dictated by destiny and fate, which is realized in proportion to
the level of genius: “…the genius continually discovers fate, and the more profound
the genius, the more profound the discovery.”31 The genius believes their life to
be directed by a definite plan toward a particular end. This belief can lead to
greatness, but also to downfall: “…through its discovery of fate that genius shows its
primordial power, but then also in turn its impotence.”32 The immediate genius does
29 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 120.
30 Watkin, The A to Z of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, 94.
31 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 120.
32 Ibid.
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not transcend temporality, and because of this fact will never experience “deeper”
anxiety:
To itself genius does not become significant in the most profound sense; its
compass can extend no further than that of fate in relation to fortune,
misfortune, esteem, honor, power, immortal fame, all of which are temporal
terms. Every deeper dialectical characterization of anxiety is excluded.33
Later Haufniensis will speak of “religious genius” which will differ from immediate
genius by its relation to spirit as internal and eternal.
Anxiety & Guilt
The next section is concerned with anxiety and its relation to guilt.
Haufniensis focuses on Judaism (and in passing, Catholicism). His first sweeping
generalization is, “Judaism rests in anxiety.”34 The anxiety of Judaism is not about
fate like that of the pagan or genius, it is rather directed at guilt: “The anxiety
found in Judaism is anxiety about guilt.”35 It later becomes clear that this anxiety
is not about actually being guilty, but rather is about merely being thought to be
guilty. This was described earlier as the “maximum” of being in anxiety about sin
or anxiety about appearing to be in sin, c.f. anxiety about evil below.
As with paganism Judaism has an external object. The analogue of the
pagans’ oracle in Judaism is the sacrifice: “To the oracle in paganism there
33 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 124.
34 Ibid., 125.
35 Ibid., 126.
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corresponds in Judaism the sacrifice.”36 The sacrifice as the external object is
preferable to the oracle because it offers some solace, however it is still only alleviates
the anxiety of being thought guilty: “The Jew has recourse to the sacrifice but it
does not help him, for what would really help is the canceling of the relation of
anxiety to guilt and the positing of a relation that is actual.”37 There is no “actual
relation” because the sacrifice is a finite external action.
Haufniensis contrasts the anxiety of Judaism with that of the “religious
genius.” Unlike the immediate genius who is focused outwardly, the religious genius
is turned inwardly. The analogue of the immediate genius’ fate is guilt, but unlike in
Judaism it is actual guilt: “The first thing he does is to turn toward himself. Just as
the immediate genius has fate as the figure that follows him, so this one has guilt.”38
Like fate, for the immediate genius the guilt is proportional to the level of religious
genius: “In turning toward himself, he discovers guilt. The greater the genius, the
more profoundly is guilt discovered.”39 The inward turn also discovers freedom, not
an external freedom, but an inner freedom. This negates any fear of fate:
In turning inward he discovers freedom. Fate he does not fear, for he takes
up no outward task and for him freedom is his bliss; not freedom to do this
36 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 126.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 130.
39 Ibid., 131.
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or that in the world, to become king and emperor… but freedom to know
within himself that he is freedom.40
By turning inward and realizing the eternal, the religious genius experiences an
infinite freedom that it not tied to glories or rewards in the external world. However,
anxiety is not absent. In place of the fear of fate that the immediate genius had,
the religious genius fears actual guilt: “It is, as fate was, the only thing he fears,
and yet his fear is not what was its maximum in the former case, namely, fear of
being thought guilty, but fear of being guilty.”41 The fear of guilt is there because
it can deny the religious genius its freedom: “The more he discovers freedom, the
more sin’s anxiety is upon him in the state of possibility. Only guilt frightens him,
for guilt alone can deprive him of freedom.”42
Anxiety as the Result of the Individual’s Sin
In his next chapter Haufniensis examines the anxiety that is the result of
sin in the single individual. Unlike other types of ambiguous anxiety or anxiety
directed at nothing, this anxiety has a very definite object: “…the object of anxiety
is something definite, its nothing an actual something, because the distinction
between good and evil is posited in concreto, and the anxiety has therefore lost its
40 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 131.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 131–132.
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dialectical ambiguity.”43 There are two forms of this anxiety that correspond to the
two parts of the distinction: anxiety about the evil, and anxiety about the good.
Anxiety about the Evil
The first form of this anxiety that is a consequence of the actuality of an
individual’s sin is anxiety about the evil. Here, “The individual is in sin, and his
anxiety is about the evil. This formation, when seen from a higher standpoint, is
in the good, for that is why it is anxiety about the evil… The bondage of sin is an
unfree relation to the evil…”44 This is the subjective anxiety that was earlier given
as the “maximum” anxiety about being guilty or appearing to be guilty. Here the
person is sinning further by worrying about sin. In the anxiety about the evil “…the
anxiety is about the actuality of sin” and “…about the further possibility of sin.”45
To add to the problem, in this anxiety the person does not want their individual
sin to be completely be removed, however they do strive to have sin quantitatively
diminished: “Anxiety wants the actuality of sin removed, not entirely but to a
certain degree, or more exactly it wants to a certain degree to have the actuality of
sin continue but, be it noted, only to a certain degree.”46 While the person wants
43 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 134–135.
44 Ibid., 144.
45 Ibid., 139.
46 Ibid., 138.
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to have their sin lessened, they do not wish it to be entirely alleviated because that
would remove the need to worry about sin.
The striving to lessen individual sin is attempted through repentance, but
according to Haufniensis, the power of repentance is deficient in that it cannot do
away with the sin, “…repentance cannot cancel sin, it can only sorrow over it.”47
Nevertheless, “Anxiety throws itself despairingly into the arms of repentance.”48
Repentance thus provides some kind of solace for the person in anxiety about the
evil in that it offers to quantitatively and temporarily lessen sin, but is still provides
this person with the condition of being able to worry about sin and the mounting
of future sin. How can one finally overcome the deficiency of repentance? Even
though this is something that the person in anxiety about evil would never consider,
Haufniensis claims that this deficiency is accomplished through faith: “All that can
truly disarm the sophism of repentance is faith…”49 This is because “…only in faith
is the synthesis eternally and in every instant possible.”50 Recall that the synthesis
spoken of here is that of spirit in eternity through the instant.
47 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 139.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 141.
50 Ibid.
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Anxiety about the Good
The second form of anxiety that is a result of the individual’s sin is
anxiety about the good, which Haufniensis inexplicably calls “the demonic” (det
Dæmoniske). Even though he called anxiety about evil a “maximum,” he goes on at
great length and many pages about the demonic, suggesting that this is in fact the
greatest (or worst) form of anxiety.
Here, the situation is the reverse of anxiety the evil: “The individual is in the
evil and is anxious about the good… the demonic is an unfree relation to the good.”51
Haufniensis gives a brief definition of what he means by the good: “The good, of
course, signifies the restoration of freedom, redemption, salvation, or whatever one
wants to call it.”52 Even though he did not include it, we would assume faith, as the
complete absolution of individual sin is included in the good. For Haufniensis the
demonic is more insidious and widespread than anxiety about the evil. He begins by
listing three approaches to viewing this form of anxiety: the aesthetic-metaphysical
point of view, in ethical condemnatory terms, and in terms of medical treatment.
With the aesthetic-metaphysical point of view, the demonic is seen as
fate or misfortune and is approached sympathetically. This is a self-protection
mechanism on the part of the demoniac: “Far from standing the sufferer in good
stead, sympathy is sooner just a way of protecting one’s own egotism. Not daring in
51 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 144.
52 Ibid.
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a deeper sense to think about such things, one saves oneself through sympathy.”53
Here the demoniac makes excuses about avoiding the good in order to protect their
own ego. These excuses are rationalizations about the good being an unachievable
goal, so there is little point striving for it. The person does not believe they are
worthy of such a task and that it is simply easier to remain in the demonic state.
When the demonic is viewed in ethical condemnatory terms, physical punishment
is involved. Haufniensis cites the “frightful severity” of the punishment historically
inflicted on the demoniac. The medical view takes the demonic as having a malady
in the physical body that is to be treated, what we now would call a psychiatric
condition. From the three viewpoints listed, it becomes apparent that the demonic
“…belongs in a way to all spheres: the somatic, the psychic, and the spiritual.”54 The
aesthetic-metaphysical takes in the physic and spiritual; the ethical condemnatory
view is primarily corporeal; and the medical is psychosomatic, involving physic and
bodily elements. Haufniensis reminds us of how the three components of body, soul,
and spirit are interdependent and that a disturbance in one affects all three: “…the
human being is a synthesis of psyche and soma sustained by spirit, and a disorder in
one therefore manifests itself in the others.”55
The demonic condition is widespread, and to some degree, everyone
experiences it: “…there are traces of it in every person as surely as every person is
53 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 145.
54 Ibid., 147.
55 Ibid.
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a sinner.”56 The demoniac sets up the good as that which is to be rejected because
it is a threat to freedom: “Freedom is posited as unfreedom, because freedom is
lost.”57 The goodness of redemption and salvation are seen by the demonic person as
“unfreedom.” This unfreedom wants to hide away: “The demonic is unfreedom that
wants to close itself off.”58 Haufniensis characterizes at length closed-off or “reserved”
nature of the demoniac i.e., as withdrawn and unwilling to communicate. “Freedom
is always in communication… unfreedom withdraws ever more in its reserve and will
not communicate.”59 He gives a biblical example of a demoniac:
…a demoniac in the New Testament says to Christ, when he approaches: τί
ἔμοὶ και σοὶ [What have I to do with you], and goes on to suggest that Christ
has come to destroy him (anxiety about the good). Or a demoniac implores
Christ to go another way.60
This example shows how the demoniac is always resentful at never appearing to be
“good enough” and thus withdraws into a reserved state.
Haufniensis gives two other aspects of the the demonic that are related to its
reserve: the demonic is the sudden; and the demonic is the contentless, the tedious.
What does he mean by these seemingly arbitrary characteristics of anxiety about
the good? The sudden (det Pludselige) has to do with the break in the continuity
56 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 148.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 149.
59 Ibid., 148.
60 Ibid., 150.
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of communication: “Reserve shuts itself off ever more from communication. But
communication is in turn the expression of continuity, and the negation of continuity
is the sudden.”61,62 This becomes clearer when Haufniensis describes the demonic as
reserve that is discontinuous, i.e., it is not ever-present: “In one instant it is there,
in the next it is gone, and no sooner is it gone than it is there again, whole and
complete.”63 Pludselige can also be translated as “abrupt,” which suggests that one
can fall in and out of the reserved demonic state unexpectedly and without warning.
How reserve is the contentless and the tedious is not well explained. Haufniensis
offers this tautology as an explanation:
In now bringing in the contentless and the boring as an additional term, this
reflects upon the essence and the reserved on the form corresponding to the
essence. This completes the whole conceptual definition, since the form of
contentlessness is precisely reserve.64
I will offer this interpretation: the reserved state as a closing off and rejection of the
good lacks any “true” or substantial content, i.e., any content worthy of interest. It
becomes a nothing. Because of this lack of content the demoniac faces boredom and
tedium in the reserved state.
Returning to the idea that unfreedom is freedom lost, Haufniensis
proposes two ways in which the freedom lost manifests itself in the demoniac:
61 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 156.
62 Note the similarity here of “communication” and Heidegger’s call of conscience.
63 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 156–157.
64 Ibid., 161.
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psychosomatically and spiritually. In the first, less common way, the manifestation
of unfreedom presents itself in the body: “…the body is the soul’s organ, and thus in
turn that of spirit. Once this ministering relationship ceases, once the body revolts,
and once freedom conspires with the body against itself, unfreedom is present as
the demonic.”65 This is a manifestation of the “medical viewpoint” propounded
earlier. Haufniensis provides examples of the symptoms: “A hypersensibility and a
hyperirritability, neurasthenia, hysteria, hypochondria, etc., all of these are or could
be nuances of it.”66 The spiritual manifestation of the demoniac’s unfreedom is the
more common than its bodily manifestation: “This form of the demonic is very
widespread and we meet here the most diverse phenomena.”67 In its more minor
forms,
…the demonic can express itself as a laziness that postpones thinking, as
curiosity that never becomes more than that, as dishonest self-deception, as
effeminate weakness that constantly turns to others, or as superior
negligence, as mindless busyness, etc.68
The demoniac will resort to these faulted behaviors in order to avoid facing up to
the good. Note that this list of characteristics is very similar to those of Heidegger’s
inauthentic Dasein, who has fallen into the world of the “they.”
65 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
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66 Ibid., 165.
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Another sign of the spiritual manifestation of the demonic can be seen in the
lack of two positive attributes: certitude (Visheden) and inwardness (Inderligheden).
These two attributes are actions:
Certitude and inwardness, which can only be reached by and exist in action,
decide whether or not the individual is demonic… arbitrariness, unbelief,
mockery of religion, etc., do not, as is commonly believed, lack content but
lack certitude, in exactly the same sense as superstition, servility, and
sanctimoniousness. The negative phenomena lack certitude precisely because
they are in anxiety about the content.69
What are certitude and inwardness? Haufniensis rarely mentions the former
without the latter, although the latter appears many times without the former.
Certitude is an attribute of inwardness, but not vice versa. He will soon define
them together as “earnestness.” With regards to inwardness: it should not be
confused with the demoniac’s reserve. The latter is a negative withdrawal as an
avoidance of the good, whereas the former is positive form of introspection and
self-reflection. Haufniensis adds this as an attribute of inwardness: “Inwardness
is an understanding, but in concreto it is a matter of how to understand this
understanding.”70 This “understanding of understanding” has a similar construction
to Heidegger’s facticity, that is, “the fact of the fact” of something’s existence.
Haufniensis provides an example: “…to understand what you yourself are saying is
69 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 167.
70 Ibid., 171.
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one thing, understanding yourself in the saying is another.”71 Inwardness can be
taken as a double self-reflection: as self-understanding-understanding.
Haufniensis gives a “schema” for the absence of inwardness which entails
that every form of the absence is “…either activity-passivity or passivity-activity”72
He gives three dyads as examples that exhibit the activity/passivity poles:
unbelief-superstition, hypocrisy-offense, and pride-cowardice.73 The first member
of each dyad corresponds to the second component with the first being the active
component and the second, the passive. These three dyads characterize lack of
inwardness. The activity/passivity aspect is not worth dwelling on here, it is worth
noting how these three examples indicate a lack of the double self-reflection. These
three examples are all directed toward the outward, finite world.
He then introduces the concept of earnestness (Alvor), referring back to
certitude and inwardness: “What are certitude and inwardness? Giving a definition
of inwardness is no doubt hard. But for the time being I shall say that it is
earnestness.”74 Redefining inwardness as earnestness doesn’t seem to help much
however, since “…there is no single definition of earnestness.”75 Haufniensis doesn’t
seem to be too concerned about this because “…with regard to existential concepts
71 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 171.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 174–176.
74 Ibid., 176.
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it always betrays better discretion to abstain from definitions…”76 He does however
classify earnestness as a type of disposition77 (Gemyt), and provides the definition
of disposition as given by Karl Rosencrantz: “…that the feeling unfolds itself to
self-consciousness, and vice versa, that the content of the self-consciousness is felt by
the subject as his own. It is only this unity that can be called disposition.”78 This is
not far from Haufniensis’s previous characterization of inwardness as understanding
of self-understanding. He believes earnestness to be the highest form of the unity
that is a disposition: “Earnestness and disposition correspond to each other in
such a way that earnestness is a higher and the deepest expression of what it is
to be a disposition.”79 How is earnestness the highest form of a disposition? It
has to do with the primitivity (Oprindelighed80) of earnestness: “The disposition
is an immediate property, while earnestness is on the contrary the disposition’s
acquired primitivity, its preserved primitivity in the responsibility of freedom…”81
The primitivity of earnestness is a sign of the eternal, and because of the presence
of the eternal, earnestness can never become mere habit, as Haufniensis states,
76 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 177.
77 c.f. Befindlichkeit in Being and Time as state-of-mind, disposedness, or disposition
78 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
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“The primitivity of disposition… indicates precisely the eternal in earnestness, for
which reason earnestness can never become habit.”82 Habit involves repeating the
same action or attitude again and again. Habit is always in the context of finite
temporality. The corresponding “again and again” in the context of the eternal is
repetition:
…habit arises as soon as the eternal drops out of the repetition. When the
primitivity in earnestness is acquired and kept, there is succession and
repetition, but as soon as primitivity is lacking in the repetition, there is
habit. The earnest man is earnest precisely through the primitivity with
which he returns in repetition.83
The concept of repetition is a central feature of Kierkegaard’s “system” and is
present in several other works, mainly Repetition (1843) and Concluding Unscientific
Postscript (1846). Haufniensis does mention repetition in a very long footnote in
the Introduction to Concept of Anxiety, but refers the reader to “Repetition, a work
by Constantin Constantius (Copenhagen 1843).”84 This is Kierkegaard’s playful
way of citing his other pseudonymous work. Because repetition is so important,
and because it is also a point of connection to Heidegger, we will briefly leave
Concept of Anxiety to examine the salient points of this concept as it is presented in
Kierkegaard’s work, Repetition.
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Repetition
In Part One of Repetition Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Constantin Constantius
introduces repetition in relation to Plato’s idea of recollection: “…for repetition is
a crucial expression for what ‘recollection’ was to the Greeks. Just as they taught
that all knowing is a recollecting, modern philosophy will teach that all life is a
repetition.”85 For Plato, recollection is an essential aspect of the soul’s immortality.
It is how we are able to reacquire knowledge from our past lives. Recollection is
described primarily in the Meno and Phaedo dialogues. In the Meno, recollection
is given as the reason why the slave boy is able to solve the geometrical problem
that Socrates presents to him.86 The boy was never taught geometry, but is able
to arrive at the solution to the problem because he already had the knowledge
through recollection, which is possible because the soul is immortal: “As the soul is
immortal, has been born often and has seen all things here and in the underworld,
there is nothing which it has not learned; so it is in no way surprising that it can
recollect the thing it knew before…”87 In the Phaedo, the fact of recollection is given
as one of the proofs of the immortality of the soul: “…for us learning is no other
than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned
what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul existed somewhere before it
85 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 131.
86 Plato, Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 881–886.
87 Ibid., 880.
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took on this human shape.”88 Both dialogues emphasize recollection as being tied to
the eternal nature of the soul.
With repetition, Constantius recognizes the eternal component of recollection,
but he takes the orientation of recollection towards remembering the past and
turns it towards the future: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement,
except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward,
whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward.”89 Constantius is exploring the
consequences of actually realizing the fact of eternal recollection. One consequence
of turning it towards the future is that one realizes that one’s current existence will
be eternally recollected in the future in the same way that one’s past existence is
recollected in the present. This opening to the eternal nature of repetition removes
temporality and the effects it has in the endless repeating patterns of everyday life.
For instance, the concepts of new and old fall away: “One never grows weary of
the old, and when one has that, one is happy. He alone is truly happy who is not
deluded into thinking that the repetition should be something new, for then one
grows weary of it.”90 Repetition entails openness to possibility, much like Heidegger’s
idea of anticipation. One does not expect novelty in repetition because novelty is
tied to finite temporality and is thus superficial. Constantius considers the case of
life without repetition:
88 Plato, Complete Works, 63.
89 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 131.
90 Ibid., 132.
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Indeed, what would life be if there were no repetition? Who could want to be
a tablet on which time writes something new every instant or to be a
memorial volume of the past? Who could want to be susceptible to every
fleeting thing, the novel, which always enervatingly diverts the soul anew?91
Constantius is claiming that life lived without realizing eternal future-oriented
repetition is merely a tabulation of past events. Life without repetition is also much
more susceptible to trivialities of novelty and the whims of contingency.
Repetition is necessary for full self-realization: “…he who wills repetition
is a man, and the more emphatically he is able to realize it, the more profound a
human being he is.”92,93 The person who does not realize repetition never escapes
the finite and is subject to the ultimate effect of temporality, namely death: “…he
who does not grasp that life is a repetition and that this is the beauty of life has
pronounced his own verdict and deserves nothing better than what will happen to
him anyway—he will perish.”94 Here Constantius points out that the person that
doesn’t realize repetition “deserves” to perish, introducing a moral imperative: one
must realize repetition.
Constantius does not provide a method for realizing repetition, other than
to say that it entails circumnavigating existence: “When existence has been
circumnavigated, it will be manifest whether one has the courage to understand
91 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 132–133.
92 Ibid., 132.
93 c.f. “Anxiety as Saving Through Faith” below where anxiety is the analogue of repetition given
here.
94 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 132.
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that life is a repetition…”95 Again, he does not explain what is meant by this
circumnavigation, we will assume that it involves viewing life sub specie aeternitatis
and seeing one’s whole life and its place in eternity. Although he is not explicit, it
would seem that because of repetition itself, this circumnavigation is not a one-time
event that is ever “completed.” The circumnavigation is continuous. This is apparent
in the fact that one can circumnavigate and still not realize repetition: “The person
who has not circumnavigated life before beginning to live will never live; the person
who circumnavigated it but became satiated had a poor constitution; the person
who chose repetition—he lives.”96 A person can circumnavigate once and then fall
into smug satisfaction at the “completion,” not realizing the eternal repetition of the
circumnavigation. This is opposed to true life through embracing repetition.
According to Constantius, God instantiated repetition, which was essential
for the world to come into existence and for it to maintain its existence: “If God
himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence…
the world continues, and it continues because it is a repetition.”97 Repetition is thus
a metaphysical necessity for Constantius, is it what holds the world together. He
posits repetition as metaphysical earnestness: “Repetition—that is actuality and the
95 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 132.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 133.
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earnestness of existence.”98 A person that realizes repetition in their own existence
has come to maturity: “The person who wills repetition is mature in earnestness.”99
We will end our look at Repetition at this point. Constantius has arrived at
earnestness, which is where we left Concept of Anxiety. Haufniensis was explaining
the difference between habit and repetition in relation to earnestness. Habit takes
place in finite temporality whereas repetition is always in the context of the eternal
and is realized through the primitivity of earnestness.
Haufniensis then further emphasizes the eternal in earnestness by defining
it in terms of inwardness: “But earnestness is something I can also express in
another way. As soon as inwardness is lacking, the spirit is finitized. Inwardness
is therefore eternity or the constituent of the eternal in the human being.”100,101
The understanding, or rather the lack of understanding of the eternal is key to
understanding the demonic: “To study the demonic properly one need only observe
how the eternal is construed in the individuality and one will be immediately
informed.”102 The demonic occurs in individuals that lack a true understanding of the
eternal. They lack inwardness and earnestness: “…anyone who has not understood
98 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling / Repetition, 133.
99 Ibid.
100 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 183.
101 This last sentence is perhaps Kierkegaard’s most succinct statement of the importance of
inwardness in his theology that appears across his entire oeuvre.
102 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 183.
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the eternal correctly, understood it altogether concretely, lacks inwardness and
earnestness.”103
Haufniensis describes how misunderstanding of the the eternal involves at
least four points: that one denies the eternal in man, that the eternal is construed
altogether abstractly, that eternity is bent into time for the imagination, and that
eternity is construed metaphysically.104 The first point has to do with the fear of
eternity, which leads to the demonic: “If the eternal is posited, the present becomes
something other than what one wants. This prompts fear and one is then in anxiety
about the good.”105 Haufniensis believes this kind of fear to be pervasive in his
time. Construing the eternal abstractly posits the eternal as the boundary of the
temporal, which finitizes it. Bending eternity into time also finitizes it and merely
“…produces an enchanting effect.”106 The metaphysical construal of eternity causes
the temporal to become “comically preserved” in it.107 In any case, Haufniensis is
pointing out that people rarely consider eternity in earnest. Haufniensis ends the
chapter by stating, “…eternity is not what people think earnestly about; they are
anxious about it, and anxiety can hit on a hundred evasions. Yet this is precisely
103 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 183.
104 Ibid., 183–184.
105 Ibid., 183.
106 Ibid., 184.
107 Ibid., 185.
184
the demonic.”108 People would prefer to construe any number of rationalizations,
evasions, and excuses in avoidance of eternity rather than to earnestly face up to it.
Anxiety as Saving through Faith
The final chapter of Concept of Anxiety is entitled “Anxiety as Saving
through Faith.” Recall that in the context of anxiety about evil Haufniensis proposed
faith as being the only way to overcome the weakness of repentance. The deficiency
of repentance is that it cannot do away with sin, only “sorrow over it.” In the final
chapter Haufniensis presents faith as the solution to the problem of anxiety. He
reminds the reader of the essential role that anxiety plays in the adventure that is
human existence:
…it is an adventure that every human being has to live through, learning to
be anxious so as not to be ruined either by never having been in anxiety or
by sinking into it. Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has
learned the ultimate.109
Here Haufniensis warns against the pitfalls of 1) not ever being in anxiety (being
spiritless) or, 2) becoming mired in anxiety (anxiety about evil or the good). One
can learn the “right way” to be in anxiety, and this is the desired goal.
While one should avoid “sinking” in to anxiety, the more one appreciates
the depths and profundity of anxiety, the better: “Through being a synthesis the
human being can be made anxious, and the more profoundly, the greater the
108 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 186.
109 Ibid., 187.
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human being.”110 He suggested this idea earlier, in the context of subjective anxiety:
“Anxiety… is an expression of the perfection of human nature…”111 He is careful to
note that “being made anxious” is not to be taken “in the usual sense in which
anxiety is about something external, about something outside a person, but in the
sense that it is the person himself who produces the anxiety.”112 The distinction here
is that in the first case, which is sinking into anxiety, is anxiety about particular
external things, whereas in the second case anxiety is generated by inwardness on
the part of the individual.
He then connects the second type of anxiety with faith: “…this anxiety alone
is, through faith, absolutely formative, since it consumes all finite ends, discovers all
their deceptions.”113 Even though transcending finite trivialities is an ultimate goal,
anxiety through faith is itself by no means to be considered pleasant or easy:
And no Grand Inquisitor has such frightful torments in readiness as has
anxiety, and no secret agent knows as cunningly how to attack the suspect in
his weakest moment, or to make so seductive the trap in which he will be
snared; and no discerning judge understands how to examine, yes,
exanimate, the accused as does anxiety, which never lets him go, not in
diversion, not in noise, not at work, not by day, not by night.114
110 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 187.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., 188.
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This is consistent with Kierkegaard’s view propounded in other pseudonymous
works, e.g., Fear and Trembling and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, that faith
and religion are the most difficult tasks that an individual can undertake. Here
Haufniensis has set up anxiety through faith as tantamount to a form of relentless
torture. Because this anxiety is connected with the eternal through faith, it never
lets up on the individual.
He then shifts to the aspect of this form of anxiety that is related to
possibility: “Anyone formed by anxiety is shaped by possibility, and only the person
shaped by possibility is cultivated according to his infinitude.”115 With the idea
of a person being cultivated by possibility he furthers his idea that an individual
grows into maturity in faith. We are reminded that this anxiety is always directed
inwardly at the eternal,
…one should certainly not be in anxiety about persons, about finitudes; only
someone who passes through the anxiety of the possible is cultivated to have
no anxiety, not because this person can escape the terrible things of life, but
because these always become weak by comparison with those of possibility.116
This is a somewhat confusing statement: earlier he said that the individual is being
cultivated to have the right kind of anxiety, the anxiety of possibility or anxiety
through faith, but here he is saying that someone who passes through anxiety can
grow to have no anxiety. This could be read as saying that the anxiety of possibility
will eventually alleviate all anxiety including the anxiety of possibility itself, which
115 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 188.
116 Ibid., 190.
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would be nonsensical. I read this as saying that the anxiety of possibility will
ameliorate the lesser, finite anxieties which in no way compare to the anxiety of
possibility. We are reminded that some may claim to not be in anxiety or to never
have been in anxiety. In one sense, they are correct in making this claim: “If…
the speaker maintains that the great thing about him is that he has never been
in anxiety, I will gladly provide him with my explanation: that it comes from his
being very spiritless.”117 The spiritless “speaker” here does not realize the necessity
of passing through the anxiety of possibility to be able to truly make the claim that
they are no longer in anxiety about finite trivialities.
Haufniensis changes tack with the warning that at the moment of the
qualitative leap or the instant of formation there is the possibility that the person
will be led away from faith: “If, on the point of being formed, he misunderstands the
anxiety, so that it leads him not to faith but away from it, then he is lost.”118 This is
because the anxiety of possibility is emphatically not altruistic. It is deceptive and
capable of leading the individual in the wrong direction, but the individual who
is already formed is not taken in by this deception. Instead anxiety, even though
terrifying, leads the individual in the right direction:
On the other hand, someone who is already formed remains with anxiety; he
does not allow himself to be deceived by its countless falsifications… The
117 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 190.
118 Ibid., 192.
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attacks of anxiety, even though terrifying, will then not be such that he flees
from them. Anxiety becomes for him a ministering spirit that leads him…119
Instead of fleeing from anxiety, the individual welcomes anxiety and allows it to
expunge all trivial anxieties:
Then, when it announces itself, when it disingenuously makes it look as
though it has invented an altogether new instrument of torture, far more
terrible than anything before, he does not draw back, and still less does he
try to ward it off with noise and confusion, but bids it welcome, greets it
solemnly… Then anxiety enters into his soul and searches out everything, and
frightens the finite and petty out of him.120
There is a slight problem here. It is unclear how someone is “already formed” so that
they would be able to welcome anxiety. There is an initial point of being formed, so
at that point any person could be led toward or away from faith. Once that person
is formed in faith, then they are able to handle further anxiety. Haufniensis has
either overlooked this issue, or is perhaps suggesting that some people, e.g., the
spiritless or the pagans are less likely to be formed in faith at the point of formation.
Haufniensis then reconsiders the issues of fate (in the pagan or immediate
genius) and guilt (in the religious genius). When the individual is formed to faith
anxiety does away with all petty finite anxieties, however then the individual will
come to the stage of trusting in fate, but the anxiety of possibility is also capable of
eradicating this shortcoming: “So when the individual, through anxiety, is formed
to faith, anxiety will then eradicate what it itself produces. Anxiety discovers
fate, but when the individual would entrust itself to fate, anxiety switches around
119 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 192.
120 Ibid.
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and takes fate away…”121 After fate is removed, anxiety finds all guilt related to
finitude: “With faith’s help, anxiety educates the individuality to rest in providence.
So too in respect of guilt, which is the second thing anxiety discovers.”122 Guilt
due to dealings with the finite world are eradicated, but not the objective guilt of
hereditary sin. The finite world cannot educate the individual on anxiety:
From finitude one can learn much, but not how to be anxious, except in a
very mediocre and corrupting sense. Anyone who has truly learned how to be
anxious, on the other hand, will tread as if in a dance when the anxieties of
finitude strike up…123
Haufniensis thus ends Concept of Anxiety, believing he has written a psychological
treatise, and that psychology cannot take the subject of anxiety any further: “Here
this deliberation ends where it began. Once psychology has finished with anxiety, is
to be handed over to dogmatics.”124
In this chapter we have seen how anxiety is involved in the second synthesis
of the self, i.e, of the temporal and the eternal. We first examined anxiety in the
context lacking awareness of sin. This included Haufniensis’s concept of the instant,
which incorporates both temporality and eternity. We saw what absence of anxiety
is like as spiritlessness, and anxiety when there is fixation on finitude and fate.
We also explored the relationship between anxiety and guilt, which also involves
121 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 193.
122 Ibid., 195.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
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finitude. The second context in which anxiety was analyzed was anxiety in terms
of the individual’s sin. This included anxiety about evil, where one is in the good
but anxious about evil, and anxiety about the good or what Haufniensis calls the
demonic, where one is in evil and is anxious about the good. This involved the
exposition of certitude, inwardness, and earnestness. Haufniensis’s final chapter
discussed anxiety’s relationship to faith and how even though true anxiety about
the infinite can be terrifying, it wipes out anxieties about finite things and finally
absolves anxiety about sin.
We have completed our long sojourn through the texts of Being and Time
and Concept of Anxiety. It has hopefully raised questions about the certainty of
Heidegger’s appropriation of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety in Being and Time,
and that the putative appropriation is not so straightforward. In the final chapter
of this work I will examine specific points of similarity and difference between
Heidegger’s concept of anxiety and that of Kierkegaard.
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Chapter VI: Similarities and Differences
How does the concept of Anxiety compare between Being and Time and
Concept of Anxiety? Are they similar enough to say that Heidegger directly
appropriated the concept from Kierkegaard in Being and Time? Would we agree
with McCarthy’s statement that Heidegger followed Kierkegaard “step-by-step” in
the development of anxiety, or would we just say that there is a striking resemblance
between anxiety in the two works but that they differ enough so as to not warrant
the theory that Heidegger’s concept relies solely on that of Kierkegaard? Or,
have we uncovered enough evidence to show that the background contexts and
“sciences” differ so much that the concept of anxiety in the two works could be
called incommensurable? Is Heidegger’s dismissal of Kierkegaard’s work as merely
that of an “ontic science” justified, or even relevant?
In this concluding chapter I will compare specific points about anxiety and
dependent themes between Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety. As noted
in the Introduction, there is a mirrored structure between Division One of Being
and Time and the first two chapters of Concept of Anxiety and between Division
Two and Chapters III–V of Concept of Anxiety.1 Because of this I will make my
1 It is also noteworthy that there is similarity between the Introductions of Being and Time and
Concept of Anxiety. In their Introductions, both Heidegger and Haufniensis write at length about
the “science” in which their respective works should be placed.
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comparisons between anxiety and related themes as they appear in Division One of
Being and Time with Chapters I and II of Concept of Anxiety, and then Division
Two and Chapters III–V.
The mirroring of structure between Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety
appears to be an undocumented appropriation on Heidegger’s part. I claim there is
a similar structure because Division One of Being and Time has to do with Dasein’s
Being-in-the-world and the worldhood-of-the-world. These are the more physical
aspects of Dasein’s existence. This corresponds to Chapters I–III of Concept of
Anxiety which describe the first synthesis, that is, the synthesis of body and soul
through spirit. This is the more physical of the two syntheses. Division Two of Being
and Time has to do with Dasein’s temporality, which corresponds to the second
synthesis of temporal and eternal described in Chapters III-V of Concept of Anxiety.
Division One and the First Synthesis
Division One of Being and Time has to do with Dasein’s physical presence in
and with the world of other entities including other people, equipment, and entities
belonging to the background environment. The first two chapters of Concept of
Anxiety have to do with a person’s embodiment, literally, as the soul synthesized
with a physical body. This is accomplished via the “positing” of spirit.2 Anxiety
2 In the first chapter of Being and Time Heidegger acknowledges the formulation of the “whole
man” as “…customarily taken as a unity of body, soul, and spirit.” (Heidegger, Being and Time,
73–74)
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occurs in both of these contexts, however there are several important differences
in the concepts of anxiety in these first halves of Being and Time and Concept of
Anxiety.
Heidegger begins his study of anxiety by saying that it is a fundamental
state-of-mind or mood. This is an essential attribute of anxiety. If this attribute
were removed, it would not be anxiety. Does Haufniensis ever refer to anxiety as
a mood? In fact, he does not. The only time mood is mentioned in Concept of
Anxiety is in terms of the “mood” of a science, e.g. ethics, psychology, that might
be the proper place for anxiety to be studied. Does Haufniensis ever portray anxiety
as something like an ever-present background state? Recall that in Being and
Time mood is how one finds oneself, or how Dasein is “attuned” to the world. For
Haufniensis, anxiety is indeed always present as objective and subjective anxiety,
but this is a given condition of human existence rather than a mood. Haufniensis
introduces anxiety in the context of innocence and dreaming spirit. Anxiety comes
on the scene when spirit is posited and the first synthesis of body-soul takes place.
This seems nothing like mood or state-of-mind. For Haufniensis anxiety is initially
a kind of tension that occurs when the person is beginning to become self-aware
rather than a mental state that dictates how a person is attuned to the world.
Heidegger’s introduction to anxiety as a state-of-mind emphasizes Dasein’s
thrownness into its world of circumstances. Haufniensis’s initial description of
anxiety does not emphasize this attribute, except perhaps in the case of Adam’s
being thrown into the world and facing his situation and the ambiguity of freedom.
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It is interesting to consider Haufniensis’s version of Adam as “first Dasein,” i.e., as
the first universal representation of self-realization. The issue with entertaining this
notion is that for Haufniensis this self-realization and the anxiety connected with it
is in the primordial situation of the individual’s self-realization in the face of God,
literally, naked before God. Heidegger’s Dasein is never in this extreme situation as
“naked” before itself or the world. Heidegger emphasizes anxiety as Dasein fleeing
in the face of itself and fleeing in the face of the world. For Haufniensis the only
example of fleeing we see is Adam’s naked flight and hiding from God.
So, at least at the outset, the descriptions of anxiety in Being and Time and
Concept of Anxiety are somewhat different. Heidegger’s version is a state-of-mind.
Haufniensis’s version is a consequence of the synthesis of body and soul. Heidegger is
focused on the phenomenon of anxiety and its effects while Haufniensis is concerned
with the provenance of anxiety.
We now get to the central point that is usually cited as proof that Heidegger
appropriated the concept of anxiety from Kierkegaard, i.e, that anxiety is the fear of
nothing. Yes, both Heidegger and Haufniensis make this claim, however it could be
contested that there are two different kinds of “nothing” here. Both Heidegger and
Haufniensis distinguish anxiety from fear, with fear having a definite something as
a threatening object. However, for Heidegger nothing is “nothing in particular” or
indefinite, whereas for Haufniensis it is the nothing, i.e., the metaphysical nothing,
the void, or the abyss of eternity.3 Both concepts of anxiety are associated with
3 This is point is emphasized more in the context of the second synthesis.
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ambiguity, but we saw that the ambiguity also has different meanings4 between the
two works. For Heidegger the ambiguity involved the vagueness of the “object”
of anxiety, which is nothing in particular, for Haufniensis anxiety is caused by
ambiguity itself. The ambiguity is the abyss of freedom which is a terrifying
confusion, as it was in the case with Adam.
Another characteristic of anxiety emphasized by Haufniensis is the
“sympathetic antipathy” of being simultaneously attracted and repulsed by the
nothing. This attribute of anxiety is largely absent in Being and Time. There is
a similar construction with Dasein’s attraction/repulsion to the “they,” and the
repulsion exemplified in fleeing from oneself and the world, but these are not the
same as sympathetic antipathy directed at the nothing. Haufniensis also emphasizes
the idea of the qualitative leap, whereby one realizes the eternal and releases their
grasp on the finite. While there is no “leap” for Heidegger per se, something
resembling it occurs in Division Two in the context of Being-towards-death and the
moment of vision. We will look at that similiarity further below.
Heidegger emphasizes anxiety as it is related to Dasein’s being-in-the-world
with other entities. Anxiety in this context has an “obstinate” character and causes
entities to lose significance. Heidegger also emphasizes anxiety as uncanniness, or
the feeling of not being at home in the world. These are much milder versions
of similar characteristics of Haufniensis’s anxiety. For Haufniensis, the effects of
anxiety are presented in a more violent form, e.g., the terror of Adam. This is
4 No pun intended.
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another difference between the two versions of anxiety, at least in the first halves
of these works: the degree of its intensity. For Heidegger there does not seem to be
much “at stake,” to cause great anxiety. It is just a matter of Dasein’s authenticity.
Dasein could go on living in the world of the “they” quite happily, it seems. Anxiety
is presented as a tepid mood involving how Dasein is attuned to the world, of how
the world it presented and how Dasein reacts to it. For Haufniensis, on the other
hand, it is the individual’s immortal soul that is at stake! Anxiety is a torturous
ordeal of the individual wrestling (in the first synthesis) with being trapped in a
finite, sexual, body that causes the individual to sin and feel guilt.
Obviously one of the central differences in the two versions of anxiety is its
association with sin and guilt for Haufniensis and the absence of these characteristics
for Heidegger. Although, for the latter in Division Two of Being and Time there is
again, a milder form of guilt associated with the call of conscience. For Haufniensis
there is the background objective anxiety of the human race and all of creation
that is the result of hereditary sin, as well as the additional subjective anxiety that
arises from sin in the individual. Heidegger makes no mention of sin since he is
steering clear of theological issues, but he does place great emphasis on fallenness
as an existentiale, or essential existential attribute of Dasein. Even though he
claims that fallenness has nothing to do with the “primal status” of Adam before
the fall, Heidegger’s pervasive state of fallenness and Haufniensis’s objective sin
bear more than a passing resemblance. Haufniensis introduces objective anxiety
as “the eager longing of creation,” a longing for the primal status that Heidegger
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denies. The longing is for the original state of perfection. There no longing like
this in Being and Time except for Dasein’s longing to fall into the “they” world.
Haufniensis’s introduction to subjective anxiety includes his famous motif of anxiety
as the dizziness of freedom. This is described as the extreme vertigo of looking
down into a gaping abyss. While Heidegger does talk about anxiety in terms of
freedom, it is Dasein’s freedom to choose itself, is is not the freedom of leaping into
the eternal. The concept of the leap in Concept of Anxiety does not occur explicitly
in Being and Time, but we will leave that until we address the idea of the instant
and moment of vision below. Much of Haufniensis’s description of subjective anxiety
involved the anxiety of existing in a sexed body, of how anxiety is proportional to
sensuousness, and his perception of the difference in this anxiety between men and
women. Heidegger steers far clear of any mention of sexuality in Being and Time. In
fact, there is very little discussion of the embodiment of Dasein at all. To reiterate,
his form of anxiety in Division One of Being and Time has to do largely with Dasein
having to cope with entities in the world and with Dasein’s fleeing in the face of
itself.
In the first halves of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety we have seen
concepts of anxiety that differ in several ways. Heidegger’s concept has to do with
Dasein’s existence and awareness of itself in a physical world of things and other
people. Haufniensis’s concept has to do with the first moments of an individual’s
formation, of existing in a sinful state in the face of God, and the sinfulness that is
due to being a sexual creature. We have seen similarity in the common idea that
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anxiety is the fear of nothing, but it is not the same “nothing” between the two.
Even though anxiety differs in certain respects between the two works, functionally
it is quite similar: it arises when Dasein or Kierkegaard’s individual encounters
something unknown or unfamiliar. Admittedly, this unknown is much more vast and
extreme for Haufniensis than it is for Heidegger, which is why the former’s version
of anxiety is more violent.
The other concept related to anxiety that bears considerable resemblance
between the two works is Heidegger’s fallenness and Haufniensis’s objective sin.
While Heidegger denies any relationship between fallenness and the Fall, both
fallenness and objective sin are given as an a priori attribute of human existence.
Regardless of the “source” of the fallen state, both Heidegger and Haufniensis agree
that it is a universal condition involving a “longing” for return, although the return
is in opposite directions: for Heidegger it is the misplaced longing to return to the
world of the “they,” while for Haufniensis it is the admirable longing to return to
the primal state of perfection. Let us now see how the resemblance between the two
concepts of anxiety bears out in Division Two of Being and Time and Chapters
III-V of Concept of Anxiety.
Division Two and the Second Synthesis
Division Two of Being and Time has to do with Dasein’s temporality as a
finite being that is aware of its own demise. The central feature of Division Two is
Being-towards-death. Chapters III-V of Concept of Anxiety are concerned with the
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second synthesis of the individual as being temporal and eternal. The main theme
of these chapters is the difference between realizing the eternal or living in the finite.
Heidegger begins Division Two by introducing Dasein’s Being-toward-death
and the anxiety associated with dying. His related concepts here are resoluteness,
and authentic anticipation of the possibility of death. He unites the two in
anticipatory resoluteness. Haufniensis does not emphasize death. As we saw, it is
only mentioned as a footnote to his tenet that “temporality is sin.” For Heidegger
death plays a more important role because he does not “posit” eternal spirit.
Dasein’s existence is decidedly finite. For Haufniensis, the body is the finite aspect,
but once spirit is realized as eternal, death takes on less signifance.
An area of Dasein’s temporality emphasized by Heidegger in the context
of Being-towards-death is the call of conscience and guilt. Haufniensis also talks
at great length about anxiety in terms of guilt. How do the concepts of guilt and
the anxiety associated with it compare between the two? Heidegger specifically
separates guilt from morality. For him, guilt is an a priori condition of Dasein’s
existence—not unlike Haufniensis’s objective sin. It is the “Being-the-basis of a
nullity,” signaling an ontological lacking in Dasein’s existence. The call of conscience
is what causes Dasein to realize guilt. Haufniensis on the other hand, has no qualms
about connecting guilt to morality, for him guilt is the result of sin. Guilt is also
connected with temporality. The pagan, who has no conception of the eternal, also
has no true guilt. It is confusing that Haufniensis’s main discussion of guilt is in the
context of one’s lacking awareness of sin. This is because the “maximum” of guilt is
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not simply being guilty of sin, but is guilt about appearing to be guilty. This guilt
is directed at finite appearances rather than the true guilt that is directed at the
eternal. Genuine guilt occurs when one turns inward and makes the connection with
the eternal.
The final area regarding anxiety in the context of temporality in Being and
Time is the idea of repetition and the instant, and is at a point where Heidegger
cites Kierkegaard. For Heidegger repetition is Dasein’s authentic repeated return to
itself from its fallen state in the world of “the they.” For Haufniensis, repetition is
connected to earnestness. It is the individual’s repeated return to the eternal. In
Kierkegaard’s Repetition, he contrasts repetition with Plato’s concept of recollection.
Both recollection and repetition are directed at the eternal: recollection towards
the past, repetition towards the future. Repetition must be embraced in order for
the individual to achieve true earnestness. Again here, we see that repetition has
essentially the same function between Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety,
except that for Heidegger it is repetition in the finite temporality of one’s lifespan,
whereas for Kierkegaard this limitation is removed.
Heidegger and Kierkegaard share the concept of the instant or moment of
vision. Since this is a point where Heidegger does cite Kierkegaard, it is reasonable
to assume from the outset their respective concepts are similar. For Heidegger
the instance (Augenblick) is the “moment of vision,” the revelatory moment when
anxiety lights up the impossibility of existence based on living with things of the
world and the possibility of authentic existence based on owning up to oneself and
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one’s death. For Haufniensis, the instant (Øieblikket) is also a moment of revelation
on the part of the individual. In addition it is a component of the second synthesis.
Just as in the first synthesis where body and soul are united through spirit, in the
second synthesis the temporal and the eternal are united through the instant. It
occurs in the moment of the leap when the eternal is posited or realized. Heidegger’s
instant has to do with the resolute moment when Dasein realizes the possibility of
owning up to itself and coming to terms with death while living in the “thingly”
world. Haufniensis’s instant is the realization of eternity in the present. Both
concepts have to do with an “earth moving” moment of revelation: Heidegger’s
moment of vision with Dasein’s authenticity and resoluteness, Haufniensis’s instant
with orienting oneself towards eternity. Both are moments of individualization.
There is one case where Heidegger and Haufniensis differ markedly with
regards to anxiety and temporality. This occurs with the theme of fate. For
Heidegger fate is connected to repetition and is an authentic feature in Dasein’s
handing down itself from the past to itself in the present—and again to itself in
the future. That is, Dasein recalls it’s authentic past and takes it up again in the
present. Fate for Heidegger is a positive attribute of authentic Dasein. Fate for
Haufniensis is decidedly negative: it is an attribute of the pagan, a misdirected focus
on finite glories and rewards rather than on the eternal.
Another point of interest in the concepts of anxiety in the respective second
halves of Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety is seen in Haufniensis’s distinction
between anxiety about evil and anxiety about the good. Recall that anxiety about
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evil is being in the good but worrying about evil. Anxiety about the good is
the reverse, i.e., being evil (dwelling in the finite) and worrying about the good.
Haufniensis spends most of his time developing the latter, anxiety about the good,
what he calls the demonic. While Heidegger does not explicitly make the distinction
between anxiety about evil versus anxiety about the good, his version of anxiety in
Division One as fleeing is quite similar to Haufniensis’s anxiety about the good.
There are also other attributes of this form of anxiety that appear in Being and
Time. Chief among these is the characteristic of the “reserve” of the demoniac. This
has to do with “suddenness” or abruptness of broken communication. Heidegger’s
analogue is in reverse, i.e., the “sudden” call of conscience that discloses Dasein and
pulls it out of fallenness. If there were a direct analogue to the call of conscience
in Concept of Anxiety, it would call the demoniac out of his reserved state. This is
essentially the function of the true form of anxiety that occurs in faith.
Haufniensis’s final chapter on faith focuses on the “right” way to be in
anxiety. It offers the solution of the eternal that alleviates the finite anxieties he
presented in Chapters III and IV. The solution of faith shares attributes with
Heidegger’s concept of anticipatory resoluteness especially with the common
attribute of great joy associated with anticipatory resoluteness and with faith.
Again, faith involves the eternal, while anticipatory resoluteness is a kind of finite
“faith” in the possibility of authentically and resolutely facing one’s death.
As we saw in the first halves of their works, in Division Two of Being and
Time and Chapters III-V of Concept of Anxiety we again see that anxiety is
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functionally similar, but differs on several points. Again the similarity stems from
facing a great unknown. For Heidegger it is a more “definite” and final unknown,
i.e., Dasein facing up to its death. For Haufniensis it is again a more vast unknown:
the individual facing up to the eternal. The main difference here in the two concepts
thus involves temporality. Heidegger’s anxiety concerns the finite temporality of
Dasein existence which inevitably ends in death. Kierkegaard’s discusses this kind of
anxiety but dismisses it as as pagan because it does not realize the eternal. Again,
as in the first halves of their respective works there are related themes that share
similarities such as the very close resemblance of repetition between the two works
as well as the nearly identical instant or moment of vision. There is also similarity
seen between anticipatory resoluteness in Being and Time and faith in Concept of
Anxiety.
Conclusion
Now that we have reached the end of our exploration of anxiety and related
concepts in Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety, we return to the question
raised in the Introduction to this work: did Heidegger appropriate Kierkegaard’s
ideas, especially anxiety and related concepts in Being and Time without due
acknowledgement? After all our considerations, the answer is a qualified “Yes.” It is
clear that Heidegger not only appropriated certain functional elements of anxiety
from Kierkegaard, but he also mirrored the general structure of its development in
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Concept of Anxiety in Being and Time. This similarity in structure between the two
works is what I claim to be the most apparent “missed appropriation.”
Why do I qualify my answer concerning the appropriation of anxiety and
related concepts? The qualification has to do with the larger contexts in which
anxiety is presented in the two works. In Being and Time, Heidegger is endeavoring
to get at the nature of Being in general by examining the phenomenon of finite
human existence in a world of finite things and other finite human beings. He
brackets out any consideration of the theological and the eternal. He does this
because these are not things we can experience ontically. On the other hand,
Kierkegaard as the pseudonym Haufniensis describes human existence without
questioning Christian dogmatics. Haufniensis is concerned with existence in terms
of the temporality, or rather the non-temporality, of the eternal. His description of
existence relies heavily on two categories that are absent in Being and Time, namely
spirit and eternity. These are components of the two syntheses: spirit is “posited”
in the “traditional” synthesis of body and soul, while eternity is the predominate
member of the temporal-eternal synthesis. Both syntheses involve “non-ontic”
elements, namely soul (and spirit) in the first synthesis and eternity in the second.
Anxiety has been suggested as the key point of connection between Heidegger
and Kierkegaard by commentators such as Magurshak and McCarthy. Magurshak
suggests that anxiety is a starting point for exploring the Heidegger/Kierkegaard
connection since it is behind nearly every major theme in Being and Time and
Concept of Anxiety. McCarthy is much more forceful in claiming that Heidegger
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followed Kierkegaard “nearly every step-of-the way” in the development of the
concept of anxiety. I agree with the former but not the latter, since there is evidence
supporting the fact the some aspects of anxiety differ between Being and Time and
Concept of Anxiety. As we have seen, for Heidegger anxiety is a state-of-mind that
affects how one interacts with the world and other beings as well as how one faces
self-awareness and death. For Kierkegaard anxiety stems from the sexual nature of
the body as well as the individual’s facing the freedom of the eternal. Heidegger’s
version of anxiety is quite mild relative to Kierkegaard’s which can be terrifying and
torturous. Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard agree that there is a “right” way to be
in anxiety. This proper form of anxiety for Heidegger leads Dasein to resolutely own
up to itself and face death. The true form of anxiety for Kierkegaard is the anxiety
of facing eternity which will lead to saving through faith and release the individual
from all finite concerns.
Is one version of this kind of true anxiety “better” than the other? What
about the commensurability issue? Can the two concepts be compared if Heidegger’s
version never escapes the realm of the finite while Kierkegaard’s is focused on the
eternal? Heidegger discredits Kierkegaard for operating in the metaphysical realm
that cannot be ontically verified. Kierkegaard’s purpose is to show the importance
of realizing the eternal and let all anxiety stem from that source. For him the finite
world and finite body can indeed cause anxiety, but it is not the true anxiety of
the eternal. Kierkegaard would almost certainly classify Heidegger’s approach as
pagan, since it has no conception of the eternal. Perhaps the question of whether
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one version of anxiety is better than the other should be formulated as whether one
of these forms is actually possible and/or sustainable? It seems nearly impossible in
either case to keep up the vigilance required to live a life of complete authenticity
or to always be focused on the eternal. Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard allow that
the individual will fall back into either the “they” world or into the wrong kind of
finite anxieties. Both have the concept of repetition whereby the individual returns
to reclaim authenticity or the eternal. The true form of anxiety for both Heidegger
and Kierkegaard has a similar function: it holds the person to what they “ought” to
do in terms of facing up to either their finitude in the case of Heidegger or facing
the eternal in the case of Kierkegaard. Heidegger’s form of true anxiety could be
construed as a secularized form of Kierkegaard’s, however it may be more accurate
to say that Heidegger’s form is a finitized form of Kierkegaard’s anxiety.
Is Heidegger’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s work as being merely that of an
ontic science justified? Yes, according to both of their definitions of science in
their respective Introductions. I do not think Kierkegaard would object to this
criticism. However, in my opinion Kierkegaard crosses the boundary of the science
he calls psychology when he posits the eternal in the second synthesis. At that
point his analysis is no longer merely a “psychological deliberation.” Because he
analyses anxiety in terms of the eternal, his analysis “transcends” that of Heidegger.
Apparently Kierkegaard takes for granted that human beings do have an “ontic”
experience of the eternal whereas Heidegger does not. This is apparent in his
statement, “Every human life is religiously arranged. Wanting to deny this confuses
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everything and cancels the concepts of individuality, race, and immortality.”5 While
we cannot go into an explanation of this statement at this point, we will equate
“religiously arranged” with realization of the eternal. Kierkegaard sees this as
an a priori condition of existence, but Heidegger denies it because he believes it
is not ontically verifiable. Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety takes the extra step
of examining it in terms of the eternal, whereas Heidegger’s analysis “ends” with
Dasein’s death.
Why did Heidegger appropriate anxiety and related themes without due
credit to Kierkegaard? As we saw in Chapter 1 of this work, it is clear that
Heidegger was conflicted regarding his identity as a theologian or as a philosopher.
He preferred to be identified as a philosopher, but he felt he was being perceived
as a theologian. Heidegger was exposed to Kierkegaard early on in his teaching
career and was greatly interested in the latter’s ideas, however when Kierkegaard’s
thought became faddish at Freiburg and Marburg and Heidegger was inundated
with lackluster students who wanted to study Kierkegaard with him, he tried to
disassociate himself from Kierkegaard. It is not terribly surprising that he would
“accidentally” omit references to Kierkegaard in Being and Time. Even though he
duly references Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, and Nietzsche,
among others, his lack of adequate references to Kierkegaard can be attributed to
the situation described above. He was trying to distance himself from Kierkegaard
5 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View
of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, 127.
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in order to avoid being labelled a theologian, and also to avoid association with
what he thought to be a inferior area of scholarship. It is not controversial to say
that Heidegger’s character was flawed. Apparently he could not live up to his own
standard of authenticity. His omission of suitable credit to Kierkegaard is perhaps
another sign of this failing, indeed it can be seen as Heidegger’s “falling” into the
world of the “they.”
Before ending this work it is worth reconsidering the first two words of
its title, “Missed Appropriations.” In the Introduction I suggested that there are
two senses to this phrase, the first being that there were appropriations made by
Heidegger from Kierkegaard that have been missed by the Heidegger/Kierkegaard
scholarship, and the second that Heidegger “missed” certain key aspects of
Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety that leave the former’s version lacking in some
way. We have certainly seen enough evidence to support the first sense, especially
with regards to the strikingly similar structure by which anxiety is developed in the
two halves of Concept of Anxiety and Being and Time respectively. This significant
appropriation is something that has been “missed” in the Heidegger/Kierkegaard
scholarship to date. In support of the second sense of missed appropriations, we have
also seen ample evidence that there are additional aspects of Kierkegaard’s version of
anxiety that Heidegger overlooked, either intentionally or accidentally. Kierkegaard’s
version goes farther in analyzing anxiety in terms of human embodiment and
human existence in the face of the eternal. His version fully embraces the “terror”
of anxiety whereas Heidegger’s version plays down or even fails to mention this
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extreme. Hopefully we have seen enough in the close examination of the texts of
Being and Time and Concept of Anxiety to quiet those who say that Heidegger’s
concept of anxiety and related themes are practically identical. We have also
seen enough evidence to show those who claim that there was only a passing
resemblance in anxiety between the two works to be incorrect. As far as “freeing”
Kierkegaard from Heidegger, it has been shown that Kierkegaard’s analysis of
anxiety is the more complete of the two and has several significant aspects that
go further and are outside of Heidegger’s analysis. This should aid in seeing the
strength of Kierkegaard’s analysis as standing on its own. Regardless, under
any consideration, it would have been better for Heidegger and for subsequent
Heidegger and Kierkegaard scholarship if Heidegger had been more forthcoming in
his acknowledgement of Kierkegaard’s influence in Being and Time.
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